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riband account; muslin account; flannel, needle, prayer-book, pin, tract, cap, and stay accounts. In the domestic set, the headings of account were- -Butter, sugar, tea, coffee, cream, eggs, mutton, beef, poultry, vegetables, &c. &c. His pride and boast were to be able to tell you to a farthing how much he had spent for each and all of these articles, for so many years back, or in any given year. I now saw, that nothing could have been better contrived than a system so tediously minute, and so scrupulously exact as this, to keep figures constantly in the head and the pen for ever in the hand.

When, in addition to this mode of keeping his accounts, I saw, that in the alphabetical list of his correspondents there was to be found the name of every important subscriber to the Penitentiary; and that, in addition to writing frequently to them to report progress, he kept up an unintermitting exchange of epistles with every member of his own numerous family, and every friend with any pretensions to intimacy; that he seldom or ever sent off a letter without retaining a copy of it, and was employed once a-month in collecting and arranging, in alphabetical order, the correspondence he had received in the course of it; I was no longer surprised at the prodigious and unceasing occupation at the boudoir, created, not for himself only, and Anne, but, more or less, for every unfortunate guest for the time being.

What struck me, if possible, more than his creative industry, was, in the midst of such ostentation, and apparently enormous expense, the rigour of his economy and the smallness of his actual income. Instead of retiring from business with a million, as had been supposed, he left it with only eighty thousand pounds. He was in receipt from his sons, to whom he had lent this principal, of five per cent on it, or exactly four thousand a-year; and to this income was his expenditure scrupulously confined. Nobody in Bath thought he could possibly be spending less than twelve or fifteen thousand a-year. But his principle was, "Take care of the pence, and the

pounds will take care of themselves; be orderly in your permanent and daily expenditure; and, with a cellar well stocked with wine, a good display of plate, a tolerable cook, well-dressed servants, and four well-bred horses, you may make a prodigious figure." Certainly no one ever illustrated, more exactly than himself, the truth of this theory by the success of his practice.

Should there be any readers of this paper, who, with much more than four thousand a-year, can neither drive four horses, nor have a French cook, nor servants with gold epaulettes, let them try back-look into the pence items of their expenditure, and get a ledger for poultry, pastry, pudding, and pettitoe accounts; they may then possibly succeed in doing what my grandfather did.

Alas, for his latter end! The principal of his fortune dwindled away to nothing in the hands of his favourite son; who, thinking money not sufficiently safe in England during the French war, invested it in a trackless waste, upon which he reared extensive but ruinous works, in North America. He was partner of a banking count in Vienna, and involved himself in large gambling transactions; the house failed, and wounded pride drove my grandfather's son to a violent death. unhappy parent lived only to see and to bewail the loss of that fortune which it had cost him fifty years of toil to accumulate, and of that son whom it was his pride, in the eightieth year of his age, to possess.

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An octogenarian, he died at last of a broken heart and a distracted head. His horses were sold; Louis withdrew to Hamburgh; La Coste returned to France; and Anne retired on a small pension, secured to her in consideration of her having agreed not to marry during my grandfather's life. The rest of the servants were discharged; the sombre escutcheon reared its dark front over the drawing-room windows; and in two little months- nay, not two- the men of Bath had ceased to remember that such a personage as my grandfather had ever lived among them. Sic transit gloria mundi !

IMMORTALITY AND IMMATERIALITY.*

THE mischief done by Lord Brougham, in his Discourse on Natural Theology, is infinite as the theme he has unsuccessfully endeavoured to argue. His needless introduction of the doctrine of the immateriality of the human mind, as a mere assertion or assumption, unsupported by any testimony, and incorrectly stated in terms, was, ou his part, an exhibition of unpardonable vanity and egotism-a futile attempt at originality, for which poor Truth was left to pay the charges as she might. The result has been to make many doubt of the soul's immateriality, who never doubted before, and to confirm the materialist in his insane dream-only the more insane in proportion as the vision of immortality may absurdly blend with its shadows. It must, however, be acknowledged that the materialist is unanswerable in his contest with Lord Brougham, such an unskilful or uninstructed advocate is the noble Paleian illustrator of this noble cause. Accordingly, it has been an easy task for Dr. Wallace, with his logical mind, to crush the Arachnean web, in the meshes of which his lordship has woven, as he thought, an impregnable citadel. Of this we should not have complained, but that this acute writer seems to think that he has also settled the question at issue. Partisans, too, have arisen, who declare Materialism, Immortality, and the Gospel of Christ, to be comates— instead of being, as they are, irreconcilable opposites. In the meantime, we look round in vain for a defender of the Truth - her asserters are no where to be found her questioners

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every where. What is Truth? is Truth? That is the cry in the market-place, in the synagogue, and at the gates of the city. What is Truth? It is looked for in the blue sky and in the clouds-it is listened for in the thunder may not the lightning shape itself into some handwriting on the wall or in the air?-surely, in the mysteries of the great deep of waters it may be discerned--from its fountains it may be evoked-from the windows of heaven it may be called down as the refreshing rain on the bosom of the earth--or in her womb, Truth may be found among the germs or the dregs of nature, in the indistinctness of hades, and the indifference of life and death! Vain and idle expectations! Truth has no such locality —

"Thy soul, O man! is her especial shrine

There find her; thou unto thyself shalt wake,

And to thy God; for heaven is hers and thine :

Seek her in youth, nor yet in age for

sake.

But though all be mute, we will speak -though Dr. Wallace has dumbfounded Lord Brougham, he shall not frighten us into silence. Though the materialists of the north or of the south, of the east or of the west, triumph in the success of their advocate, we will, in our degree, make demonstration of courage, and haste to the rescue of the Truth, both from the mischievous meddling of her incapable advocate, and the perilous approach of his tonguevaliant rival in the lists.

In undertaking a task thus onerous,

1. Observations on the Discourse of Natural Theology, by Henry, Lord Brougham; chiefly relating to his Lordship's Doctrine of the Immateriality of the Human Mind, as proved by Psychological Phenomena; the Applicability of the Inductive Method of Proof to Natural Theology, so far as relates to Psychological Facts, Dreams, &c. &c.; and the Bearing of the "Discourse" on Divine Revelation. By Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL.D., one of his Majesty's Counsel-at-Law in Ireland, &c. London; J. Ridgway and Sons, Piccadilly. 1835.

2. Additional Observations on the Discourse of Natural Theology, by Henry, Lord Brougham, intended to disprove the Doctrine that the Immortality of the Soul depends on its being Immaterial; and also to trace the origin of the Doctrine of the Soul's Immateriality. By Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL.D., &c. Dublin; Milliken and Son, Grafton Street, Booksellers to the University. London; B. Fellowes, Ludgate Street.

1835.

3. Natural Theology Considered, with reference to Lord Brougham's Discourse on that Subject. By Thomas Turton, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the ( kida: Rricted at the

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we shall treat the theme in solemn and
serious-wise, as befits argument so lofty.
Our discourse shall be less critical than
constructive. The critical section has
been executed in a scheme of mental
science, of which it has not been un-
truly, though unfriendlily, said, that
"it is not atheism; for its author affirms
that practical reason is entitled to infer
the existence of a supreme Intelligence.
It is not theism; for he denies that
theoretical reason can demonstrate the
existence of an infinite, intelligent
Being. It is not materialism; for he
maintains that time and space are only
forms of our perceptions, and not the
attributes of extrinsic existences.
is not idealism; for he maintains that
noumena are independent of pheno-
mena; that things perceptible are prior
to perception. It is not libertarianism;
for he allows the will to be determined
by regular laws. It is not fatalism;
for he defines this to be a system in
which the connexion of purposes in
the world is considered as accidental.
It is not dogmatism; for he favours
every possible doubt. It is not scep-
ticism; for he affects to demonstrate
what he teaches." Yes! so far has
criticism succeeded-it has destroyed
all other isms; but it has done-it can
do no more. Its province is destructive
-its assertions are negations; i. e. it
indicates that something is — but what
it is, says not; only that it is not some
other thing. To this extent goes Dr.
Wallace's book; as a critique, it de-
stroys Lord Brougham's notions of
immaterialism; but when the author
undertakes to affirm, be becomes in-
stanter illogical. This can be made
clear to the meanest capacity at once.
What is an immaterial soul? he asks
-a substance not material! Well!
but a substance is something distinct
from what it supports. Be it so.
Then, of course, this substance, and
the thought, the feeling, and the will-
ing, which are its qualities, are different
and distinct ideas? Granted. But, to
proceed, if substance be not identified
with its qualities, of what does itself
consist? what is its essence or nature?
Answer; we are perfectly ignorant of
what it is-its nature, essence, origin,
or duration, and only understand that
it is not in any degree material. In
fine, that, relatively to matter, it is a
negation. So far, so good, in so much

as the logic of the schools is concerned. But we have not done yet; some little talk upon matter remains behind. According to the author before us, it is a substance in which inheres, or which supports the qualities of extension, solidity, impenetrability, but which is distinct from such qualities. Of this material substance, as distinct from its qualities, we know no more than of the immaterial one. For aught we know, then, he concludes, the substance which supports the mental qualities, and the substance which supports the qualities of body, may be the self-same substance. Such is his argument; and he consistently condemns Lord Brougham for asserting that there are two substances, and giving the name of immaterial to that which supports the mental qualities. This is all logical enough. But then, if his lordship is to be restrained from giving a name to the substance, or substances, is not also Dr. Wallace? It would seem not; for, in his opinion, to assert the materiality of the soul is not to deny its immortality. Upon what grounds? "That matter, a substance supporting one set of qualities, and mind, supporting another set of qualities, both having been created, must both be equally in the power of the Creator, to preserve and to annihilate according to his pleasure, whatever that may be. The Creator, qua Creator, has power when he shall think proper to will it; he may either annihilate or prolong, ad infinitum, the existence of any being, whatever may be the qualities or the nature he has given to that being. He cannot, indeed, will or do what involves a contradiction; but this can never be an objection in the way of his perpetuating or shortening being. Therefore," he concludes," that on the mere immateriality of the soul its immortality cannot depend that it must depend on the original will-or (if the Deity can change) on any variation of that will which may be dictated or suggested by his justice or his wisdom." Here is a tolerable list of assumptionsmere assumptions-in place of facts, and made, relative to the substance of mind, concerning which the writer is confessedly ignorant and occurring in a treatise in which he complains of a pseudo immaterialist having proceeded on a mere assumption, instead of an

• Vide the third volume, p. 10, of Tavlor's Historic Survey of German Poetry.

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To all projected or produced: whate'er Comes into being merits nothing but Perdition; better, then, that nothing were Brought into being. What you men call sin,

Destruction-in short, evil-is my province,

My proper element."

One point more, by way of introduction, we think fit to adduce, and shall then plunge into the main inquiry. It appears to Dr. Wallace that it would be more useful if the advocates for the immateriality of the mind, with reference to its immortality, should apply themselves to an inquiry after the origin of the soul, rather than after its immateriality; for if it were once made apparent that the mind pre-existed, or was eternal, the question as to its immateriality would then become comparatively less important; for, if its pre-existence independent of the body was established, whether by earlier creation, or by being of itself eternal, no argument could arise against its immortality on the principle of Lord Brougham, for it would then be plain that its duration would not necessarily cease with the organisation of the body, as it had derived its origin independent of it. Having delivered this decision, Dr. Wallace then quotes Gibbon as saying, very truly," that "four different opinions have been entertained concerning the origin of human souls. First, that they are eternal and divine ; second, that they were created in a separate state of existence, before their union with the body; third, that they have been propagated from the original stock of Adam, who contained in himself the mental as well as the corporeal seed of his posterity; fourth, that each soul is occasionally created and embodied in the moment of conception." "It is a question," adds Dr. Wallace,

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worthy of consideration, for the curious or the incredulous in this matter, whether the chance of finding certainty,

bly to suggest the consideration of it. Gibbon, in his usual style, slyly says that the last of those sentiments appears to have prevailed among the moderns, and that our spiritual history is grown less sublime, without becoming more intelligible.""

Dr. Wallace, notwithstanding this latent and substantive materialism of his system, is evidently a sincere inquirer; and deserves to be helped out of difficulties, from which it would seem he is not able to extricate himself. Let us mount at once to the springhead of his troubles. "I must confess my ignorance, both of the substance of the soul, distinct from its qualities, and of the substance of matter with respect to its qualities-I am equally and profoundly ignorant of both." Ignorant of both he may, but need not—of one he must be. Here is the distinction which Dr. Wallace has failed to perceive. One we do know the other we cannot know. Of what he calls the substance of matter, we need not set about proving that we can know nothing; for he himself contends for the doctrine. Of the substance of the soul, it is expedient that we should attempt some demonstration of our knowledge; for he denies that we have

any.

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We are soul-if there be a substance of the soul, we are that substance. So far as the logic of the schools is concerned, which in reality predicates of matter only, the substance of the soul is a mere negation-what it is, is not affirmed. But is there not a higher logic stillno mere anatomist of passive properties, but identical with the living principle itself? The substance of matter we may infer from its qualities; but separate from ourselves we know nothing of it. The substance of soul, on the other hand, we must be (speaking analogically, in order of time), previously to the expression of any of its qualities. To render the manifestations of its attributes possible, the substance must pre-exist. I, therefore, as the substance of the soul, must exist before any qualities can be generated; and my knowledge of such qualities is consequent upon my primarily being. I am I act and hence I know. I these mental qualities, as of the quaam, accordingly, not only percipient of but I am the very subSamcelves

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symbolic acts and formal representations. Add to this, that I am not only the substance itself, but a conscious, a self-conscious substance-an intelligent, a self-intelligent being. Now, this is a fact which may be used in the way of induction, or in any other legitimate manner, with perfect safety; and only because this is indeed a fact, is it possible for us to know or to perceive any thing-nay, we could know nothing, as distinct from ourselves, if we might not know ourselves also. An intelligent being implies a subject with an object of perception; a selfintelligent being, a subject which bas itself for such object. Nor is it feasible to conceive of an intelligent being thus perceiving other objects, without distinguishing them from itself, and, in thus discriminating, contemplating itself as distinct from them. Thus "the heaven-descended selfknowledge" is the spring-head of all knowledge—nay, and all other knowledge, upon the Berkleian scheme, which Dr. Wallace seems to patronise, is but a series of modes of self-knowledge-as all other being is but a modification of the one individual selfcontemplatist. The body itself, in that scheme, would be but a self-projected object, without any distinct substance for it to inhere in; and, as Dr. Wallace himself admits, we may doubt whether for what we denominate material qualities there is a substance at all supporting them.* Admit this to be true for a moment, and you will have no difficulty in understanding the sublime doctrine of Plato, that "the immaterial soul is incapable of existing without some body or other;" which, on the Berkleian theory, would only mean that an intelligent being must have itself for an object. Conceive

this of the Divine Being apart from creation, and you have, conceding that such Being is intelligent, a subject being its own object. Take yet another step; identify, as we have done, a sentence or two back, this object with body, and then translate the whole into the language of eternity, and rise to the transcendental idea that this Being and its action, this subject and its object, are essentially coeval and inseparate, and thereto add the mystical symbolisation of St. John, and you will interpret both the body and the object into the incarnate Word, and see dimly loomed forth some revelation of that highest mystery. In this refined sense, an immaterial philosopher might contend for the coeternity of matter-a Father of the Church might assert that God is body and the modern doctrine of consciousness, that "the powers of the understanding would for ever continue dormant, were it not for the action of beings external on the bodily frame" -nay, even that "all our ideas and knowledge are ultimately to be derived from sense and matter"-might be safely held, and all equally, without the slightest imputation of materialism; as the external beings with the bodily frame, and even the matter itself, would cease to be material, the only substance recognised being that of the percipient being, thus wonderfully endowed with the power of becoming, and modifying itself into, an infinite variety of forms, an eternal generation of objects, as so many intuitions of itself.

This is ground on which both materialist and immaterialist can stand together, admitting, as each does (on the Berk leian theory), of one only substance, by whichever of the two names it may be called. They both admit the same thing, however they may

"As to the nature and essence of that in which the existing qualities adhere, the substratum, which we call matter, we are, confessedly, totally ignorant; and some even of Christian philosophers altogether deny the existence of any such entity. Berkeley put forward the proposition boldly, and maintained it by arguments, perhaps not yet answered, except to the satisfaction of those with whom habit, and the prejudices derived from it, have more influence than strictly logical proof." -Observations, p. 125.

This is, indeed, the very meaning of Tertullian, in the passage referred to from Beausobre. "Who can deny," says he," that God is a body, though he is a spirit? Every spirit is a body, and has a form proper to it. Melito, so much boasted of for his knowledge and his virtues, composed a treatise to prove that God is corporeal."— P. 84 of Additional Observations. Such passages prove no more the materialism of the Fathers, than the doctrine of an incarnate Deity, the materialism of the Christian religion.

D. Stewart, first dissertation, part two, fifth volume, Suppl. to Encyclo. Brit. He adds, "It is a proposition now universally admitted by philosophers "

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