תמונות בעמוד
PDF
ePub

admiring the powers of the mind, we seek not its real helps." (Aph. 9.) Men had forgotten that they were the ministers of nature, which far exceeds the subtlety of the sense and understanding; and he affirms that the vulgar induction was inefficient to discover works, and the vulgar logic insufficient to discover sciences.

That mode of rising directly from sense and particulars, to the most general axioms, he calls "the anticipation of nature," as being a rash and hasty thing; but the other mode of raising axioms from sense and particulars, by a continued and gradual ascent, till it arrives at last to the most general axioms, which was the true but untried way, he calls "the interpretation of nature." In order to avoid the former, and employ the latter, a restoration was to be begun from the very foundation and leaving the ancients in possession of their honours, he points out a new path, and prepares the mind for the reception of the method which he proposed: "the leading men to particulars, their sense and order; and they were to prevail upon themselves to forsake their notions for a time, and begin their acquaintance with things."

"Our method has some resemblance with that of the sceptics at the entrance, but differs widely from it, and becomes opposite to it, in the end. They simply assert that nothing is knowable, and we say, that much cannot be known of nature in the common way; but then they destroy the authority of the sense and understanding, whereas we supply them both with helps." (Aph. 37.)

No part of Bacon's works is more valuable than his exact and sagacious exposition of the general, or rather natural, sources of error. He calls these prejudices by the expressive name of idols, the false objects of false worship, vain, delusive, and dangerous. These idols he divides into four kinds-idols of the tribe, idols of the den, idols of the market, idols of the theatre; and so comprehensive is this classification, that the enumeration will be found to include the principal causes which obstruct the discovery or reception of natural or moral truth in all cases. They almost constitute the Pantheon into which the soul of man has been degraded; and our author may claim the honour of being the first to restore and purify the living temple. They are discussed in 24 aphorisms, and before particularizing the several kinds, the reader is informed in the 40th, that the proper remedy for removing and driving out the idols, is the raising of notions and axioms by legitimate induction. Yet he was of opinion that the indication of them was the more necessary, as they would again rise up and grow troublesome after the reformation of science.

1. The idols of the tribe are common to the whole race of mankind, and have their foundation in human nature: "For it is a false assertion that the human sense is the measure of things; since all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are with relation to man, and not with relation to the universe. But the human understanding is like an unequal mirror to the rays of things; which combining its own figure with the figures of the objects it represents, distorts and perverts them."

2. The idols of the den or cave are identified with the peculiar character of the individual: "The idols of every man in particular; for besides the general waywardness of human nature, we every one of us have our own peculiar den or cavern, which refracts or breaks the light of nature; either because every man has his respective temper, education, acquaintance, course of reading, and authorities he most respects; or because of the differences of impressions, as they may be made on a mind that is preoccupied and prepossessed, or on one that is calm and unbiassed; so that the human spirit according to its disposition in individuals, is a thing fluctuating, disorderly, and almost accidental. Whence Heraclitus well observes, that men seek the sciences in their lesser worlds, and not in the great and common one.' He speaks in another place of this kind of idol as every man's particular demon, or seducing familiar; and again, compares every man's mind to a glass, with its surface differently cut, so as differently to receive, and reflect, and refract the rays of light that fall upon it.

3. Idols of the forum have their rise from the compact, or association of mankind which depends upon language. "For men associate by discourse; but words are imposed according to the capacity of the vulgar: whence a false and improper imposition of words strangely possesses the understanding. Nor do the definitions and explanations, wherewith men of learning, in some cases, preserve and vindicate themselves, any way repair the injury; for words absolutely force the understanding, put all things in confusion, and lead men away to idle controversies and subtleties without number."

4. The idols of the theatre are the deceptions, perversions, and prejudices, which take their rise from the different tenets of philosophers, and the perverted laws of demonstration. And these are so denominated, " because all the philosophies that have been hitherto invented or received, are but as so many stage-plays, written or acted; as having shown nothing but fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor is this said only of the ancient or present sects and philosophies; for numberless other fables, of the like kind, may be still invented and dressed up, since quite different errors will proceed from almost the same common

causes."

We have no space for observation on the author's profound comments on these various prejudices; he is a complete iconoclast; and if the reader would wish to see all these divisions more fully illustrated, we must refer him to Professor Playfair's Preliminary Dissertation.

"All these idols," says Bacon, "are solemnly and for ever to be renounced, and the understanding must be thoroughly cleared and purged of them; for the kingdom of man, which is founded in the sciences, cannot be entered otherwise than the kingdom of God; that is, in the condition of a little child." In order that the understanding may be the more disposed to cleanse itself, and put away its idols, he thinks proper to diverge into some particular confutation of false systems of philosophy. He notices, (1.) The sects and sorts of these theories, which he divides into three general kinds, sophistical, empirical, and superstitious. (2.) The false colours thereof, or the signs or characteristics of false systems; whether taken from their origins, their fruits, their progress, the confessions of their own authors, or from consent. (3.) The causes of so great an infelicity, or of errors in philosophies; and, (4.) The causes of so lasting and general a consent in error; which bring us to the ninety-third aphorism; where he proposes to "inquire into the grounds of hope," for the further advancement of philosophy and the sciences; and there follows a chain of arguments, for establishing a solid foundation of hope for the success of genuine philosophy in future. He has thus endeavoured to remove despair, (which is the principal cause of the slow progress of the sciences,) and finishes what he had to offer concerning the signs and causes of error. He enumerates the three kinds of confutations, by which he hoped to pull down the old structure: viz. 1. the confutation of the natural reason, when left to itself; 2. the confutation of the manner of demonstrations; 3. the confutation of the received theories, or prevailing philosophies and doctrines. "It would, therefore," (he says, in Aphorism 115,) "be time to proceed to our rule and art of interpreting nature, did not something lie in the way, that requires to be removed. For we proposed by an introductory set of aphorisms to prepare the mind, to receive what is to follow; and having now levelled and polished the mirror, it remains that we set it in a right position, or, as it were, with a benevolent aspect to the things we shall further propose. For in every new undertaking, not only the being strongly prepossessed with an inveterate opinion, but also a false notion or expectation of what is to follow, proves sufficient to give a prejudice. We must, therefore, next endeavour to establish a just and true opinion of the thing we intend, though this opinion be only temporary, and of use but till the thing itself is well understood."

The remainder therefore, of this first part, (from Aphorism 116 to 130,) is occupied with the idea of the new method of interpreting nature, as the final preparation to the inductive

method itself. He does not inform us positively of the method, but rather discovers what it is not, in order to prevent erroneous expectations.

After" postulating it of mankind” that they would not imagine he had any design to form a sect in philosophy, and declaring himself to be utterly unsolicitous "about such useless things as depend upon opinion," he says he would not be wanting in his assistance to the first beginning of great things. He laid down no one entire and general theory, nor had any hopes of living to finish his whole work, but he was determined to tender and to render this" assistance." As he was no " founder of a sect," so was he no promiser of particular works. He ingenuously admitted the imperfection of his natural history, whether " procured from books, or his own inquiry:" but while he left the hasty experimentalist to collect many particulars from his tables, and apply them to works, he endeavoured after greater things, and would wait with patience for the harvest. The 118th Aphorism is a remarkable one, as it is a confession of the probable want of verification in his history and tables, and at the same time a defence of them, which has been a good deal overlooked. "But this is nothing," and "let no one be concerned, if our history has its errors." He was also aware that there would occur many things in them, that appeared at first sight, (1.) trifling and vulgar; (2.) sordid and ignoble; and (3.) subtile, which might alienate the minds of men from considering them: and he soon disposes of these probable contempts. Then follows a fine defence of his rejection of all former sciences and authors at a stroke. It would not have been difficult for him to attribute what he produced, "either to the early ages, (when, perhaps, the knowledge of nature flourished more, though with less pomp, than after it came into the flutes and trumpets of the Greeks,) or even in certain particulars, to some of the Greeks themselves; and thence derive authority and honour to his inventions." But relying wholly upon the evidence of things, he rejected all stratagem and imposture; and judged it of no greater moment to the business in hand, whether what was then discovered was known to the ancients, and, by the vicissitude of things and ages, is made to set and rise; than to be solicitous whether America is the island Atlantis, or were first discovered by Columbus; for the discovery is to be derived from the light of nature, and not from the darkness of antiquity. He shows that his procedure of striking out all authorities at once was more rational than a bit-by-bit rejection as the errors have been fundamental; and therefore it is no wonder if they have not obtained what they never had in view; nor arrived at the end they never proposed; nor finished the course which they neither entered nor held:" and he thought that the method being perfected, great things would be open to all, and almost to all alike.

Then as to his not having himself proposed the true and best end and scope of the sciences, the contemplation of truth being of greater dignity and sublimity than all utility and greatness of works, whilst the long dwelling in experience and particulars, which he recommended, fixed the mind to earth, or rather sunk it into an abyss of hopeless confusion, while it kept it from soaring in the diviner state of abstract wisdom and tranquillity. This was just the sort of argument for our author to deal with, and he allows its force. But he "would place a true model of the world in the human understanding, such as the world is found to be, and not such as any one's reason might make it "—he would have no mock models, no idols of man, for the ideas of the divine mind; no arbitrary abstractions, but the true signatures of the Creator upon the creatures, as impressed upon matter, and limited by true and exact lines. Therefore truth and utility are identified-they are the very things required-all other improvements follow the improvement of the mind; and, therefore, the works recommended should be more esteemed as they are pledges of truth, than as they are of use in life.

He then candidly states another palpable objection to his system, which is even still urged by those who are anxious to refute what no one has asserted on behalf of our author,

that he was the first to practise the inductive method. In Aphorism 125, he thus states the objection: "That we are only doing what has been done before, that the ancients proceeded in the same way that we do, and therefore that we shall probably, after all this struggling and striving, but at length come to some one or other of those philosophies which prevailed among the ancients; for that they in the beginnings of their contemplations, procured a large stock of examples and particulars, digested them into registers, common-place books, and titles, and thence composed their philosophies and their arts; thus pronouncing upon full discovery; that they added examples occasionally, by way of confirmation, and as a help to instruction, but thought it needless and burthensome to publish their notes, memoirs, and common-place books of particulars; herein following the example of builders, who, after they have erected an edifice, take down the ladders and scaffolding, and remove them out of sight." And how could the ancients have proceeded otherwise? They had a form of inquiry and discovery, but it was no other than flying from certain particular examples, with the assistance of common notions, to the most general conclusions and principles of the sciences, thence deducing inferior conclusions; and if new particulars and examples arose, or were produced to oppose their established doctrine, they either made them square by subtle distinctions, or accommodated explanations to their own rules; or else in a gross manner, struck them out by exceptions; and at the same time wresting and fitting the more tractable particulars to their own principles.

Again, as he disallowed a liberty of pronouncing at once, and insisted upon the most strictly regulated method of coming from intermediate particulars to universal conclusions, it might be objected that he patronized such a suspension of the judgment, as would bring all to a state of scepticism. He thus replies to this objection, which was no figment, but one he had doubtless often heard: "The truth is, we intend and propose the art of doubting properly; for we do not detract from, but administer to, the sense; and do not despise, but regulate, the understanding. And it is better to know so much as is necessary, and yet not think ourselves to know all, than to think that we know all, and yet remain ignorant of that which is necessary." From the 127th Aphorism, it is plain that he intended his method to be one of universal applicability: "Our new logic, which proceeds by induction, comprehends every thing." He designed to draw up tables of induction for mental, moral, and political, as well as natural philosophies.

The grounds of hope having been laid, and unjust prejudices removed, he thinks he may speak of the excellency of the end in view. He places the inventors of arts before founders of empires, legislators, and deliverers of their countries. He refers to the power, efficacy, and consequences of three modern inventions, whose origin was obscure: the art of printing, gunpowder, and the compass; which have given the world a new face, (1.) with regard to learning, (2.) with regard to war, (3.) with regard to navigation. A man's desire to aggrandize himself, or his country, is a mere degenerate ambition, compared with his (if it deserve so bad a name as ambition) who strives to restore and enlarge the power and empire of mankind over the universe of things; which is, without dispute, more solid and majestic. Resolving all into the contemplation of things as they are in themselves, which he esteemed to be of greater dignity than even the immediate benefits of invention that might flow from it, and calling in the directing aid of rectified reason and sound religion, he proposes to consider the art itself of interpreting nature, and, in the next book, predicts that the art of invention will improve and grow up with inventions themselves.

The second book of the Novum Organum is considerably larger than the first, and consists of fifty-two aphorisms, for the "interpretation of nature," with the digested matter of particulars, designed for the work of the understanding, in a few determinate subjects, by way of example or palpable model. We are now in the house of the interpreter himself; and as he depicted the character of a true interpreter in such lively colours, it remains to

be seen whether he approaches to it. The interpreter duly qualified-the interpreter such as he has boldly sketched-was to proceed in this manner: "He must first consider the state of mankind; next remove the obstacles in the way of interpretation; and then, coming directly to the work, prepare a history and regular sets of tables of invention; show the uses thereof, their relations, dependencies, and subserviency to each other. He must represent how little real and serviceable knowledge mankind is possessed of; and how all just inquiry into nature has been neglected. He must use choice and judgment in singling out and giving the first place to such subjects of inquiry as are most fundamental or important; that is, such as have a tendency to the discovery of other things, or else to supply the necessities of life. He must likewise observe the pre-eminency of instances; which is a thing that greatly conduces to shorten the work. And when thus provided, he must again renew his inquiries, draw out fresh tables, and now with a greater ripeness of knowledge, more successfully enter upon and perfect the business of interpretation; which will thus become easy. And when he has done this, he will directly see and enumerate, in a pure and native light, the true, eternal, and most simple motions of nature; from the regular and exact progress whereof proceeds the infinite variety of the universe: and afterwards, being wholly intent upon the discovery of human uses, and the state of things then present, he will regulate and dispose all in a different manner for practice; assigning to the most secret and hidden natures, others that are explanatory thereof, and such as are superinducing to those that are the most absent.".

[ocr errors]

The first ten aphorisms relate to "the discovery of forms, or causes, in nature." The tenth divides the indications for the interpretation of nature into two general parts: the first relating to the raising of axioms from experience, and the second to the deriving of new experiments from axioms. The last part was never proceeded with, or published: the former he divided into three kinds of administrations or helps; viz. the helps, (1.) for the sense; (2.) for the memory; and (3.) for the reason. The first object, therefore, was to procure a just and adequate natural and experimental history, as the foundation of the whole thing;" which history must be "digested and ranged in proper order," in tables and subservient chains of instances, "that the understanding may commodiously work upon them; and the understanding must not enter upon the task of raising axioms by itself, but be first regulated, strengthened, and guarded by means of a genuine and real induction, as a key of interpretation. The inquiry of forms was to proceed in this manner: "First, all the known instances agreeing in the same nature, though in the most dissimilar subjects, are to be brought together, and placed before the understanding; and this collection is to be made historically, without any over-hasty indulgence of speculation, or any great subtlety for the present." He then illustrates his method of discovering forms by an inquiry into the form of heat.

In Table 1, he collects "Instantia convenientes in natura calidi," or, Instances agreeing in the nature of heat; which are a collection of particulars wherein heat is found, so that they agree in having the nature of heat common to them all.

In Table 2, he collects" Instantiæ in proximo quæ privantur natura calidi,” or, Instances of approximation yet wanting the nature of heat.

Table 3 forms a table of " Degrees of Heat."

These three tables were intended to present a view of instances to the understanding, for the practice of induction; and its first work was, (according to Aph. 15, 16,) “ to throw out or exclude such particular natures as are not found in any instance where the given nature is present, or such as are found in any instance where that nature is absent; and again, such as are found to increase in any instance when the given nature decreases, or to decrease when that nature decreases. And then after this rejection and exclusion is duly made, the affirmative, solid, true, and well-defined form, will remain as the result of the operation." And as

« הקודםהמשך »