« הקודםהמשך »
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
I HAVE endeavoured to make this edition something more full and satisfactory than the first. I have sought with the utmost care, and read with equal attention, every thing which has appeared in public agaiost my opinions; I have taken advantage of the candid liberty of my friends; and if by these meaas I have been better enabled to discover the imperfections of the work, the indulgence it has received, imperfect as it was, furnished me with a new mo. tive to spare no reasonable pains for its improvement. Though I have not found sufficient reason, or what appeared to me sufficient, for making any material change in my theory, I have found necessary, in many places, to explain, illustrate, and enforce it; I have prefixed an introductory discourse concerning Taste: it is a matter curious in itself; and it leads naturally enough to the principal inquiry. This, with the other explanations, has made the work considerably larger, and by increasing its bulk, has, I am afraid, added to its faults; so that notwithstanding all my attention, it may stand in need of a yet greater share of indulgence than it required at its first appearance.
They who are accustomed to studies of this nature will espect, and they will allow, too, for many faults. They know that many of the objects of our inquiry are in themselves obscure and intricate; and that many others have been rendered so by affected refinement, or false learning ; they know that there are many impediments in the subject, in the prejudice of others, and even in our own, that render it a matter of no small difficulty to shew, in a clear light, the genuine face of nature. They know that whilst the mind is intent on the general scheme of things, some parti. calar parts must be neglected ; that we must often submit the style to the matter, and frequently give up the praise of elegance, satisfied with being clear.
The characters of nature are legible, it is true; but they are not plain enough to enable those who run to read them. We must make use of a cautious, I had almost said, a timorous, method of proceeding. We must not attempt to fly, when we can scarcely pretend to creep. In considering any complex matter, we ought to examine every distinct
ingredient in the composition, one by one; and reduce every thing to the utmost simplicity ; since the condition of our nature binds us to a strict law and very narrow limits. We ought afterward to re-examine the principles by the effect of the composition, as well as the composition by that of the principles. We ought to compare our subject with things of a similar pature, and even with things of a contrary nature; for discoveries may be, and often are, made by the contrast, which would escape us on the single view. The greater number of the comparisons we make, the more general and the more certain our knowledge is like to prove, as built upon a more extensive and perfect induction.
If au inquiry thus carefully conducted should fail at last of discovering the truth, it may answer an end perhaps as useful, in discovering to us the weakness of our own under. standing. If it does not make us knowing, it may make us modest. If it does not preserve us from error, it may at least from the spirit of error; and may make us cautious of pronouncing with positiveness or with haste, when so much labour may end in so much uncertainty. . I could wish that, in examining this theory, the same method were pursued which I endeavoured to observe in forming it. The objections, in my opinion, ought to be proposed, either to the several principles as they are distinctly considered, or to the justness of the conclusion which is drawn from them. But it is common to pass over both the premises and conclusion in silence, and to produce, as an objection, some poetical passage which does not seem easily accounted for upon the principles I endeavour to establish. This manner of proceeding I should think very improper. The task would be infinite, if we could establish no principle until we had previously unravelled the complex texture of every image or description to be found in poets and orators. And though we should never be able to reconcile the effect of such images to our principles, this can never ova turn the theory itself, whilst it is founded on certain and indisputable facts. A theory founded on espe. riment, and not assumed, is always good for so much as it explains. Our inability to push it indefinitely is no argu. ment at all against it. This inability may be owing to our ignorance of some necessary mediums; to want of proper application : to many other causes besides a defect in the principles we employ. In reality, the subject requires a much closer attention than we dare claim from our manner of treating it.
If it should not appear on the face of the work, I must caution the reader against imagining that I intended a full dissertation on the Sublime and Beautiful. My inquiry went no farther than to the origin of these ideas. If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the Sublime be all found consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head of Beauty; and if those which compose the class of the Beautiful have the same consistency with themselves, and the same opposition to those which are classed under the denomination of the Sublime, I am in little pain whether any body chooses to follow the name I give them or not, provided he allows that what I disposed under different heads are in reality different things in nature. The use I make of the words may be blamed, as too confined, or too extended; my meaning cannot well be misunderstood.
To conclude: whatever progress may be made toward the discovery of truth in this matter, I do not repent the pains I have taken in it. The use of such inquiries may be very considerable. Whatever turns the soul inward on itself tends to conceptre its forces, and to fit it for greater and stronger flights of science. By looking into physical causes, our minds are opened and enlarged ; and in this pursuit, whether we take, or whether we lose or gain, the chase is certainly of service. Cicero, true as he was at the Aca. demic philosophy, and consequently led to reject the cer. tainty of physical, as of every other kind of knowledge, yet freely confesses its great importance to the human un. derstanding; 'Est animorum ingeniorumque nostrorum naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contem. platioque nature. If we can direet the lights we derive from such exalted speculations, upou the humbler field of the imagination, whilst we investigate the springs, and trace the courses of our passions, we may not only communicate to the taste a sort of philosophical solidity, but we may reflect back on the severer sciences some of the graces and elegances of taste, without which the greatest proficiency in those sciences will always have the appearance of something illiberal.
ON a superficial view, we may seem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no less in our pleasures; but, notwithstanding this dif. ference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the standard both of Rea, son and Taste is the same in all human creatures ; for, if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken either of their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears, indeed, to be generally acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falsehood there is something fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tests and standards, which are allowed on all sides, and are supposed to be established in our common nature. But there is not the same obvious concurrence in any uniform or settled principles which relate to Taste. It is even commonly supposed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be properly tried by any test, nor regulated by any standard. There is so continual a call for the exercise of the reasoning faculty, and it is so much strengthened by perpetual contention, that certain maxims of right reason seem to be tacitly settled amongst the most ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude science, and reduced those maxims into a system. If Taste has not been so happily cultivated, it was not that the subject was barren, but that the labourers were few or negligent; for, to say the truth, there are not the same interesting motives to impel us to fix the one, which urge us to ascertain the other. And, after all, if men differ in their opinion concerning such matters, their difference is not attended with the same important consequences; else I make no doubt but that the logic of Taste, if I may be allowed the expression, might very possibly be as well digested, and we might come to discuss matters of this nature with as much certainty, as those which seem more immediately within the province of mere reason. And indeed it is very necessary, at the entrance into such an inquiry as our present, to make this point as clear as possible; for if Taste has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to some invariable and certain laws, our labour is like to be employed to very little purpose : as it must be judged a useless, if not an absurd undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and to set up for a legislator of whims and fancies.
The term Taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate : the thing which we understand by it is far from a simple and determinate idea in the minds of most men, and it is therefore liable to uncertainty and confusion. I have no great opinion of a definition, the celebrated remedy for the cure of this disorder. For, when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard, or embrace on trust, or form out of a limited and partial consideration of the object before us, instead of extending our ideas to take in all that nature comprehends, according to her manner