amined a few facts inductively, they have found it convenient to frame them into a theory, by which they could explain other phenomena; thus they have insensibly departed from their maxim, until at length, they use hypotheses in the place of facts. Probably the task upon their time, patience, and intensity of thought, was too great to be continued, as long as was necessary to complete their system. But some have written with a view to refute a certain error, which has been so constantly associated in their thoughts while writing, that every illustration seems carefully adapted to that specific object; without regarding the sources whence the arguments have been derived. Our countryman, Edwards, has given to the world a specimen of patient research and intense thought, in his "Treatise on the Will." But he has not rigidly applied the principle under consideration to the method of his investigations. Having his mind intensely fixed on his object, the refutation of a certain error, he has used arguments drawn from facts and from hypotheses, without discrimination of their source; only taking care that they should answer his purpose, in prostrating the system which he opposed. This could be plausibly and forcibly done, in many instances, by hypotheses, because the error which he opposed was a mere hypothesis. The same may be said of almost all the writers on the phenomena of mind. With the exception of a few facts industriously arranged and classified, which will stand the test of all examination, the systems of mental science may be properly considered a collection of hypotheses, one giving place to another, as successive writers have employed them-sometimes with little, but often with no improvement in the stock of knowledge. Frequently they have been mischievous in their application to the

subject by perverting facts; and they have always hindered the progress of mental science. Almost all metaphysicians have too much attachment to some favourite associations and classifications of thoughts, with which their minds become familiar. Those few associations embrace the first principles of their scheme, which they find useful in solving other phenomena. Their minds soon become charmed with the principles, and their application in solving difficulties; they save much laborious thinking; a fine theory is adopted, and their system is completed under its influence. Such have hitherto been the course and results of mental research; and such will ever be the state and character of mental science, discordant and unfixed, until there shall arise some man who will examine the subject inductively throughout, and furnish the world with the results, expressed in terms of precision, and a style of clearness in illustration, not yet attained-Hypotheses and theories must be laid aside, and facts alone must guide.

A work on this subject, such as we need, would require a mind of strong intellectual power, well disciplined to accurate thought, to patient and persevering investigation; and then its possessor must devote years of labour and revision to the system. Hitherto, this department of science has not been made the main object of any man's study during a whole life, as natural phi losophy and the mathematics have been of many men. In these latter branches of science, the facts are classed, the terms are fixed, and every man who reads and thinks, can compare the facts and examine the system. If any new discovery be made, it is carefully disposed and arranged in its place, and real advancement is made in the science. Every improvement becomes common property, and when it is announced, every lover of the sci

ence can make himself master of the whole process by which the discovery was made: because he is led by the hand every step. But it is otherwise in mental philosophy; few things are fixed, and classifications are various and multiplied, producing confusion and doubt. If one hypothesis be swept away, and a real improvement be made by any individual, another cannot receive it without a process of thought as intense, and almost as original, as that by which the discovery was made. All other branches of science can now be studied under the guidance of books, without perplexing hypotheses, and the result is satisfactory, because it is obvious truth; but in this, original thought and independent examination are necessary, to arrive at any satisfactory and valuable result. Perhaps there will always, from its nature, be less precision and more discordant opinions in this, than in almost any ether department of knowledge. We can enter at once into the possession of Newton's discoveries, because the whole process is placed before us; but in mental science only the result is seen, without the process. The object cannot be attained without fixed attention to unembodied thoughts, and evanescent feelings of one's own mind. If we had, therefore, a correct and thorough system of metaphysicks, it is doubtful whether the majority of students would compare the classifications with the facts, and examine thoroughly the phenomena of mind; and unless this be done, hypotheses are likely to be preferred to truth, and much confusion to remain in the minds of those who adopt them.

It may be observed here, that almost all the writers on mental philosophy have attempted, not only to classify the phenomena of mind, but also the materials of knowledge, with their relations, associations, and similarity. This has led them into so wide a field of investigation

that their discussions become too complex and indefinite. It is true that the names of mental exercises are, many of them, derived from the external objects to which they relate: and there is undoubtedly an intimate connexion between mental science and logical discussions. But it seems to us important that they should be examined distinctly, for the sake of truth and accuracy. We would not undervalue dialectics, but let every branch of science be in its place, and its elements be carefully examined by themselves. When once the elements of the two branches are thoroughly examined and well settled, then let their relation and connexion be illustrated, for the improvement and use of both.

After all that has been said of the inductive method, there is an important question to be settled, viz. by what standard shall we estimate the phenomena of mind; or how shall we pursue the inductive. method of investigation? To this inquiry we answer, by our own consciousness and the revelation of God.

By our own consciousness. Every man must of necessity employ and trust his own consciousness in this investigation. investigation. If this should deceive him when properly employed, there is no remedy; because this is the last resort and the highest tribunal of truth, in the cases appropriately within its sphere. Here every man will and must trust his consciousness, rather than all other testimony, and it may be in opposition to all other evidence. But when the body and mind are in a healthful state, consciousness will not deceive us. There may, indeed, be some mental illusions and wrong associations, which may become habitual, and serve to mislead in some mental investigations; but even here, rigidly inductive appeals to consciousness, afford the only prospect of expelling the illusion, and correcting the habit.

We do not now enter on the examination and discussion of consciousness, to decide the question, whether it be a distinct faculty of mind, a mere feeling, a mere intellectual exercise, or a combination of both feeling and apprehension. This question will be considered in its place, when we examine the phenomena of mind, or elements of the science. It seems necessary to advert to the fact, in this place, that the mind does take cognizance of its own acts. Whatever this may be called, and however the knowledge may be attained, the fact is most certain and needs no proof. Indeed if it should be alleged that it is necessary to prove to a man that he is conscious of his own mental acts, we should not know what arguments to employ. We might describe his mental exercises, and state their results in external conduct, but this would only be evidence of his consciousness to others, not to himself. The most it could do would be to recal to his mind the facts in their connexion. The proof is in his own mind-it must be intuitive, the fact itself. Intuitive truths and simple ideas do not admit of being made more certain, or more plain, by argument or illustration, We may describe them, and illustrate their use, but beyond this we cannot go. These things being premised, we say that all mental phenomena, in order to be understood and classed, must come under the cognizance which the mind takes of its own acts. Every illustration and every definition, must accord with consciousness. Now it would seem from the nature of the case, that there might be more certainty in the knowledge of mind than of matter. All our knowledge of matter is through the medium of the senses, the cognizance which they take of the properties belonging to material substances. We do not suspect our senses of deceiving us, and yet illusions are sometimes so comVOL. IX. Ch. Adv.

plete, that for a time we are deceived. In such cases, a second experiment sometimes dispels the illusion, and sometimes it is dispelled by analogical reasoning, or by opposing and audible testimony. After all we must be guided by our senses, properly employed, in all matters which come appropriately under their cognizance. In this illustration, and throughout this article, we use terms in their popular import, and according to common usage, without attempting their analysis. sciousness must be our guide, in acquiring knowledge of all those things which appropriately come under its cognizance. There may be some difficulty in certain cases, to determine what belongs to its sphere, but in such cases the question respects more particularly the relations, not the elements-the connexion and influence of mental acts, and not the acts themselves.

So we say con

The revelation of God, is also our guide in this investigation. In the moral estimate of our mental relations, this furnishes our standard, and may not be contravened. In the elements of mental science this standard corresponds with consciousness. He, who formed the mind and governs it, has given a revelation of his will, adapted to man's mental state and character. This all will admit, who accredit his revelation. That He, who knows what is in man, not only knows how to adapt his instructions to his case, but has done so, is secured by his goodness. And what is thus secured, appears in fact upon the face of the document which he has sent us. Let us be understood on this part of the subject.

The fair grammatical interpretation of the revelation will be found to correspond with the result of induction, pursued according to consciousness, so far as both relate to the same things. But here it should be remembered, that mental philosophy, founded on hypotheses, is a

very dangerous guide in the interpretation of the holy scriptures. The interpreter of scripture should ascertain the mind of the Holy Spirit, according to correct philological principles: then, if the true meaning be ascertained, and it correspond not with the views he has taken of mental phenomena, he should suspect the correctness of his mental investigation, and rigidly scrutinize every step in the analysis. We may be sure that the descriptions which God has given, of the human mind and its exercises, correspond with the facts; and if we are guided by consciousness in our mental analysis, the result will be the same.

It is true that God's revelation was not given for the purpose of teaching men a system of mental science. It was not necessary that he should reveal directly the facts which we know, or which we may know, from our own consciousness. But it is also true that, in the development of man's moral character, relations and responsibilities, the whole mental phenomena are directly or indirectly involved. Not that we believe every thing properly belonging to mental science, will be found in the Bible; but all the elements are there, and should be regarded as fixed principles. They should be well understood, correctly defined, and never invaded by theories of any kind. We do believe that correct philology, and an appropriate application of grammatical principles to the interpretation of the scriptures, will furnish data sufficient to correct our speculations in mental philosophy. This will be done by settling correct principles, and compelling us to adopt the inductive method of investigation. The sum of the matter is this: revelation does not teach directly, nor was it needed so to teach, mental science; but it recognises the principal facts of mental phenomena, in such a manner as to furnish sufficient principles to

guard us against hypothetical theories, and guide us in the pursuit of truth.

We have but one remark more at present, on the method of studying the science; and that is, a caution against analogical reasoning in the investigations. The human mind. loves analogy, and whenever its use is appropriate, it is certainly a forcible, as well as an agreeable method of illustration. Whenever analogies are judicoiusly selected and properly applied, they give life, vigour and permanence to impressions, which are otherwise rarely attained. But they are inadmissible in the investigations of the exact sciences, and of mental philosophy. Who would think of teaching the mathematicks by analogies taken from political discussions, or from any source whatever? It would be equally absurd to attempt analogical deductions, in classing mental phenomena, or in examining the facts under inspection and analysis. We must therefore be cautious how we apply the same mode of reasoning to mind, which is applicable to the body and its senses. We cannot prove by analogy, that the mind consists of parts or numbers; nor because the body has several senses, some of which may be destroyed and the rest remain perfect, may we infer that the same is true of the mind. The mind must be examined by itself, in all its phenomena: and no proof, argument, or classification can be analogically established. Nothing except facts, and those belonging to the department itself, can be trusted. In the abstract science of mental phenomena, we must be very cautious how we admit analogies. The inductive method, under the guidance of consciousness and the word of God, affords the only prospect of safety and truth. All other methods will perplex and may grossly deceive us.

We have been the more prolix in this article, because we think many

have been misled by their method of investigation; and others have been disgusted by the bewildering hypotheses and perplexing analogies, so often and so improperly employed in the discussion of this subject. We feel confident that a successful application of those principles which we have attempted to describe, to the method of investigation, will be both useful and safe. F.

FOR THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

The article on the doctrine of imputation in the July number of the Biblical Repertory, I read with great satisfaction. It presents a luminous and correct exhibition of that important truth. It ought to be widely circulated. I feel, how ever, apprehensive that from the brief notice taken of President Edwards, in that article, the reader may receive a wrong impression of what has been taught by that great man, on this important doctrine. It has led me to examine with some care his work on original sin; and if you will grant me a few pages in your useful miscellany, I will endeavour to present a fair and fuller exhibition of his sentiments.

I. Original sin, in Edward's view, comprehended not only innate depravity, but the imputation of Adam's first sin.

In the very first sentences of his treatise, he says-"By original sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the innate sinful depravity of the heart. But yet, when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, as to include not only the depravity of nature, but the imputation of Adam's first sin; or, in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that sin. So far as I know, most of those who hold one of these have maintained the

other; and most of those who have opposed one have opposed the other. And it may perhaps appear in our future consideration of the subject, that they are closely connected, and that the arguments which prove the one, establish the other, and that there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one, than the other."

"I shall, in the first place, consider this doctrine more especially with regard to the corruption of nature; and as we treat of this, the other will naturally come into consideration, in the prosecution of the discourse as connected with it.”—I quote from Dwight's edition.

II. President Edwards proves innate depravity of heart to be universal. No quotations are needed to support this particular. Every one, having the slightest acquaintance with his work on original sin, will allow at least the fact, that he attempts to establish this important truth.

III. He endeavours to show, that the imputation of Adam's first sin is taught WITH GREAT PLAINNESS in holy scripture.

"As this place" (referring to Rom. v. 12-21) "in general is very full and plain, so the doctrine of the corruption of nature derived from Adam, and also the imputation of his first sin, are both clearly taught in it. The imputation of Adam's one transgression, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured that by ONE MAN'S SIN, death passed upon all; all being adjudged to this punishment, as having sinned (so it is implied) in that one man's sin. And it is repeated over and over, that all are condemned, many are dead, many made sinners, &c., by ONE MAN's offence, by the disobedience of ONE, and by ONE offence. And the doctrine of original depravity is also here taught, when the apostle says, by one man sin entered into the world; having a plain respect (as hath been shown) to that