signifies, rash and indiscreet in assenting and dissenting; people that speak and do foolishly, because they speak and do without deliberation. Pride. 14. Καταφόνησίς τις πλὴν αὑτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ; ' a despising of others, if compared with ourselves:' so Theophrastus* calls it. Concerning which we are to judge ourselves by the voices of others, and by the consequent actions observable in ourselves any thing whereby we overvalue ourselves, or despise others; preferring ourselves, or depressing them in unequal places or usages, is the signification of this vice; which no man does heartily think himself guilty of, but he that is not; that is, the humble man. A particular of this sin is that which is in particular noted by the Apostle, under the name of aλaloveía, 'arrogance,' or 'bragging;' which includes pride and hypocrisy together: for so Plato defines it to be, ἕξις προσποιητικὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων, ‘a pretending to excellences which we have not;' a desiring to seem good, but a carelessness of being so; reputation and fame, not goodness, being the design. To this may be referred ‘emulations;' λo, so the Apostle calls them; 'zeals,' it signifies immoderate love to a lawful object: like that of the wife of Ajax in Sophocles: ἴδετε τὴν ὁμευνέτιν Αἴαντος, ὃς μέγιστον ἴσχυσε στρατοῦ, She did him most strange, zealous services, as if her affection had no measure. It signifies also violent desires of equalling or excelling another for honour's sake, ambition and envy mixed together: it is a violent pursuit after a thing that deserves it not. A consequent of these is, Aixоoraría, aipéoç. Seditions, or Schisms and Heresies. Διχοστασίαι, αἱρέσεις. 15. That is, divisions in the church upon diversity of opinions, or upon pride, faction, and interest, as in choosing bishops, in prelations and governments ecclesiastical, from factious rulers, or factious subjects; which are properly 'schisms,' "but use commonly to belch forth into heresy:" Ajax. 501. Lobeck. p. 29. Kap. x. Astii. p. 29. 1 according to that saying, "Plerumque schisma in hæresin eructat." An Evil Eye. 16. That is, a repining at the good of others; 'envy,' a not rejoicing in the prosperity of our neighbours; a grieving because he grieves not. "Aut illi nescio quid incommodi accidit, aut nescio cui aliquid boni:" When good happens to another, it is as bad as if evil happens to himself. Ω τῆς μεγίστης τοῦ φθόνου πονηρίας This is one of the worst of crimes, for a man to hate him that is prosperous; hate him whom God loves or blesses.'It bears part of its punishment along with it: the sin hath in it no pleasure, but very much torment. "Nam sese excruciat qui beatis invidet." A part of this is unthankfulness"; those who do not return kindnesses to others, from whom they have received any, neither are apt to acknowledge them: which is properly an envying to our friend the noblest of all graces, that of charity; or it is pride or covetousness, for from any of these roots this equivocal issue can proceed. Lovers of Pleasures. 17. Such who study and spend their time and money to please their senses; ―rarum, ac memorabile magni Gutturis exemplum, conducendusque magister": Rare epicures and gluttons, such which were famous in the Roman luxury, and fit to be presidents of a Greek symposiac, not for their skill in philosophy, but their witty arts of drinking. Ingeniosa gula est. Siculo scarus æquore mersus Ad mensam vivus perducitur P Sensual men :'-Such who are dull, and unaffected with the things of God, and transported with the lusts of the lower belly; persons that are greedy of baser pleasures". Ὁ ἄδικος αὐτῷ πλέον τῶν ἡδέων νέμει, said the scholiast upon Stob. Floril. tit. 38. n 2 Tim. iii. 2. • Jav. ii. 113. Rupert. P Petron. c. 119. Anton. p. 371. 4 Alex. Aphrod. in lib. de Anim. Aristotle : "The wicked man allows to himself too large a portion of sweet things." Liquorishness is the common word to express this vice in the matter of eating and drinking. Busy Bodies. 18. That is, such who invade the offices, or impertinently obtrude their advice and help, when there is no need, and when it is not liked, nor out of charity, but of curiosity, or of a trifling spirit: and this produces talking of others,' and makes their conversation a scene of censure and satire against others; never speaking of their own duty, but often to the reproach of their neighbours, something that may lessen or disparage him. The Fearful, and the Unbelievers. 19. That is, they that fear man more than God, that will do any thing, but suffer nothing, that fall away in persecution; such who dare not trust the promises, but fear want, and fear death, and trust not God with cheerfulness, and joy, and confidence. Συνευδοκοῦντες τοῖς πράσσουσι. They that take pleasure in those that do these things. 20. That is, they who in any sense encourage, or promote, or love the sin of another, are guilty themselves; not of the other's sin, but of their own. He that commands a man to swear, is not guilty of that swearing, but of that commanding him. It is a sin to do so; but that sin to which the man is encouraged, or tempted, or assisted, is his own sin, and for it he is to repent; every man for his own. For it is inartificially said by the masters of moral theology, that by many ways we are guilty of the sins of others: by many ways indeed we can procure them to sin; and every such action of ours is a sin, against charity and the matter of that commandment in which the temptation was instanced: but their sin is not ours; their sin does not properly load us, neither does our being author of it, excuse them. It was the case of Adam and Eve, and the serpent, who yet did every one bear their own burden. Aristotle, Zeno, and Chrysippus, were notorious in this kind. "Non est enim immunis à scelere, qui ut fieret imperavit, nec est alienus a crimine, cujus consensu licèt a se non admissum crimen, tamen pub lice legitur," said St. Cyprian'. He that commands, and he that consents, and he that delights, and he that commends, and he that maintains, and he that counsels, and he that tempts, or conceals, or is silent in another's danger, when his speaking will prevent it, is guilty before God. "Corrumpere, et corrumpi sæculum vocatur." This evil is of a great extent, but receives its degrees according to the influence or causality it hath in the sins of others. 21. These I have noted and explicated, because they are not so notorious as others, which have a public name, and filthy character, and easy definition: such as, adulteries, fornication, drunkenness, idolatry, hating of God and good men, perjury, malicious lies, Kaì Tà ToLaura, as St. Paul adds, “and such-like," these and those and all that are like these, exclude us from the kingdom of heaven. They are "the works of the flesh;" but these which are last reckoned are such which all the world condemns, and they are easily discerned, as smoke, or a cloud upon the face of the sun but the other are sometimes esteemed innocent, often excused, commonly neglected, always undervalued. But concerning all these, the sentence is sad and decretory. "They that are such, shall not inherit the kingdom of heavent:" but "they shall have their part in the lake, which burneth with fire and brimNow if we list to observe it, many of these are such which occur so frequently in our daily conversation, are so little noted and so confidently practised, that to try men concerning their hopes of heaven by such measures, would seem strange, and hard: but it is our faults that it is so; these are the measures of the sanctuary, and not to be prejudged by later and looser customs. SECTION II. Whether every single Act of these Sins puts a Man out of 22. In this question, by a single act, I mean, a deliberate act, a wilful, observed, known act; for concerning acts by surprise, by incogitancy, by imperfection, I shall give a spe r Epist. 21. Gal. v. 21. t1 Cor. vi. 10, "Rev. xxi. 8. cial account in a chapter on purpose. To this therefore I answer by several propositions. 23. I. There are some acts of sin so vile, and mischievous, that they cannot be acted but by a great malice or depravation of the will; and do suppose a man to be gone a great way from God before he can presumptuously or wilfully commit any of them; such as are idolatry, wilful murder, adultery, witchcraft, perjury, sacrilege, and the like: such which by reason of their evil effect are called "peccata clamantia ad Dominum," "crying sins;" as, oppressing widows, -entering into the fields of the fatherless,-killing a man by false accusation,-grinding the face of the poor,-some sort of unnatural lusts: or such which by reason of their scandal, and severe prohibitions of them, and their proper baseness and unholiness, are "peccata vastantia conscientiam," "they lay a man's conscience waste;" such are all these that I have now reckoned. Now concerning every one of these there is amongst wise and good men no question, but every act of them is exclusive of a man from all his hopes of heaven, unless he repent timely and effectually. For every act of these is such as a man cannot be surprised in the commission of it; he can have no ignorance, no necessity, no infirmity, to lessen or excuse his fault; which, because it is very mischievous in the event, expressly and severely, and by name forbidden, is also against holiness, and against charity, against God, and against the commandment, so apparently, that there is nothing to lessen them into the neighbourhood of an excuse, if he that commits them, have a clear use of reason. Some acts of other sins are such, which as as they are innocent of doing mischief to our neighbour, so they are forbidden only in general; but concerning the particular there is not any express certainty, as in drunkenness; which though every Christian knows to be forbidden, yet concerning every particular act, it is not always so certain that it is drunkenness, because the acts partake of more and less; which is not true in murder, in adultery, apostasy, witchcraft, and the like: besides which, in some of the forbidden instances there are some degrees of surprise, even when there are some degrees of presumption and deliberation, which in others there cannot be. Upon which considerations it is apparent, that the single acts of these greater |