a religious sense. Each of these capacities lifts him above the level of the lower animals, and each is capable of indefinite rising to higher planes. For who that looks at the history of mankind can deny this progress ? Individuals undoubtedly have in every age existed who reached the loftiest standards. Enoch walked with God. Socrates and Plato taught an exalted morality, one might say a Christian doctrine. But Socrates was slain by the Athenian State because of his teaching. In Greece and in Rome there was high civic virtue but very low personal morality, and nothing that could be called recognition of a true God. Slowly, and with difficulty, these ideas grew through the following ages, and undoubtedly they have become in the present day more generally diffused in civilisation than at any former time. It is true that knowledge grows but wisdom lingers, yet it cannot be said that wisdom stands altogether still. Public opinion is saner and sounder now than it has ever been before, although we must still admit that it is far from having reached a satisfactory development.

The highest reach of wisdom, the understanding of the real nature of God, has also unquestionably made some progress. Compare it in heathen

CHAP. IV]

LIMITED BY BRAIN

61

countries, compare even the conceptions of the Jews with the modern ideas under the Christian dispensation, and the advance is manifest. It is perhaps most manifest in the fact that we tend to reject the dogmatic formulas which in former ages cramped and distorted our apprehension of the Divine Being. Thus advancing in understanding of Him, it may truly be said that we are approaching nearer to His image.

It may, however, be observed that the intellect in man, which is his spirit, operates necessarily through his body. In some mysterious way the mind communicates sensations to the brain, and by a reverse process the sensations communicated by external objects to the brain reach the mind. As therefore the brain and nervous system are the organs of communication, the nature and extent of the communication depend in some measure upon their ability to act. Thus in the highest degree the intellectual power is limited by the capacity of the brain, and in every lower degree it may be still more limited. We know even that a mental state resembling idiocy may be caused by pressure on the brain, and may be relieved by removing the pressure. It follows that since we know the mind only by its operation through the brain, the true mind

may be concealed or even perverted by an abnormal condition or structure of the brain. This important truth may give us hope that in the infinite wisdom and love of the Almighty physical condition will be taken into account in judging of human defects, or even sins; and that what seems to us depravity of mind may at least sometimes arise from deformity of brain, and may hereafter disappear with the removal of the physical cause. The question is beyond our solution, but we know that God is all-merciful.

But the gift of intellect carries with it as a necessary sequence the principle of Freedom of the Will. For the will is directed by the intellect, and the intellect weighs the motives that incline to either side in every question, and decides which of them is preponderant. Herein lies one of the distinctions between instinct and reason. Instinct suggests only one course-generally it is the bestbut it is not founded on experience, for the young of animals show it without any experience; nor on reflection, for it operates instantaneously; nor on judgment, for it is irrespective of the immediate circumstances. But reason learns by experience, it contrasts opposing considerations, it weighs the

CHAP. IV] FREEDOM OF THE WILL

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future as well as the present, it varies according to the actual needs of the moment, and the action adopted is the result of all these mental operations. Freedom to select the action is therefore a necessary result or complement of the processes of intellect, and in this respect also man is made after the likeness of God.

But this proposition has been denied on two grounds: firstly, metaphysical, resting on the argument that every mental determination is necessarily suggested by the antecedent operation of the mind; and secondly, theological, resting on the argument that God has foreseen all events, and that therefore man cannot change them. The former, or metaphysical, argument is too abstruse to be discussed here. But the theological argument may be met by the question: What if God has chosen not to foresee the determination which a man's will may take in the exercise of its freedom of choice? There is no insurmountable obligation laid on the Omnipotent to fix human actions beforehand. We acknowledge that if he so wills He can enforce His will. But if He determines not to will, what is there to be said against it? To deny that He can refuse to will is to deny His omnipotence, it is to make even Him a slave to necessity. We

But we can

that we will

ourselves know that in the case of a servant we can will that he shall perform a certain act, and that if we so will, it will be performed. 'I say to this man, Do this, and he doeth it.' also, in our plenary authority, decide leave it to his discretion or choice; and, in that case, we do not know whether he will do it or not. So also may not God choose to leave it uncertain even to Himself, because He chooses to leave it to the human will ?

The best answer to both these doubts is, in fact, to be found in our own consciousness. Each one of us knows and feels that he may do an act or not do it as he pleases. He may lift his hand or let it rest at his pleasure. He may look up or keep his eyes fixed on the ground, he may rise or remain seated, he may go to one place or the other, he may do an act or refrain, all as his own will decides. It is true, indeed, that all his acts are subject to God's permission at every moment. The power of action, life itself, is at each instant subject to God's will. But so long as He leaves the power to act, there is every ground for the belief that He leaves the will free to direct our actions, and with that freedom comes inevitably the responsibility for its use.