things take their chance. The Economist and Mr. Giffen prophesied three years ago that trade would soon mend. They ridiculed our fears and what they called our heroic remedies. But the world now knows they were prophets who prophesied pleasant things because men loved to have it so.

But where can an adequate remedy for all this mischief and evil be found? Our reply is: Restore again to its proper place the metal that has been dethroned. Let it have a joint sway with gold in a fixed and determinate proportion, established on a broader and surer basis than ever before. In other words, rehabilitate silver to the rank of "money, in conjunction with gold, in Europe, Asia, and America. Let England, France, the States of the Latin Union, the United States of America, and India adopt the bi-metallic money system, by solemn international covenant, and the difficulty is solved. The congealed life-blood will again dissolve and flow through the arteries of commerce. The lost par

of exchange with silver-using countries will be established more effectively than ever before. India will be rescued from impending bankruptcy. The sun of prosperity, now greatly obscured, will shine again on the face of the earth. And the sum of human happiness, so far as material comfort is concerned, will again be greatly augmented.

On the other hand, do nothing; follow still longer the teachings of the laissez aller prophets of 1876, and our misfortunes are prolonged; and the gloom, which now as with a thick mantle covers our distressed industries and commerce, becomes intensified.

Let it be remembered that the evils which now exist were all foretold with marvellous exactitude by the advocates of bi-metallism. In 1869 Mr. Ernest Seyd, in his able pamphlet entitled the "Depreciation of Labour and Property which would follow the Demonetization of Silver," warned European financiers of the dangerous character of the projects which were then the subjects of discussion. His warnings were unheeded. Surely this incontrovertible fact entitles the Bi-metallic School of Economy to demand a more dispassionate consideration of the remedial measures they propose than has up to this point been accorded to them by the leaders and guides of public opinion.

Aversion from touching their currency laws is, on the whole, a safe state of mind for a people to cherish. It is, moreover, easy to be orthodox, and it requires some degree of moral courage to face the charge of heresy. This is the only explanation that can be offered for the impatience with which, in almost every quarter, a fair hearing has been hitherto refused to the advocates of the bi-metallic money system. The aversion was sententiously epitomized by the late Mr. Bagehot in the Economist of 30th December, 1876, in the following words:"The English people, rightly or wrongly [mark the true English obstinate orthodoxy in the use of the word wrongly] will never consent to change their currency"! That this was the determined attitude of the English mind has on such-like evidence or

reasoning, re-echoed by the press, been apparently taken for granted by our rulers, and the assumption is the only excuse for their recent course of action. It doubtless accounts for the fact that at the late Monetary Conference held in Paris, our delegates appeared with instructions binding them "to take no part in any vote which would call in question the maintenance of our single gold standard." Thus it has happened that England, the greatest monetary Power, rendered abortive a Conference which, if it had been prepared ex animo to consider the questions presented for solution by the United States, might have rendered the very highest service to mankind.

But time keeps rolling on. No daylight appears. Adversity intensified lifts up her voice and becomes a hard but yet a true teacher. What if, after all, it be found that England has not even dispassionately considered the question, while certain financial dogmatists have proclaimed that she has emphatically pronounced against the bi-metallic money system? I put this as an interrogation. I desire that it shall be considered on good grounds as an affirmation. England has not The pronounced against the international adoption of bi-metallism. press, led by the Economist, has, it is true, been against us; but there are now hopeful signs that a better state of mind is beginning to prevail. The English people are ever ready to adopt such wise and salutary measures as are most likely to advance their material prosperity; but the question is too technical for popular discussion, and not having been submitted to the popular judgment it is an utter fallacy to maintain that the English people have taken any resolution whatever in regard to it. From absolute knowledge I aver that the ranks of the bi-metallists have, during the past few months, been greatly augmented, and that our views have of late in many influential quarters made very important and satisfactory progress. It is no breach of confidence to say that one of our deputies to the Paris Conference writes to me that he finds much less aversion from our views in the City than he imagined had existed, and my belief is that if the Government had had any idea of the preparedness of the public mind calmly and rationally to face this question, the instructions given to the Paris delegates would have been couched in terms altogether different from those they carried with them across the Channel.

The

Nature again, which it was popularly imagined for some time had pronounced against our cause, has come to our assistance. Nevada mines have really all along been uttering a plea for bi-metallism. It ought to be known that the ore produced from these mines yields. almost exactly 50 per cent. value in gold, and 50 per cent. value in silver. That is to say, the weight of the pure metal when smelted is about fifteen or sixteen of silver against one of gold. This ought to have been received as the language of encouragement. She now speaks

in accents of warning, for the world is markedly falling off.

yield of gold from the mines of the The annual value is now only about

£18,000,000, against £22,000,000 a few years ago, and £33,000,000 in the year 1852. The yield of silver is also falling off. The American yield of silver in 1878 was $37,000,000, and the yield of gold $37,000,000, while the estimates for 1879 are pointing to considerably diminished quantities of both metals. These important facts have not escaped the attention of Mr. Giffen, the statistician of the Board of Trade. Mr. Giffen in 1876 was one of the propagators of the laissez aller doctrine in regard to the demonetization of silver. He is now calling public attention to the fact that the gold supplies are markedly falling off. He deprecates the further disuse of silver, and hints at the necessity for our Government turning their attention to the serious questions involved in the diminution in the supply of money.*

I will now proceed to deal with the difficulties, real or imaginary, which are popularly understood to be a barrier to the rehabilitation of silver as "money," in addition to those which I have already incidentally disposed of.

First. It is objected that it is beyond the prerogative of nations to fix a ratio of valuation or exchangeability between the two metals; and that it is practically impossible for them to do so.

To this objection we reply that it is as much within the sphere of national prerogative to choose both metals for money as to elect one; and seeing that it is of world-wide importance that both gold and silver shall continue to be used, it is impossible to form the unit

money" out of the two metals except by means of a fixed legal ratio or propor

* Statistics have been published showing the downward tendency of the prices of many commodities of late, and it is alleged that decreasing values must be attributed to a rise in the value of gold. Amongst these figures we find a place assigned to silver, and it is contended that its reduced value shews that it has only shared the fate of many other commodities. The hope is held out to us that when the tide of prosperity returns, silver will rise in price just as corn or cotton may be expected to advance. Such reasoning is altogether fallacious. The statistics to which I allude refer chiefly to variations in the prices of commodities that are annually produced in quantities more or less adequate for immediate use and consumption. The prices of these commodities are governed by laws altogether different from those which, prior to 1876, governed the relation between gold and silver money-a relation which it is now our effort to get restored on a stronger basis than ever existed before. Let me illustrate this difference and at the same time the hopelessness of the present position of silver. If we have a twenty per cent. short wheat crop this year in England and France (as may occur), and if the United States' crop is short, we may see the price of wheat rise-even in these bad times-from forty shillings up to fifty-five shillings or sixty shillings per quarter. If the United States' cotton crop were to fall off twenty per cent., we should undoubtedly see the price of cotton rise in the Liverpool market at least one penny per lb., or about the same per centage. But if the yield of the silver-mines were to fall off twenty per cent. this year, and if India has no large trade balance to receive (as may be the case), instead of seeing silver rise in price, we are likely, notwithstanding the diminished production, to see it continue to go markedly down as reckoned in gold-even much under the present quotation. Why? Simply because the laws which were wont to govern the relation between gold and silver having been abrogated or suspended, the discredited metal becomes mere merchandize, and must go down in price in the London market. Before silver was discredited as money, it was maintained with very unimportant oscillations in a fixed ratio to gold, by French monetary law, whatever the variations were in the yield of the mines. That ratio is now lost to the world, and silver will ere long be only worth what the silversmith may choose to pay for it-perhaps one shilling or two shillings per ounce. Until the two ideas of "money" and "commodity" are distinctly separated, there can be no clear thought on the subject. I have considered it best, in order not to break the continuity of my main argument, to put these observations in the form of a foot-note.

tion betwixt them. We allege, moreover, in the words of the Italian Delegates to the Paris Conference that "since the French law established such a relation, none but unimportant oscillations occurred in the relative value of the two metals (till the law was suspended): consequently if the French law obtained by itself such a beneficent result, à fortiori such a relation would be established on a basis that would remain unshaken, from the date on which nations as France, England, and the United States, agreed by international law to fix the relative value of the two metals."

Second. It is alleged that if a few nations remained outside of the international covenant they might at any time endanger the equilibrium.

We reply to this objection that the adoption of the bi-metallic money system is only proposed on the understanding that the leading monetary Powers shall agree to it, and that on a uniform ratio. It is essential for absolute safety that France (perhaps with the States of the Latin Union, Belgium, and Italy), England, with her colonies, the United States, and India should adopt it. Now these countries are, and are likely to be, the great absorbents of money. Holland would undoubtedly join us. Germany cannot keep the bullion she recently acquired, not as the reward of industry but as the spoils of war, and can never endanger the equilibrium. Russia, Austria, Spain and Portugal, Brazil, the South American Republics are all internationally indebted to the leading monetary States. They are consequently never likely to be able to play on the currencies of the Great Powers. It is much more likely they will all fall in with the money system adopted by the latter, as that which will afford the greatest safety; and we know some of them are ready to do so. We therefore say that it is capable of demonstration that no power on earth could upset the equilibrium established on such a basis as we propose; and in the face of the enormous advantages we can point to as likely to be obtained through its adoption, we maintain that it is a suicidal policy on the part of England to hesitate and hold back. She is the nation most deeply interested, and she is suffering more than any other from the ruinous consequences of the mono-metallic propaganda which her financiers inaugurated.

Third. It is sometimes said that the fixing of a ratio, and making either metal unlimited legal tender, may be unfair to the creditor, as the debtor will naturally discharge his obligations with the cheaper metal.

To this stock objection we reply, that after the adjustment of such an international covenant as we have indicated, there would thenceforth be neither a cheaper nor a dearer metal. It is capable of mathematical demonstration that the ratio will remain absolute and unshaken. ounce of silver will be equal to the 15th or 16th (or whatever the ratio be fixed at) part of an ounce of gold; and an ounce of gold will be identical in value and power to 15 or 16 ounces of silver. If silver

can be made unlimited legal tender on such a ratio, it would be absurd to imagine that the producers of it will take less than the ratio guarantees, so long as the mints of the world are open for automatic coinage without charge into legal-tender money. Nor would it ever be needful to pay more than the legal ratio for bullion, seeing that coin of full value would be available for trade purposes when wanted. When the potency of the French equilibrium during seventy years is considered, and when we reflect on the very small oscillations that occurred, notwithstanding the very great variations in the supply of the two metals, we surely ought to be entirely free from apprehension if the proposed ratio be established on the broad and solid foundations which have been suggested. Once establish the ratio with automatic coinage free of charge, and the term "price," as applied to either gold or silver, is for ever abolished. They become "money." Men use money to

acquire property or commodities, or to lend it on variable terms. They will never sell it. Consequently, to speak of "price," or of the "cheaper" or " dearer" metal thenceforth, will be found to be either a paradox or a misuse of terms.

Fourth. It is said we thus propose to create two standards, and that this is a wholly artificial arrangement which cannot be advocated on scientific grounds.

We reply, that all monetary arrangements are, in a certain sense, artificial, and that it is no more unscientific for nations to choose both metals for their money than to rest their currency on one metal only. Much may be said on purely scientific grounds in favour of a preference for the use of both metals. And in regard to the term "standard," we affirm that the world has often suffered from the senseless jargon of political economists. The term "standard," in respect of money, ought logically to have reference only to the weight and fineness of the coin. In this sense only was it understood when first introduced. As for the rest, let the eminent Hamilton, Secretary of the American Treasury in 1792, speak to us again, as he did then, in the following words of world-wide significance and wisdom :—

"Upon the whole it seems to be most advisable, as has been observed, not to attach the unit exclusively to either of the metals: because this cannot be done effectually without destroying the office and character of one of them as money, and reducing it to the situation of a mere merchandize . . . . To annul the use of either of the metals as money, is to abridge the quantity of circulating medium, and is liable to all the objections which arise from a comparison of the benefits of a full with the evils of a scanty circulation."

The "unit" created by bi-metallism is legal-tender "money," composed of the two elements or metals, gold and silver, conjoined by an absolutely fixed link or ratio of relative value attached to them, according to our proposal, by the force of international monetary law.

Fifth.-Objections to bi-metallism are sometimes made on the ground