Ten Cents a Copy Saturday, July 3, 1920 Vol. III, No. 1 Issued Weekly at 110 W. 40th Street, New York, N. Y. Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, Publisher. J cob Wittmer Hartmann, Editor. HE economic policy of the Soviet Government was established in the midst of incessant fighting, when the entire country was a vast mili- The Soviet organs which direct the economic At the head of the entire administration is the All the activities of the Supreme Council of Na- The appointment of the president of the Su- preme Council of National Economy, and that of his substitute, are ratified by the Central Executive Committe of the Soviets of all Russia; that of the members of the Bureau by the Council of Peo- ple's Commissaries. But the candidatures are usu- ally submitted before ratification to the general Council of National Economy are approved by the Bureau, but never until after a preliminary under- standing with the corresponding syndicate. The workers as well as the specialists (engineers, tech- nicians), have members in all the committees and The local Councils of National Economy are the executive organs of the Supreme Council of The management of the factories and adminis- tration for the various state enterprises and trusts is composed in each case of from five to seven members (workers and specialists), but they are sanctioned by the corresponding section of the Supreme Council of National Economy or of the local Council of National Economy only after a preliminary understanding with the corresponding A great number of specialists are on the Com- mittees and in the management of factories: as many as sixty per cent are specialists and forty Thus the Soviet power replaced the system of capitalist direction by the Soviet system, which planted deep roots in the farthest corners of our economic life. Despite the difficult external and internal conditions this system is accomplishing To sum up these two years of struggle, the means of production passed almost entirely from Nationalization of the factories, shops, mines, etc., was brought about first in the principal False information has often been circulated in Western Europe with regard to this nationalization, which, it was said, followed no fixed plan. This is a falsehood without foundation. Nationalization, especially beginning with the second half of the year 1918, was brought about in accordance with a fixed plan embracing the industrial branches and enterprises most important and indispensable for the organization of the national economy. As to the "small trades" and the cooperatives, not only were they not nationalized, but they were protected by special decrees and dispositions. The following tables gives an idea of the proportionate figures for nationalization in the course of the last two years: Nationalization During the Years 1918-1919. 1. Enterprises 2. Merchant marine construction 3. Private property 4. All the banks of all cities. 4,000 16,000 60,000,000 hectares These figures are a little short in the case of the enterprises, 4,000 enterprises are under the Supreme Council of National Economy, but in the provinces many nationalized enterprises, being under the direction of local organs, do not figure in the statistics drawn up by the central organs. It may be said with certainty that ninety per cent of industry is nationalized. The Soviet power inherited from Capitalism enterprises isolated and deprived of connecting bonds. Its task, as indicated above, was to construct an organization of national economy based upon socialist principles. It was indispensable that there be organized and created in the domain of industry and that of rural economy associations of isolated enterprises, that they be provided with fuel and basic materials, and their financial system constructed upon new principles. In resume of all the innovations introduced in the domain of national economy in the course of these two years (1918-1919) we have the following table: lution, or like the State trust for machine construction, comprising sixteen of the most important enterprises, represent a result unprecedented in the economic world. The situation is similar in the nationalized enterprises of the textile industry, to the number of more than 500, divided into forty different associations each embracing several enterprises and all directed by a "principal management." From the point of view of finance, provisions, registration, the reception of products, etc., the organization of industry in state trusts was of enormous advantage. The regulation of accounts between the nationalized enterprises and their associations takes place only in the books and without the payment of cash. Owing to this system the distribution of fuel and basic materials becomes more equal and rational. If one considers the extremely difficult situation in which Soviet Russia was placed, during these last two years, in the matter of fuel, having at her disposal only ten per cent of indispensable coal and only ninety-three million poods of naphtha in lieu of the 400 millions necessary each year, one can see that only the centralization of distribution and a certain economy have aided us to evade a terrible fuel crisis. As for the distribution of raw materials, that was organized in a satisfactory manner. In the sphere of rural economy the organization of Soviet exploitations directed by Soviet organs made it possible not only to protect agriculture, the great land properties, but also permitted the industrial proletariat to take part for the first time in agricultural labor, and created also for the first time solid ties between industry and agricultural exploitation, between the city and the country. At present nearly three million hectares are already in the hands of Soviet exploitations and agricultural communes. Returning to the economic situation and the results of the economic activities, we should indicate first that this situation, as a result of our activity, depended upon changes brought about by the civil war. The Don Basin, the Urals, the Caucasus, the principal sources of fuel and raw material-of coal, naphtha, iron, cast-iron, steel-passed from hand to hand. For a certain length of time they fell again to the Soviet power, but new assaults by the White Guards deprived us of them, ruining organized production and taking from us accumulated reserves. As a result the center of Soviet Russia became our principal base. The loss of the Don Basin meant for us the loss of eighty per cent of all our coal; the occupation of Baku by the English deprived us of naphtha; the occupation of the South and the Urals-of metals. It is easy thus to realize clearly the difficult conditions under which our economic life developed. But in addition to territorial conditions, our economic situation was influenced by the fact that 221-24 The above figures are only for fuel and raw material accumulated and utilized by the Supreme Council of National Economy. We can see that the situation has become worse in the matter of fuel because of the loss of the naphtha. In 1918 we could transport the naphtha from Baku, but in 1919 we did not receive any at all. Owing to this circumstance we were obliged to use wood fuel for the railroads and other enterprises, and this was the cause of the famine in fuel for dwellings. Before the war no more wood was prepared than now: from four to five million cubic sazhins, but then there was coal, and naphtha which served industry, and the wood was used principally to heat dwellings; now wood is the principal fuel. As regards peat, the situation has improved, and in 1919 it was prepared in greater quantities (1918-fifty-eight million poods; in 1919-sixty million poods). The preparation of raw material for our textile industry was sufficient, and the industry is fully provided for. Flax and furs have accumulated in such great quantities that it would be easy to export them abroad. With regard to metals the situation has become difficult, we have utilized our old reserves all this time. With the retaking of the Urals and the defeat of Kolchak, the situation has improved and we are receiving metals from the Urals. In short, the system of provisioning under Soviet rule functions perfectly and is solidly constructed. The latest statistics indicate that more than a million workers (excluding those employed on railroads, commerce, etc.), are at the present mo 1918 almost 30 million 4 mill. cu. sazhins 58 million 93 million 2,784 thousand 5,461,000 pieces 30 million 1919 almost 30 million 5 mill. cu. sazhins 60 million Baku occupied by English 51⁄2 million 61⁄2 million (with Turkestan reserves) 2 million 2 million 2,365,800 pieces (for six months) 40 million do not show it. In short, the total number of salaried workers (workers and employees) reaches the minimum number of three million men. In certain spheres progress even may be claimed. During these two years our economic organs undertook the organization of fifteen important enterprises several of which are already completed and operating. At Podolsk (province of Moscow) a great factory for the repair of locomotives has been constructed and is already operating; as is a cartridge factory at Simbirsk. Two great electrical stations, one at Kachira, the other in the marsh of Chatour, are being completed. The construction of a faetory of agricultural machinery and implements has commenced at Saratov. But the most important enterprise is the exploitation of schist deposits in the provinces of Samara and Kazan, an enterprise begun in 1919. Several mines are already being exploited. Let us cite here the figures relative to the principal branches of industry serving military as well as civil needs. Production and Reserves in 1919 Fabrics Average monthly production-14 million arzhins Reserves nearly a milliard arzhins. Sugar Production during the campaign 1918-1919: Production in 1918-1,032,023 boxes. |