gation of restitution, as in the familiar case of those who are not experts volunteering their advice in difficult matters. Compare the injurious advice of the priest, the lawyer, the physician, with the friendly words of neighbours; the former may be the efficacious cause of loss when the latter count for very little. The one who follows bad counsel, knowing it to be bad, may suffer in consequence thereof; but he has no claim for indemnification from his adviser. "Scienti et volenti non fit injuria.'

(3) Consent binds to restitution for loss, if it be efficacious. Consider the political obligations of voters, and their contributing to public loss by knowingly voting for the less worthy, or by withholding their votes from the worthy.

(4) Praise or blame before the act is done is equivalent to counsel, and is to be judged by the same rules. Restitution is not due when the act already done is applauded.

(5) Participation may be either in the injurious act or in its profits. In both cases restitution for injury done is obligatory, subject to the conditions respecting coöperation which have been already pointed out.

(6) By silence, by not hindering, by not revealing, negative coöperation in injury is given. For the injury is not hindered when it is possible so to do (e.g., not voting for the more worthy candidate for office). In such cases the law of charity is violated, which sin calls for repentance and amendment, not for restitution, unless the duties of one's office have been neglected.

Observe that the superior is answerable, in common law as well as in morals, for the negligence of his employees, if his own negligence were culpable. This is true of both servants and agents. But in common law exception is made if the negligence of those employees were wilful, criminal injury, or out of the line of their authority. But, on the other hand, owners of hacks, or inn-keepers, are liable for injuries done through drivers or servants, and can claim no such exception (Blackst. i. 430).

§ 6. What things are to be restored?

(1) Goods of the soul. The injury which is done through deceit, fraud, or unjust fear must be repaired; otherwise, only charity binds the conscience, for "scienti et volenti non fit injuria." Such unjust injury may be error in faith or in morals, and it is the erroneous official teacher, not the unofficial, who is bound to correct the error, if it were due to ignorance or negligence, not to guile or deceit.

Common law is very careful in defining what slander and libel are actionable (Blackst. iii. 123), setting very definite limits in this regard; e.g., limiting the time within which action may be brought.

But note the attempt of American newspapers to relax the common law of libel.

But though it is strictly just so far as it goes, conscience must go much further to the intended wrong and the injury actually done. For the truth of the charge will not release conscience from its obligation, whatever American newspapers may claim, if there were no just warrant for the publication. But the legal distinction between malice in fact— i.e., actual malice-and malice in law-i.e., a wrongful act intentionally done-is equally serviceable in our science of Moral Theology.

(2) Goods of body-e.g., loss of life or limb, or violation of chastity-call for retributive justice, and no proper restitution can be made. (Vid. infra, Satisfaction.) But all consequent losses which can be measured demand strict restitution.

(Qu.: Is the seducer who has not made promise of marriage bound to marry the seduced? If illegitimate progeny be in question, both human and Divine law make him responsible for the support and education of that offspring, and, in many cases at least, this may require marriage.)

(3) Goods of fortune have been already considered as a question between man and man; but they are also due to the state, according to Divine command as well as the law

of nature, since they are necessary for the common good. Lawful government, therefore, has a right to part of the people's goods, and that part may be collected either directly or indirectly, as excise or tariff.

Conditions. (a) Taxes must be just, i.e., imposed for the common good; (b) they must be laid equally on all; if so, they are binding on conscience (S. Matt. xxii. 21; Rom. xiii. 6).

Note, therefore, the sin of evading such burdens, thereby increasing those of other citizens; of corrupting assessors, custom-house officers, tax collectors, etc. But there are many difficult questions involved in the determining what is right.

Injuries in trade. "Forestalling" the market-i.e., contracting for merchandise on its way to market, etc., with a view to the undue enhancing of the price of it; "engrossing" provisions by buying them up for the same purpose ("corners"); spreading false rumours for the same end; getting a monopoly of necessaries, or making a combination for the same purpose, are offences punishable by common law* as well as by the Divine law (Blackst. iv. 158). Should they not be, at least, as severely treated by human legislation as "conspiracy" among labourers? The same principles apply to interference with workmen, preventing them from hiring themselves, compelling them to join unions (“scabs"), or other interference with the freedom of labour.

(Qu.: Do harmless adulterations violate the law of justice if the price of the article be reduced accordingly?)

Satisfaction to retributive justice. (See Part III., page 308.) The question is not now of what is due to Divine retribution, but of penalties inflicted by human law, such as capital punishment, confinement in prison, exemplary dam

* Recent decisions with respect to "trusts" extend the scope of the civil law.

ages, and the like. These rest upon the just sentence of human law, and not on the satisfaction which the penitent voluntarily offers to the broken law of God.

One is bound, therefore, when condemned, to bear the penalty of the law if he be guilty and if the law be just; but no moral law requires him to come forward and denounce himself.

It follows, also, that escape by breaking jail is justly treated as felony by common law, as also "rescue," or aiding another to escape.

(Qu. 1. Suppose that the condemned to death or long imprisonment has opportunity to escape without injuring others; is he guilty before God in doing so?)

Qu. 2. Suppose that he is innocent, or known to be so, what is his right? What is the duty of the one who knows his innocence ?)

Observe that public nuisances, being an injury to the community, are subject to similar retributions of justice, and by common law may be suppressed or fined. Such are houses of prostitution, gambling houses, lotteries, tramps, and vagabonds (Qu.: drinking "saloons"?) (Blackst. iv.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTRACTS.

§ 1. Definitions and divisions.

As viewed by Moral Theology, these are constantly recurring applications of the laws of justice, especially of commutative justice. But common law and moral law some

times move on different lines.

What is a contract? It is an agreement by which one or more persons bind themselves to one or more, collectively or severally, to do, to give, or to omit something.

Divisions. (1) Common law supposes some "consideration," good or valuable, which makes the contract (a) oner

ous.

In morals, however, contract may be (b) gratuitous, which, for our purpose, at least, may include such contracts as "mutuum" and "depositum" (vid. infra).

An equitable consideration, however, is of no avail if it tend to deprive third parties of their just rights; otherwise it will stand, if accompanied by deed or immediate possession.

A promise, though morally binding, or a moral duty not enforceable by law, will not be recognized as adequate consideration. In law, a promise is binding only if it have been accepted, and another promise given in exchange, or some act done, which constitutes the consideration.

(Qu.: Legal force of subscriptions, apart from expenses incurred in consequence of such subscriptions ?)

On the other hand, if the consideration be valuable, law will not inquire into its adequacy if there be no evidence of