lies just in this, that we can regard-nay, that to a certain extent we cannot but regard—our own individuality from a point of view in which it has no more importance than other individualities; or, at least, in which all its importance is derived from its relation to the whole of which it is a part. And the poet who said,

"Unless above himself he can

Exalt himself, how mean a thing is man!"

had truly discerned that moral life also is dependent on the transformation of man's individuality by this universal consciousness with which it is linked and bound up.

Now this view of self-consciousness, as objective in spite of its subjectivity, universal in spite of its individuality, necessarily leads to a conception of man, not merely as one of the many existences in the manifold universe, but as the existence in which all the others are summed up, and through which they are to be explained. On one side of his being, indeed, we must regard him as a "part of this partial world,”* and, in this point of view, we can understand his life only in relation to the other things and beings which limit him on every side. Nay, as he is the most complex and dependent of existences, we can only rise to a satisfactory knowledge of him, after we have laid a basis for this knowledge, in the study of the simpler phenomena of the organic and inorganic world. But, on the other hand, the possibility of all this objective science-of this science by man of that which is not man—lies in this, that he is not merely part of the whole, not merely the most complex existence in the whole, but that the universal principle, the principle which gives unity to the whole, manifests itself in him. It is because, as has been said, "Nature becomes conscious of itself in man," that man in his turn can read the open secret of Nature. In spelling out the meaning of Nature and history, he is taking the true way, and indeed the only way, to the knowledge of himself; but this knowledge would be to him impossible if the self-consciousness that makes him man were not also the principle of unity in the objective world. Comte himself has an obscure perception of this truth when he says that, "strictly speaking there is no phenomenon within our experience which is not in the truest sense human; and that not merely because it is man that takes cognizance of it, but also because, from a purely objective point of view, man sums up in himself all the laws of the world, as the ancients truly felt." If Comte had only brought together the subjective and the objective unity-the unity of knowledge, and the unity of existence-both of which he here finds in man, and if he had recognized the necessary relation of the two, he would have reproduced the highest lesson of German idealism. For that lesson is just this, that the subjective unity, the unity of self-consciousness, which is presupposed in all knowledge of experience of the objective world, must at the same time be regarded as the objective principle of * Cf. Mr. Green's Introduction to Hume's Works, § 152. + Pol. Pos. iv. 161 (Transl.).

its existence. The macrocosm, to use an ancient conception, of which Comte somewhere speaks with approval, can be comprehensible only to the microcosm,—which finds in the great world the means of understanding itself, just because in another way it has in itself the key for the understanding of the world. Man can know that which is not in himself, whether individually or generically, because from another point of view there is nothing in which he does not, or may not, find himself.

As a consequence of this, the last science, the science of man, in so far as it is also the science of mind, cannot merely be built upon and added to the sciences that go before it, but must react upon and transform them. For, though the knowledge of man presupposes the knowledge of Nature, yet, on the other hand, the knowledge of Nature which we get, when we abstract from it its relation to man, is imperfect and incomplete. The true view of Nature cannot be attained except by those who regard it in relation to that being who is at once its culmination and its explanation. Or, to put this in another point of view, the intelligence which appears in man is presupposed in every object of the intelligible world. Self-consciousness is, therefore, not an episodic appearance in a world, which is unprepared for it, and which might exist, or be understood, without it. It is the revelation of the meaning of all that went before. What was stated not long since as the modern view of Materialism, that in matter we find the " potency" of life, and even of mind, may be willingly accepted by idealists; for the converse of this proposition is, that mind is the "realization," and therefore the only key to the ultimate nature of matter. Hence all the sciences which treat of the mathematical, physical, chemical, and vital relation of things, must be regarded as hypothetical and imperfect, in so far as they start with an abstraction; for thought, spirit, mind, is implied in them all, and a complete idea of the relations of things cannot be obtained, until we have regarded humanity as, in this point of view, not only the last, but also the first, not merely the end, but also the beginning of nature. In this sense the analytic separation of the sciences from each other and from thought must be modified and corrected in a final synthesis, which is indeed "subjective," in so far as it brings into view the unity of the subject presupposed in all knowledge. But to one who has understood the full meaning of the process, this "subjective synthesis" is also objective; and, indeed, it alone is able to vindicate, while it explains, the limited objectivity of the other sciences.

Now it is Comte's merit that he altogether rejects that false subjective synthesis, which was the natural result of the principles of Locke and Berkeley. Denying the doctrine that we know immediately only the states of our own consciousness, and that, therefore, all science is based upon psychology, he takes his stand at an objective point of view, and arranges the sciences in an objective order, which begins with the inorganic world, and ends with man as the complex of all existences. And, on the other hand, it is also his merit that he sees the necessity of that

true "subjective synthesis" which arises from the reaction of the last science, the science of man, upon those that went before; or, in other words, from the perception that man is not merely the end, but also in a sense the beginning of Nature. But this ultimate correction and re-organization of science from a subjective point of view appears in Comte in a distorted and imperfect form, in a form that leaves "subjective" and "objective" synthesis still opposed to each other, or only gives room for an artificial or external reconciliation between them. For Comte does not recognize the subjectivity implied in our first objective knowledge of the world, and hence, when he introduces the subjective side of that knowledge, he seems to be starting from a new and independent point of view, and not simply to be bringing into clear consciousness what was presupposed in the previous movement of thought. In other words, the subjective synthesis of Comte does not arise from a perception that the subjectivity of men is universal, and therefore objective. On the contrary, he denies the possibility of discovering any principle of unity in the objective world, and maintains that the objective sciences, when left to themselves, tend towards the "régime dispersive" of a wayward and lawless curiosity. Hence the principle of unity which is necessary to bring order and system into our knowledge must be imported into these sciences from without. On this view, we can organize knowledge only in reference to the subjective principle supplied by the altruistic affections, which are innate in man, which bind men together so as to make all humanity through all space and time into one great organism, and which supply a definite end and aim to all the intellectual, as well as to all the active energies of the individual. This subjective principle has, Comte thinks, been the unconscious stimulus of all the efforts of the social and intellectual leaders of men in the past; it has been the source of all that organized co-operation of families and nations on which man's physical and moral progress has depended. Positivism has to make it into the direct and conscious purpose and aim of human endeavour, and thereby to check that vain and wasteful application of man's limited powers, which has prevailed in the past, and especially during the revolutionary period of transition, now coming to an end. Hence Comte condemns, not only the metaphysicians, for their researches into things altogether out of the reach of man, but also the scientific men, for their eagerness to extend the knowledge of their special subjects indefinitely and in any direction suggested by an empty curiosity, without regard to the practical end of all science. The Mathematician, who wastes himself in the discovery of forms and methods which have no known relation to the requirements of physics; the Biologist, who speculates on the origin of species, forgetting how little light such inquiries can throw on the development of man; even the Sociologist, who pursues remote investigations into the history of climate and race, before such studies are made necessary by the practical difficulty of extending the civilization of the West, regenerated by

Positivism, to the populations that are less advanced in civilization"— are all brought under the Comtist anathema as guilty of wasting the small powers of man on questions which are not immediately necessary or useful. "The public and its teachers should always refuse to recognize investigations which do not tend either to determine more precisely the material and physical laws of man's existence; to throw greater light on the modifications which these laws admit, or at least to render the general method of investigation more perfect." "It is necessary that the sciences should in the first instance be studied independently; but this study should in each case be carried only so far as is necessary to enable the intellect to take a solid grasp of the science next above it in the scale, and thus to rise to the systematic study of Humanity, its only permanent field."* With this view, the priests of Positivism are, as we have seen, to have no specialists among them; nor, indeed, any, who will devote their lives to scientific investigation alone; except, it may be, a few distorted and unbalanced natures, in whom an abnormal tendency to intellectual pursuits has stunted the growth of the moral sympathies. To make scientific men renounce the intellectual life as an end in itself, and to direct all their energies to the solution of those problems which seem to have most immediate relation to the improvement of man's estate, is one of the main objects which Comte has in view in restoring the spiritual power. A free development of each science for itself apart from the rest, and a free development of science as a whole, without reference to action for ends determined by social sympathy, are equally opposed to the Comtian ideal. The world and all objects in it are to be regarded by the Positivist merely as means, which we seek to know not for themselves, but only in order that we may use them for a predetermined end. For, according to Comte, the energies of the intelligence run to waste except when they are directed by an esprit d'ensemble, and the only totality, with reference to which such systematic direction is possible, is the "subjective" totality of humanity.

I have already indicated to some extent the grounds on which I would criticize this theory of "subjective synthesis." It implies, for one thing, that there is no natural convergence of the sciences, due to the unity of the parts of the intelligible world with each other and with the intelligence; but that the synthesis of knowledge is artificial, and forced upon it from without. Man, in Comte's point of view, is not a microcosm, who finds himself again in the macrocosm. He is like a stranger in a foreign country, who seeks to arm himself with such fragments of knowledge about it as are necessary for his protection and his own private ends. Yet this statement, without qualification, would not be altogether just to Comte; for, in his view, the individual man does find himself in the presence of one "object," which is also "subjective,"of one Great Being, which he has not to treat as an external means to ends of his own, but rather in which he has to find his own end. The synthesis Pol. Pos. i. 370, 383.

of knowledge, therefore, is not subjective so far as Sociology and Morals* are concerned, whatever it may be in regard to the other sciences. The unity, in reference to which knowledge is to be organized, is not merely the unity of man's nature as an individual, but rather as a "collective" being (a bad adjective surely to apply to mankind, when they are regarded as "members one of another"). Comte thus repeats the "homo mensura” in the sense that Humanity is for each man the measure of all things (though things in themselves escape all our measuring). We can transcend ourselves so far as to take the point of view of humanity. though not so far as to take the point of view of the objective unity of the world. Nay, it may even be said that we must so transcend ourselves, for Comte denies that the individual can separate himself from his race, except by a forced and illegitimate abstraction. Man, as an

individual," he declares, "cannot properly be said to exist except in the too abstract brain of modern metaphysicians ;" and the same principle on its ethical side leads him to condemn the doctrine of absolute personal rights, and to say that "individuals should be regarded not as so many distinct beings, but as organs of the one Supreme Being." According to these principles it would be impossible for us either to know what we are as men, or to live a life in accordance with our nature as men, if we were confined within the limits of a purely individual consciousness. Our consciousness of ourselves is essentially social, and the individualistic point of view is the result of a false abstraction, which can never be made complete. For, strive as we will, we cannot in thought, any more than in reality, isolate the individual from society, without at the same time taking from him all that characterizes him even as an individual. To speak, therefore, of knowing man, except as a member of the family, of the nation, or the race, is irrational. The science of man would be impossible if we were not able to get beyond our individuality, and to look at it, as well as at all our other individualities, from the point of view of the unity of humanity.

To such a conception of the nature of man as essentially social, few, we think, would nowadays object. But a "metaphysician" might wish to carry it a little further, and to recognize not only the essential relation of man to man, but also the essential relation of man to the universe. If it is a fiction of abstraction to separate the individual from society, is it a less fiction to isolate him from the world in which he lives,. and in relation to which all his powers and tendencies have been developed? To ask what humanity would have been in a different world is surely as absurd a question as to ask what he would have been had he not lived with his fellow-men. If it be allowed and asserted that the objective or universal point of view is possible, or even necessary, in relation to humanity, there is no ground for denying that it is possible and necessary in relation to the universe. Once admit that the individual can,

*The distinction made in the " Politique Positive" between Sociology and Morals, depending as it does on the opposition of the intellect to the heart, will be discussed afterwards.