the fatigues of the week until Monday, or rather that he might study there with greater freedom, where he had a second wellchosen library. It was in this country house, simple but well situated and very agreeable, that he received his friends and disciples. For a long time Mayor of Torfou, he accepted with gratification the homage gladly offered to him at certain periods of the year, particularly at the annual fête of the place. The poor of the neighbourhood found in him a benefactor whose counsel was never sought in vain.

Pinel was gifted with an excellent constitution, and a well-poised mind; and thanks to a sober life and freedom from all excesses, he nearly always enjoyed good health. But in 1793 a typhoid fever which he caught in his attendance upon the prisoners at Bicêtre, amongst whom it was very prevalent, brought him to the verge of the grave. He took pleasure in recounting that he mainly owed his restoration to small, often-repeated doses of old Arbois wine, and from a grateful remembrance of this fact, he always had this wine in his cellar, and sometimes on his table.

There was that, says M. Bricheteau, in his manner and appearance which at once set at ease those whom the reputation of the celebrated physician brought to his consulting room; no man was ever more accessible even at the time of his greatest renown and his innumerable engagements.

His countenance was grave, his forehead furrowed with wrinkles, his look as of old was mild, affable, and intellectual. "Looking on him," says Dupuytren, "one might imagine he beheld one of the sages of Greece.”

During the latter years of his life he spent some portion of each day in gardening, either in the garden of the Salpêtrière, or at his own country house.

Pinel lost his first wife about 1812, and married again in 1815. His second wife was an excellent lady, who was sincerely attached to him, and bestowed upon him all the care and solicitude which he needed. His family certainly owe to her the prolongation of my uncle's life, and his sons are no less indebted to her for the preservation of the fortune which he had acquired. When the infirmities consequent upon advanced age, and a first slight attack of apoplexy in 1820 led to his retirement from active life, my aunt never more left him for an instant; she lavished upon him every succour and attention, and every proof of affectionate devotion and conjugal love. When the arbitrary ordinance of Corbière was promulgated, by which, when near eighty years of age, he was left with an income insufficient to maintain his household on the modest footing in which he lived, his venerable wife hid from him their straitened position, and did all in her power to prevent his noticing it; she changed none of her husband's habits,

but, on the other hand, denied herself in order that she might have it in her power to comply with them. I have myself witnessed this noble conduct, and I am happy to be able to render this homage to the memory of a woman who was devoted and generous not only towards her husband's sons but also towards all his relations.

From 1820 to 1826, Pinel had several other apoplectic attacks which were followed by partial paralysis. The first seizure left but few traces, but those which followed enfeebled and changed his physical organization. During the last two years of his life he resided almost exclusively in the country. A few friends visited him occasionally, and he was glad to see them and very sensible of their kind attentions.

It is generally believed that the last years of Pinel's life were passed in a species of infancy or intellectual weakness; this is an error, as I might prove by the testimony of his intimate friends who visited him to the last. Without possessing all the activity and energy of his formerly brilliant intellect, he nevertheless preserved the integrity of his judgment, the delicacy of his wit, his power of appreciation, and his medical tact; but he was not always able to express his thoughts as he would have wished: he was conscious of this difficulty and of the morbid causes to which it was due. At the same time when he was able to overcome this embarrassment of speech he expressed his ideas with brevity and clearness. He was ordinarily silent, and appeared absorbed in his reflections or incapable of attention; but, on the contrary, he lost nothing of what passed around him. His visitors were therefore at times astonished at the fitness and justice of his laconic and sensible remarks.

M. Ferrus has often told me, and has repeated to me within the last few days facts which he witnessed, and which confirm what I here state. The following is one of the most remarkable. One day during the last year of Pinel's life a young girl who had had a fall was brought to his house in the country, and complained of severe pain in the inferior part of one of the forearms. Some physicians who were present, and amongst others Messieurs Rostan, Ferrus, and Pinel, jun., after having carefully examined the child, were unable to discover any injury; at the same time as motion was very painful and the patient complained of great suffering, my uncle who had not appeared to have taken any interest in the matter, approached and said to his friends, The child is very young; examine the inferior part of the radius, there is probably a separation of the epiphysis." A new examination immediately proved the justice of Pinel's diagnosis.

66

On the 15th October, 1826, he returned to Paris in good health, and without anything to denote his approaching end

During the night of the 21st he was taken with violent shivering, which was the prelude of pneumonia, under which he succumbed on the third day, notwithstanding all the attentions of his wife, his sons, and the physicians who had been called in.

An immense crowd accompanied his remains to the cemetery of Père la Chaise, where Dr. Rostan, his old pupil and friend, pronounced with emotion over his tomb a few feeling and eloquent words. Most of the physicians of Paris made it a duty to assist at his funeral, and all the learned bodies of which he was a member sent deputations. It was very touching also to see in the procession a considerable number of old women from the Salpêtrière, vho came to pay a last tribute to him who for more than thirty years had been their physician, father, and benefactor,

ART. VI.-BAIN'S PSYCHOLOGY.*

WITHOUT Committing ourselves to an unqualified endorsement of all Mr. Bain's detailed opinions as to the phenomena and laws of mental action, we feel no hesitation in expressing our conviction, that no single contribution has ever been made in our country to the science of mind, that has done so much to render it an accurate science as these two volumes are likely to do. This arises in part from the method adopted, and in part from the full and exhaustive manner in which this method is worked out. Mr. Bain has entirely forsaken the time-honoured a priori plan of investigation, which is in fact no plan at all, but chiefly a series of assumptions, and circular reasoning upon these; and has treated mental phenomena as objects of true inductive analysis; taking them singly and in combination as indicating so much value in the general result; and thereby laying a stable foundation for a system of rational descriptive psychology. In accomplishing this, Mr. Bain evinces profound and extensive acquaintance with all the sciences which bear directly upon mental developments, especially with physiology in most of its departments; he has also the boldness to accept as legitimate objects for reasoning the abnormal as well as the normal phases of thought, action, and feeling. We may, perhaps, question whether some of our mental states are not still too complex and too imperfectly known to admit of ultimate analysis, so that the elements can be distinctly traced and classified; and whether in attempting this, Mr. Bain has not overstrained some of his theo

*The Senses and the Intellect. By Alexander Bain, A.M. London. 1855. The Emotions and the Will. By Alexander Bain, A. M., Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in the University of London, London, 1859.

ries, particularly, for instance, when treating of Belief, Freewill, Emotion, &c.; this we may question or suspect, but granting all this or more, few will deny after carefully reading these interesting and elaborate volumes, that the author has rendered a service to our science which may now be partially recognised, but which can only be fully appreciated perhaps after the labours of many others have built an enduring system upon his foundation.

Having premised thus far upon the general character of the work, we believe that instead of further defending our author's method and indicating his precise place amongst the schoolmen (a work for which we imagine he would be little recognisant), it will be more acceptable to our readers to place before them a concise analysis of the plan, with a somewhat more detailed account of such parts of the theory (and these are many and important) as are entirely new.

Mr. Bain recognises in the outset three attributes or capacities of mind:

1. It has Feeling, in which is included what is commonly called Sensation and Emotion.

2. It can Act, according to Feeling.

3. It can Think.

On this classification we may remark that Feeling, Emotion, and Consciousness are terms used "to express one and the same attribute of mind."* In the second attribute so simply stated, we trace one of the author's most defined views, that voluntary action results exclusively from feeling; a principle which afterwards materially influences his views upon volition; the will appearing but as the result of the balance of motives.

An important consideration is broadly stated immediately after this classification :

"Consciousness is inseparable from the first of these capacities, but not, as it appears to me, from the second or the third. True, our actions and thoughts are usually conscious, that is, as known to us by an inward perception; but the consciousness of an act is manifestly not the act, and although the assertion is less obvious, I believe that the consciousness of a thought is distinct from the thought. To flee on the appearance of danger is one thing, and to be conscious that we apprehend danger is another."+

We believe that all this is true, but we should go further if thus far. For by whatever process of reasoning Thought can be represented as unconscious, by the same can Emotion be so viewed.

* See p. 1, Introduction, vol. i. In all these references the treatise on the Senses and the Intellect is considered as the first volume, and that on the Emotions and the Will as the second,

+ Loc. cit.

And if Action may be unconscious, and at the same time the result of Feeling, as by the terms of the second definition it is supposed to be, the motor cause we should infer should be (possibly at least) as unconscious as the resultant act. But in the present stage of the investigation it would be premature to enter more fully into this question.

There is nothing requiring specific notice in the preliminary general notions given of Feeling or Action; those concerning Thought are worthy of quotation:

"The first fact implied in it (i.e., Thought or Intelligence) is discrimination, with sense of agreement or difference, as when of two things taken into the mouth the animal prefers one to the other.

To

go back upon a former experience as preferable to the present is to act upon an idea, a thought; whenever this is clearly manifested we see an intelligent being.

"Another fact of intelligence, also exhibited by the lower orders of creatures, is the power of associating ends with means or instruments, so as to dictate intermediate actions.

"These two facts, discriminating with preference, and the performance of intermediate actions to attain an end, are the most universal aspects of intelligence, inasmuch as they pervade the whole of the animal creation."*

Perhaps this is an assumption rather too general and hasty. It can scarcely be doubted that there are large tribes of creatures clearly recognisable as of animal nature, in which we certainly have no evidence of discrimination in the sense here implied, though that it may be there is not impossible. In many of the same creatures there is the same lack of any proof that ends are intelligently associated with means. The author continues thus:

"In the higher regions of mind, the attribute of thinking implies the storing up, reviving, and combining anew all the impressions constituting what we call knowledge, and principally derived from the outer world acting on the senses. It is this wider range of intellectual operations displayed by the human mind, that gives scope for exposition in a work like the present.

"Although in the animal constitution Thought is coupled and conjoined with Feeling and Volition, it does not necessarily follow that Intelligence is a necessary part of either the one or the other. I have a difficulty in supposing Volition to operate in the entire absence of an intellectual nature, nevertheless I cannot help looking upon the intellect as a distinct endowment, following laws of its own, being sometimes well developed and sometimes feeble, without regard to the force or degree of the two other attributes."+

In proceeding to consider the phenomena of mind, Mr. Bain enters briefly upon the proofs (sufficiently familiar to physiolo* Vol. i. Introduction, p. 6.

+ Ibid.