gists) that the brain and nervous centres are the organs to which its manifestations are due, or with which they are connected. A concise account follows of the nervous centres and the organs of sense and locomotion. Throughout this work, mind is treated of as closely connected, inseparably connected, with the actions of a material organism; not, so far as we can trace, from any leaning towards what is generally called materialism, but simply for convenience, inasmuch as all our experience of mind is derived through and from the observation of material changes by means of our material organs; and in a system so purely inductive and descriptive as the present it is absolutely necessary to state and recognise that, so far as we can know, where mind acts, there matter is in change; and where these changes are to be observed, it must be through material organs of sense. We believe that the question of the materiality or immateriality of mind is not once alluded to, nor indeed the nature of mind at all; it is with phenomena only that this work deals.

One of the views most distinctive of, and most extensively affecting, the entire theory set forth in these volumes, is connected with "Spontaneous Activity." So far from holding the popularly received doctrine that sensation originates motion, Mr. Bain upholds " that movement precedes sensation, and is at the outset independent of any stimulus from without; and that action is a more intimate and inseparable property of our constitution than any of our sensations, and in fact enters as a component part into every one of the senses, giving them the character of compounds, while itself is a simple and elementary property.' This doctrine is inextricably interwoven with the entire theory of volition; in the mode in which it is brought forward it has the aspect of novelty; the acquisition of voluntary acts is placed by it upon an entirely new basis; on these grounds we shall enter at more detail into our author's line of argument.

The first step is to prove the "existence of a class of move◄ ments and actions anterior to, and independent of, the sensations of the senses." These movements arise, according to this view, from the central stimulus of the nervous system, and are "the spontaneous discharge of the active energy of the nerve centres."t The proofs adduced are as follow:

"1. The tonicity of muscles; not amounting to motion, but the tension implying a lower degree of similar activity.

"2. The permanent closure of the sphincter muscles, not accounted for either by impressions from within or without the body, or by the muscles' own contractility, inasmuch as the destruction of certain nerve centres relaxes these muscles.

"3. The action of the involuntary muscles."

* Vol. i. p. 67.

+ Vol. i. p. 83.

On which argument, however, the author judiciously refrains from laying much stress.

"4. In awakening from sleep, movement precedes sensation. If light were essential to the movements concerned in vision, it would be impossible to open the eyes. The act of awakening from sleep can hardly be considered in any other view than as the reviving of the activity by a rush of nervous power to the muscles, FOLLOWED by the exposure of the senses to the influences of the outer world. I know of no circumstance that would go to show that sensation is the antecedent fact, in the case when the individual wakes of his own accord. The first symptom of awakening that presents itself is a general commotion of the frame, a number of spontaneous movements the stretching of the limbs, the opening of the eyes, the expansion of the features -to all which succeeds the revival of the sensibility to outward things. Mysterious as the nature of sleep is in the present state of our knowledge, we are not precluded from remarking so notable a circumstance as the priority of action to sensibility, at the moment of wakening.

"But if this be a fact, we seem to prove beyond a doubt that the renewed action must originate with the nerve centres themselves. The first gestures must be stimulated from within, by a power lodged in the grey masses of the brain; afterwards they are linked with the gestures and movements suggested by sense, and revived by intelligence and will. . . We are at liberty to suppose that the nourished condition of the nerve centres, consequent on the night's repose, is the cause of that burst of spontaneous exertion which marks the movement of awakening. The antecedent of the activity in this case is therefore more physical than mental, and this must be the case with spontaneous energy in general."*

Before passing on to another order of proofs adduced by the author, we would make one or two remarks on those already given. We are inclined to believe in the spontaneous activity here indicated, inasmuch as we can see no reason why nutrition and rest should not induce a state of polarity in the nervous centres, which finds its restoration to equilibrium by this sort of discharge; we can, on the contrary, see many cogent reasons why it should be so. But the fact must not be overlooked that these arguments do not prove the case, that they are indeed perfectly explicable on the converse hypothesis. We need not enter into the physiological refutation of the first three sections; the fourth claims a few remarks. We doubt extremely whether, save in very exceptional instances, motion does precede sensation in the act of awaking. (1) We are all conscious, very frequently, of a more or less prolonged interval between our first waking idea (i. e., sensation), and our first motion or action; when existence appears to be nothing but a pure sensation. (2) The active phenomena of awakening, as above described, agree accurately with * Vol. i. pp. 75-6.

those almost invariably observed when the waking state is brought about by an external stimulus or influence upon the senses. (3) We awaken in a precisely similar manner, when we do so in obedience to some idea (sensation) conveyed in a dream. (4) Not unfrequently, when we awake suddenly with a start, and motion appears to be the first link of the waking chain, we remember, some time afterwards, that we were dreaming, and received a sudden shock, ideally, in the dream which caused the start. (5) The opening of the eyes, previous to the stimulus of light, can count for nothing as a proof, because it would occur equally in the dark in obedience to any sudden call, or impulse, as part of the co-ordinate movements. (6) It is quite impossible to prove that an organic sensation does not preexist in all cases of awakening, even supposing that no dream, or conscious interval or idea should be present. Thus far, therefore, although inclined to agree with the theory, we are in doubt as to the cogency of the arguments adduced in proof. We will now, however, examine those derived from other considerations.

5. The early movements of infancy are supposed by our author to be in great part due to the spontaneous activity of the nervous centres. Some part of these movements may be attributable to the stimulus of sensation, to the sights, sounds, and movements of outward things;-some part again to emotion or sensation generated within the body, or to states of consciousness growing out of the brain and the bodily processes generally, "as when internal pain gives rise to paroxysms, or high health to the lively movements of mere animal spirits;" but as these appear to be actions and gesticulations which show no connexion with sight or sound, or other influence of the external world, and also that have no particular motional character either of pleasure or pain, it appears that " we can ascribe them to nothing but the mere abundance and exuberance of self-acting muscular and cerebral energy, which will rise and fall with the vigour and nourishment of the general system."*

The activity of young animals in general, and especially of such animals as are remarkable for their active endowments, as insects, seems to us to be the strongest argument brought forward to prove the spontaneity of muscular action:

"When the kitten plays with a worsted ball, we always attribute the overflowing fulness of moving energy to the creature's own inward stimulus, to which the ball merely serves for a pretext. So an active young hound, refreshed by sleep or rested by confinement, pants for being let loose, not because of anything that attracts his view, or kindles up his ear, but because a rush of activity courses through his members, rendering him uneasy till the confined energy has found vent * Vol. i. p. 77.

in a chase or a run. We are at no loss to distinguish this kind of activity from that awakened by sensation or emotion, and the distinction is accordingly recognised in the modes of interpreting the movements and feelings of animals. When a rider speaks of his horse as fresh,' he implies that the natural activity is undischarged, and pressing for vent; the excitement caused by mixing in a chase or in a battle, is a totally different thing from the spontaneous vehemence of a full-fed and under-worked animal."*

In like manner it would appear as though the activity of early human life ought to be attributed in great measure, neither to sensation nor emotion, but to "freshness"-to a current of undischarged activity. High health, natural vigour, and spontaneous outpouring appear frequently to be the only obvious antecedents of ebullient activity. "The very necessity of bodily exercise felt by every one, and most of all by the young, is a proof of the existence of a fund of energy that comes round with the day, and presses to be discharged."

"

The remaining arguments for muscular spontaneity are more complex, and pro tanto more open to objection. They are founded upon extreme activity as dependent upon excitement,upon the fact that sensibility and activity are not proportionate one to the other (an argument open to much discussion); and upon the consideration that without this spontaneity, volition, or "activity guided to ends," would be impossible. We shall see shortly how this last position is developed; and that we may do this and keep up the connexion, we will pass over without comment the other arguments.

In the chapter on the "Instinctive Germ of Volition" (p. 289) we find it stated that, "this fact of spontaneous activity I look upon as an essential prelude to voluntary power, making, indeed, one of the terms or elements of volition; in other words, volition is a compound, made up of this and something else." What is it then, that is superadded to spontaneous motion of limbs, body, voice, tongue, eyes, &c., to produce volition?

"If we look at this kind of (spontaneous) impulse closely, we shall see wherein its defect or insufficiency lies, namely, in the random nature of it; being dependent on the condition of the various nervous centres, the discharge is regulated by physical circumstances, and not by the ends, purposes, or uses of the animal."+

Mr. Bain's theory of the growth of volition being quite new, we shall give it in his own words, although the quotation is somewhat lengthy. "I will endeavour to indicate what seems to me to be the circumstance that leads to this remarkable union between the two great isolated facts of our nature; namely, on the one hand, feelings inciting to movement in general, but to no action * Vol. i. p. 77. † Vol. i. p. 291.

in particular, and, on the other hand, the spontaneous movements already spoken of." Our readers will do well to note the next sentence and the italics which are our own, as directing attention to Mr. Bain's special views as to the purely accidental origin of each particular act of volition:

"If at the moment of some acute pain, there should accidentally occur a spontaneous movement, and if that movement sensibly. alleviates the pain, then it is that the volitional impulse belonging to the feeling will show itself. The movement accidentally begun through some other influence, will be sustained through this influence of the painful emotion. In the original situation of things, the acute feeling is unable of itself to bring on the precise movement that would modify the suffering; there is no primordial link between a state of suffering and a train of alleviating movements. But should the proper movement be once actually begun, and cause a felt diminution of the acute agony, the spur that belongs to states of pain would suffice to sustain this movement. .. If the state of pain cannot awaken a dormant action, a present feeling can at least maintain a present action. This, so far as I can make out, is the original position of things in the matter of volition. . . . . An example will perhaps place this speculation in a clearer light. An infant lying in bed has the painful sensation of chilliness. This feeling produces the usual emotional display, namely, movements, and perhaps cries and tears. Besides these emotional elements, there is a latent spur of volition, but with nothing to lay hold of as yet, owing to the disconnected condition of the mental arrangements at our birth. The child's spontaneity, however, may awake, and the pained condition will act so as to irritate the sponta neous centres, and make their central stimulus flow more copiously. In the course of a variety of spontaneous movements of arms, legs, and body, there occurs an action that brings the child in contact with the nurse lying beside it; instantly warmth is felt, and this alleviation of the painful feeling becomes immediately the stimulus to sustain the movement going on at that moment. That movement, when discovered, is kept up in preference to the others occurring in the course of the random spontaneity.

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By a process of cohesion or acquisition, which I shall afterwards dwell upon, the movement and the feeling become so linked together, that the feeling can at after times awaken the movement out of dormancy; this is the state of matters in the maturity of volition. The infant of twelve months' old can hitch nearer the side of the nurse, although no spontaneous movements to that effect happen at the moment; past repetition has established a connexion that did not exist at the beginning, whereby the feeling and action have become linked together as cause and effect. A full-grown volition is now manifested, instead of that vague incitement that could do nothing until the right movement had sprung up in the course of a series of spontaneous discharges of the central sources of power.'

* Vol. i. pp. 294-6.