fact, that the marriage of two sisters together would be a source of rivalry and jealousy. But does this reason exist where the one sister is married only after the death of the other? In such a case, the very ground of the prohibition falls away; and the old lawmaxim applies in its full force: Cessante ratione cessat lex. The prohibition in the law was made to counteract a particular evil; but where that evil does not and cannot exist, the law can have no application.

In either case, therefore, whether we deny or admit the interpretation in question, this 18th verse appears to have no bearing to prohibit the marriage of a wife's sister after the wife's decease.

If the positions of the preceding discussion have been correctly taken, and if I have succeeded in bringing them out clearly to view, the following would seem to be the main points of the Biblical argument.

1. That the tenure of marriage among the Hebrews was uncertain and precarious; and the Hebrew wife was little more than the servant of her husband.

2. That hence there was among the Hebrews a strong distinction between consanguinity and affinity by marriage; the former being permanent and sacred, the latter comparatively temporary and vague.

3. That therefore laws prohibiting marriage with a female relative by blood, did not necessarily and per se prohibit marriage with the wife's relatives of the like degree.

4. That consequently, in respect to affinity by marriage, the Hebrew was bound only so far as there were specific prohibitions, viz. in the case of the mother, daughter, and grand-daughter of his wife.

5. That there was no such prohibition in the case of a wife's sister; except during the life-time of the wife.

These positions being sustained, it would follow that the decision of the General Assembly was not required by the word of God.

With these considerations, as it seems to me, the Biblical argument may be regarded as completed. Minor collateral questions may indeed be raised; but all the great points which can well be brought into discussion, lie within the limits here drawn. The

view above taken obviates the necessity of here pursuing, as is sometimes done, the inquiries: Whether the prohibitions of this passage in Leviticus do or do not relate to marriage; Whether the term wife can here mean also widow; and further, Whether the Mosaic law is still binding upon Christians.

But there are some, who, while they hold that the Scriptures laid no prohibition upon the Hebrew in respect to the marriage of a wife's sister after the death of the wife, suppose nevertheless that the ground and spirit of the Mosaic prohibitions, impose upon Christians the obligation to abstain from such marriages.' It is assumed that the Jewish family constitution was the foundation and rule of all the Mosaic prohibitions in respect to marriage; according to which constitution the father was the patriarch or head of a large family, consisting of the sons with their wives and children, the unmarried daughters, and the necessary domestics and slaves. It is argued, that because in such a family the intercourse of a nephew with the wife of his paternal uncle, and that of a brother with the wife of his brother, was far more frequent and intimate, than that of the nephew with the wife of his maternal uncle, or that of the husband with the sister of his wife; therefore, a paternal uncle's wife and a brother's wife are specified in the prohibition; while a maternal uncle's wife and a wife's sister are not thus specified. From this arrangement is drawn the conclusion, "that it is the law of God that a man should not marry any of his oixɛia, that is, the members of his own family, those who are accustomed to associate with him on the terms of domestic intimacy." And on the strength of this principle the ground is taken, that even did the Scriptures "assert that the marriage of a man with the sister of his deceased wife was lawful for the Jews, it would not be the less unlawful for us."

This would seem to be, at least, an abandonment of the whole ground of Biblical argument urged before the General Assembly, and on which in a great degree that Assembly founded its decision. But is this principle in itself more tenable? Or, if admitted in this case, would it not necessarily become of wider application, and so refute itself? The argument is, that although this rule might

The substance of the following remarks appeared in the New-York Observer of February 4th 1843.

not include and so prohibit the wife's sister under the form of the Jewish household; yet it does include and so prohibit her under the forms of social and family life to which we are now accustomed; because, although the wife's sister did not naturally and usually form a part of a Jewish family, yet she is often in our day a member of her sister's household, associating on terms of domestic intimacy with the sister's husband and others of his kindred. The family constitution is changed; but the principle of the law remaining, its application, it is said, should now be extended more widely than under the Jewish dispensation.

Granting for the moment this position to be true, and sufficient to sustain the prohibition of marriage with a wife's sister; it may be worth inquiry, whether the same principle is not applicable to other cases of kindred. For example, it is not at all unfrequent, that a husband's brother becomes a member of his household; and then he stands on a footing of family intercourse and domestic intimacy with the wife and with her sister; especially if the latter, as is not seldom the case, is also an inmate of the same family. He calls her sister, and she calls him brother; and their intercourse would naturally give rise to brotherly and sisterly affection.

Again, how often does the father of a family take home a nephew or a niece to bring up in his own house and with his own children? They grow up together from childhood to manhood or womanhood; and although they may not call each other brother and sister, because that is not the precise degree of blood existing between them, yet they stand towards each other in the relation of brother and sister; and in this case, too, their intercourse naturally gives rise to brotherly and sisterly affection.

The instances also are not rare, in which parents in like manner adopt children who are not of their kindred, and bring them up as members of their own family. Here they stand in the same relation as before; and there is often little, if any, distinction between the affection and conduct of those who are brothers and sisters by blood, and of those who are not.

Nor is it less frequent, perhaps, that a female acquaintance of the wife becomes a member of the household, and continues for years to be the cherished inmate and friend of the family. Now should the wife die, how could it be lawful for the husband, ac

cording to the principle in question, to marry the person so situated, although perhaps standing in no degree of kindred or affinity with his former wife?

Indeed, in all these instances, the persons are oixeior, members of the same family, and accustomed to associate together on the terms of domestic intercourse. If then the proposed principle be good to shut out marriage with a wife's sister, it is difficult to see how marriage can ever be lawful between any of the classes of persons thus situated.

The sum of the matter seems then to be, that those who adopt this view, rest the whole main question, not upon any direct command or language of the word of God, but upon a principle supposed to be deduced from the general character of the divine law; a principle, which by their own admission was not applicable to the people to whom that law was given; and which too, if now admitted, cannot be restricted to the case of a wife's sister, but must include and prohibit also many marriages, as to the lawfulness of which no Christian, not even one of themselves, has ever entertained a doubt.

IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF EXPEDIENCY.

By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D.D. President of Brown University.

AMONG the consequences which flow from the rapid development of the democratic principle, no one has failed to observe the increased energy which it has conferred upon public opinion. Great and increasing power is always an object of apprehension, especially so, when we can scarcely divine the direction in which it will be exerted. Every man is conscious that he can accomplish little, and may suffer much, by resisting, single-handed, the Leviathan of Hobbes. Hence, he too frequently hastens to make his peace with a despot, which will be pacified by nothing but submission; and, having surrendered up opinion, belief, nay, common sense itself,

at the feet of this mysterious divinity, he becomes, in the language of one of our philosophers, absorbed into its essence, and immediately unites in hunting down to the death, the most distant living thing that refuses obedience to the universal will.

Foreigners have frequently remarked, that this blind devotion to the popular voice, this sad want of mental and moral independence, is more prevalent in this country than in any other. It is natural that it should be so. In no country that ever existed, has the whole power of society been so directly in the hands of the whole population. In no other country, probably, has property been so equally divided; never has so large a portion fallen to the lot of every individual; never was the ability to read and write so universally diffused; and nowhere are the means of rapidly communicating knowledge to every portion of the community, so universally enjoyed. In other countries of great extent, an agitation at the centre has commonly died away before its wave has reached the circumference. But here, the whole surface, from centre to circumference, is in motion at once. The whole power, legislative and executive, and frequently judicial, is in the gift of the people. Public opinion is speedily aroused, either for good or for evil; and it requires but little skill in a professed agitator, to direct the whole storm of its violence upon the head of any unfortunate wight, who will not add to its clamour and do homage to its infallibility. It is thus liable to become a terrific engine in the hands of unprincipled and ambitious men. What was intended by our constitution to be the terror of vice, may be the persecutor of virtue. What was designed for the purpose of abasing falsehood and annihilating folly, may become the direct enemy of truth, and the chosen instrument of thoughtless, daring presumption.

In these remarks, however, we intend to utter no denunciation against the democratic principle; nor would we bewail the energy which recent events have conferred upon public opinion. We believe, fully, in the government of the people; but we believe also, that the people, like any other sovereign, must be restricted in the exercise of its prerogative within the limits of constitutional law. Without such restriction, there can be no government but that of brute force; and soon there will be no society. We duly estimate