and earth, by the benediction of a producat, but was | racle-working faith; others, that draw nearer to immediately inspired from God; so it is not possible probability, calling to their view the secret passages that it should be, otherwise than by accident, sub- of things, and especially of the contagion that passject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the eth from body to body, do conceive it should likesubject of philosophy; and therefore the true know-wise be agreeable to nature, that there should be ledge of the nature and state of the soul, must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendixes, which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth, divination, and fascination. Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens: natural is, when the mind hath a presentation by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts, either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental; whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees, and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The politician hath his predictions; "O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit!" which stayed not long to be performed in Sylla first, and after in Cæsar; so as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of, which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive, and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion, which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions, save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency and elevation, which the ancients noted by fury, and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other. Fascination is the power and act of imagination more intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant: for of that we speak in the proper place; wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic, have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of mi some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown, now almost made civil, of the mastering spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously, a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended, that ceremonies, characters, and charms, do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it; as images are said by the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, "In sudore vultûs comedes panem tuum." For they propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiencies in these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity. The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, is of two kinds: the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth direction or decree, the latter action or execution. It is true that the imagination is an agent or nuncius in both provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can be acted: for imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion, saving that this Janus of imagination hath differing faces; for the face towards reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good, which nevertheless are faces, "Quales decet esse sororum." Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger, but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen," who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions, that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather pleasure, or play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason; so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine "De animâ," whereunto most fitly it belongeth: and lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that Human Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, Rational and Moral. The part of Human Philosophy which is Rational, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity for as it was truly said, that knowledge is "pabulum animi ;" so in the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned "ad ollas carnium," and were weary of manna; which though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and are conversant; but this same "lumen siccum" doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as they are in worth, "rational knowledges" are the keys of all other arts; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "That the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms;" so these be truly said to be the art of arts; neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow. The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred; for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded'; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition. Invention is of two kinds, much differing; the one of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience, as if in the making of an inventory, touching the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, That there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the WestIndies had never been discovered, if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange, if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over. That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment, standeth plainly confessed: for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus asknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato, in his Theætetus, noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men. "Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem foliis, et flore comantem Purpureo: non illa feris incognita capris, Gramina cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ." So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Ægyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute; "Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam," etc. And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see the West-Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion: so as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the potlid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance, or any thing else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other. "Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of and do put in use: which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being; for so Cicero saith very truly, "Usus uni rei deditus, et naturam et artem sæpe vincit." And therefore if it be said of men, "Labor omnia vincit Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas ;" Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like; yea, and divinity, because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest, that form may have use, and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, "Quæ assensum parit, operis effœta est;" but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds; for arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words, and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of conse it is likewise said of beasts, "Quis psittaco docuit suum xaipe;" Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill lest it, should take root and grow Add then the word extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty; and the word paula-quences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, tim, which importeth the extreme slowness; and we are where we were, even amongst the Ægyptian gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of invention. Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent; wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of," Aërei mellis cœlestia dona," distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find, that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects, upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not. As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse, which were brought before him, and failed of David which was in the field. And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile, as have managed these things, to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars, which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, for serjeants and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service: certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth; for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions, whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood. that can ever correct that error, being, as the physicians speak, in the first digestion; and therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension, and held opinion, that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, "Scientiam dissimulando simulavit:" for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge, like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would not For acknowledge so much; and in the later academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia, I doubt, was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in copy of speech, seem to have chosen that sect as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence, and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity. But here was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon the senses, which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavillations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense, to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass. naturæ. This part of invention, concerning Experientia the invention of sciences, I purpose, if literata, et inGod give me leave, hereafter to pro- terpretatio pound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term experientia literata, and the other interpretatio naturæ: the former bcing but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise. The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention; for to invent, is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of this invention is no other, but out of the knowledge, whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as, to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chace, as well of deer in an enclosed park, as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name; let it be called invention, so as it be perceived and discerned that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, "They did as if one that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, "that the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store:" and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept that pleaders should have the places whereof they have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly; that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of, if he will take the pains, he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled in thesi so that when he cometh to a particular, he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes, who in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the farther handling of it to rhetoric. The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge, as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to prompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion, else how shall he know it when he hath found it ?" And therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask: or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report, that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient. Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to, but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtile in a few things, which are within their command, and to reject the rest, I do receive particular topics, that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences: for in these it holdeth, “Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis;" for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth; so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth, which light if we strengthen, by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit. Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention: for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense: but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequences is another: the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of nature. For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured; for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling: therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn. So then this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles to be agreed by all, and exempted from argument: the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention: the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution; the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure of which form it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words; and this is that part of logic which is comprehended in the analytics. But yet farther, this doctrine of Elenches hath a more ample latitude and extent, than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured, and others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elenche; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, especially of such words as are most general and intervene in every inquiry; it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful uses, leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again, the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions. Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation, not so much perplexing the reason, as over-ruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle, when I shall speak of rhetoric. But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to effect more than the negative or privative. So that a few times hitting, or presence, countervails ofttimes failing, or absence; as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him, in Neptune's temple, the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, "Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest." "Yea, but," saith Diago The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance' sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations, with their redargutions, which is that which is termed Elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be, yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment, This part concerning Elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example; not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution; yet it is manifest, the degenerate and corrupt use is for cap-ras, "where are they painted that are drowned ?" tion and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature. Let us behold it in another instance, namely, "That |