broken under the species of bread; not in itself;' Well! is it broken, or is it not broken? let it be broken under what it will,-if it be broken, the thing is granted. For if being broken under the species, it be meant that the species be broken alone, and not the body of Christ,-then they take away in one hand, when they reach forth with the other. This being a better argument, 'The species only are broken, the species are not Christ's body, therefore, Christ's body is not broken:' better I say than this, "The body of Christ is under the species; the species alone are broken; therefore, the body of Christ is broken.' For how can the breaking of species or accidents infer the breaking of Christ's body, unless the accidents be Christ's body, or inseparable from it; or rather how can the breaking of the accidents infer the breaking of Christ's body, when it cannot be broken? To this I desire a clear and intelligible answer. Add to this, how can species, that is, accidents, be broken, but when a substance is broken? for an accident, properly, such as smell, colour, taste, hath of itself no solid and consistent, nor indeed any fluid parts,-nothing whereby it can be broken, and have a part divided from a part; but as the substance, in which the accident is subjected, becomes divided, so do the inherent accidents; but no otherwise: and if this cannot be admitted, men cannot know what one another say or mean; they can have no notices of things or regular propositions. 13. Secondly; but I demand, when we speak of a body, what we mean by it? For, in all discourses and intercourses of mankind, by words we must agree concerning each other's meaning: when we speak of a body, of a substance, of an accident, what does mankind agree to mean by these words? All the philosophers, and all the wise men in the world, when they divide a substance from an accident, mean by a substance, that which can subsist in itself, without a subject of inherence. But an accident is "that, whose very essence is to be in another":" when they speak of a body and separate it from a spirit, they mean that a spirit is that, which hath no n Aristot. lib. i. posterior c. 6. et lib. ii. c. 10. Metaph. lib. vi. c. 4. Idem significatur per ipsum nomen ovμbinxos; quod abit cum substantiâ, iudexovov, receptum scilicet in subjecto. Accidens quod accidit. material, divisible parts, physically; that which hath nothing of that which makes a body, that is, extension, limitation by lines, and superficies and material measures. The very first notion and conception of things teaches all men, that what is circumscribed and measured by his proper place, is there and no where else. For if it could be there, and be in another place, it were two, and not one. A finite spirit can be but in one place, but it is there without circumscription; that is, it hath no parts measured by the parts of a place; but is there after another manner than a body, that is, it is in every part of his definition or spiritual location. So it is said, a soul is in the whole body; not that a part of it is in the hand, and a part of it in the eye, but it is whole in the whole, and whole in every part; and it is true that it is so, if it be wholly immaterial: because that which is spiritual and immaterial, cannot have material parts. But when we speak of a body, all the world means that, which hath a finite quantity, and is determined to one place. This was the philosophy of all the world, taught in all the schools of the Christians and heathens, even of all mankind, till the doctrine of transubstantiation was to be nursed and maintained, and even after it was born, it could not be forgotten by them, who were bound to keep it. And I appeal to any man of the Roman persuasion, if they can show me any ancient philosopher, Greek, or Roman, or Christian of any nation,-who did not believe it to be essential to the being of a body to be in one place:' and Amphitruo in the old comedy, had reason to be angry with Sosia upon this point. Tun' id dicere audes? quod nemo unquam homo antehac Homo idem duobus locis ut simul sito ? And, therefore, to make the body of Christ to be in a thousand places at once, and yet to be but one body,-to be in heaven, and to be upon so many altars,-to be on the altar in so many round wafers,—is to make a body to be a spirit, and to make a finite to be infinite; for nothing can be so but an infinite Spirit. 14. Neither will it be sufficient to fly here to God's omnipotency for God can indeed make a body to be a spirit; Plaut. Amphitr. act. 2. sc. 1. 16. Schmieder, p. 40. but can it consist with the Divine Being, to make an infinite substance? Can there possibly be two categorematical, that is, positive substantial infinites? or can it be that a finite should, remaining finite, yet not be finite, but indefinite and in innumerable places at once? God can new create the body, and change it into a spirit; but can a body, remaining a body, be at the same time a spirit? or can it be a body, and yet not be in a place? is it not determined so, that remaining in a place it cannot be out of it? If these things could be otherwise, then the same thing, at the same time, could be a body and a spirit,-limited and unlimited,-wholly in a place, and wholly out of it,-finite and infinite, a body, and yet no body,—one, and yet many,-the same, and not the same, that is, it should not be itself. Now, although God can change any thing from being the thing it is, to become another thing, yet is it not a contradiction to say, it should be the same it is, and yet not the same? These are the essential, immediate consequents of supposing a body remaining a body, whose essence it is to be finite and determined in one place, can yet, so remaining, be in a thousand places. Thirdly; the Socinians teach, that our bodies at the resurrection shall be (as they say Christ's body now is) changed substantially. For corruptible and incorruptible, mortal and immortal, natural and spiritual, are substantial differences and now our bodies being natural, corruptible, and mortal, differ substantially from bodies spiritual, immortal, and incorruptible, as they shall be hereafter, and as the body of our Lord now is. Now I am sure, the church of Rome, allows not of this doctrine in these; neither have they reason for it; but do they not admit that in hypothesi,' which they deny in thesi?' For is it not a perfect change of substance, that a body from finite is changed to be at least potentially infinite, from being determined in one place to be indefinite and indeterminable? To lose all his essential properties must needs infer a substantial change; and that it is of the essence of a body to be in once place, at least an 6 ν Όπερ σώματι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ hov image. Plotin, lib. de Anim. apud Euseb præpar. Evang. lib. 15, 4 Quomodo erit sol splendore privatus ? vel quomodo erit splendor, nisi sol sit à quo defluat? Ignis verò quomodo erit calore carens? vel calor unde manabit, nisi ab igne? Cyril. Alex. lib. i. in 1. c. Joh. essential propriety, they will not, I suppose, be so impudent as to deny, since they fly to the Divine omnipotency and a perpetual miracle, to make it be otherwise: which is a plain demonstration, that naturally it is so; this, therefore, they are to answer, if they can. 15. But let us see, what Christian philosophy teaches us in this particular. St. Austin is a good probable doctor, and may be trusted for a proposition in natural philosophy. These are his conclusions in this article. "Corpora quæ non possunt esse nisi in loco";""Bodies cannot be, but in their place."" Angustias omnipotentiæ corpora patiuntur ; nec ubique possunt esse, nec semper; Divinitas autem ubique præstò est":" "The divinity is present every where; but not bodies,—they are not omnipotent:" meaning, it is a propriety of God to be in many places, an effect of his omnipotence. But more plainly yet; "Spatia locorum tolle corporibus, et nusquam erunt; et quia nusquam erunt, nec erunt; ;""If you take from bodies the spaces of place, they will be no where, and if they be no where, they will not be at all" and to apply this to the present question, he affirms, "Christus homo, secundùm corpus, in loco est, et de loco migrat; et cum ad alium locum venerit, in eo loco unde venit, non est ":" "Christ, as man, according to the body, is in a place, and goes from a place; and when he comes to another place, is not in the place from whence he came."―For besides that so to do is of the verity of Christ's body, that it should have the same affections with ours; according as it is insisted upon in divers places of the Scripture, particularly, St. Luke, xxiv. 39; it is also in the same place, and in the story, apparent, that the case was not altered after the resurrection, but Christ moved finitely by dimensions, and change of places. So Theodoret ; "Dominicum corpus incorruptibile resurrexit, et impatibile, et immortale, et divinâ gloriâ glorificatum est, et à cœlestibus adoratur potestatibus; corpus tamen est, priorem habens circumscriptionem :" "Christ's body even after the resurrection is circumscribed as it was before." And, therefore, as it is impious to deny God to be invisible: so it is profane, not to Serm. Dom. monte. c. 9. In Psal. lxxxvi. t * Ep. 67. believe and profess the Son of God, in his assumed humility, to be visible, corporeal, and local, after the resurrection: it is the saying of St. Austin. 16. And I would fain know how it will be answered, that they attribute to the body of Christ, which is his own creature, the incommunicable attribute of ubiquity, either actually or potentially. For let them say, is it not an attribute of God to be unlimited, and to be undefined by places? St. Austin says it, and it is affirmed by natural reason, and all the world attributes this to God, as a propriety of his own. If it be not his own, then all the world hath been always deceived, till this new generation arose. If it be, let them fear the horrid consequent of giving that to a creature, which is the glory of the Creator. And if they think to escape by saying, that they do not attribute to it actual ubiquity, but potential,—that is, that though he be not, yet he may be every where ;-let it be considered, if the argument of the fathers was good (by which they proved the Divinity of the Holy Ghost), This is every where; therefore this is God;' is it not also as good to say, 'This may be every where therefore this may be God?' And then it will be altogether as bad, as any thing can be imagined: for it makes the incommunicable attribute of God to be communicable to a creature: and not only so, but it is worse; for it makes, that an actual creature may be a potential god, that is, that there can be a god, which is not eternally a god, that is not a pure act,—a god that is not yet, but that shall have a beginning in time. 6 17. Fourthly; There was not, in all school divinity, nor in the old philosophy, nor in nature, any more than three natural proper ways of being in a place, circumscriptivè,' ‹ definitivè,' ' repletivè.' The body of Christ is not in the sacrament circumscriptively;' because there he could be but in one altar, in one wafer. It is not there definitively,' for the same reason, because to be definitively in a place is to be in it, so as to be there, and no where else.-And both these are affirmed by their own Turrecremata : it remains, that it must be repletivè' in many places, which we use to attribute y Lib. de Essent. Divinit. Ἐγὼ δ ̓, ὅ Θεοῦ 'στιν ἔργον, εἰμὶ πανταχοῦ.—Stob. tit. iii. Grot. p. 117. |