will of one who sees God necessarily loves whatever he loves in its relations to God (Heb. xii. 14). § 3. On the obtaining of this beatitude. It is the obtaining of perfect good. Man is capable of this perfect good, for his spiritual reason can comprehend it, and his will can seek it; not perfectly under present conditions indeed, but when he has attained to the perfection of the supernatural life for which he was created. Since beatitude is perfect and sufficient good it must exclude all evil, and satisfy all desire. In this life all evil cannot be excluded; ignorance, inordinate affections, bodily pains all stand in the way. Neither can all desire be satisfied. For man naturally desires permanence of the good which he possesses; but the goods of this life are transitory; and so is life itself, while man naturally shuns death. Therefore perfect beatitude cannot be found in this life. If we consider, again, that in which beatitude peculiarly consists, sc., the vision of God, of which man is in this life incapable, the conclusion will be the same. In this life man can only rejoice in hope of it or in some imperfect participation of it. This beatitude can never be lost. For, (1) it satisfies all desire, and excludes all evil. But man naturally desires to keep the good which he has, and he cannot be perfectly happy if he thinks that he may lose it. Or if, again, he is deluded by false opinion that he will never lose it, that false opinion is itself an evil, while perfect beatitude excludes every evil. And (2) this vision of God so satisfies the soul, is so perfectly free from every drawback to felicity, that the blessed cannot wish to lose it; God will not withdraw it, which would be penalty for fault; neither has anything the power to withdraw the soul from this vision. Man is made to participate in the eternity of God, finding his own destiny in this everlasting beatitude (S. Matt. xxv. 46). Man, by his natural powers, cannot acquire beatitude. For its perfection is found in the vision of God; but this is above the nature of every creature. Its natural cognition is after the manner of its being. But the Divine essence infinitely exceeds every created substance; therefore no creature can by its natural powers obtain this ultimate beatitude. It is indeed the end of man; but in this, as in other respects, man, having free will, is to use that in turning to the One who alone can make him perfectly happy. The greatness of the end makes him exalted above those irrational creatures which can attain their end, so much lower than his, by their own natural powers. CHAPTER II. ON WILL. § 1. What constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary? Human acts are peculiarly voluntary. In some actions or motions the impulse which produces them is to be found in the agent, or thing moved. In others, we find an external impulse. Thus we speak of the attraction of the earth towards a stone, and of the stone towards the earth, as if there were an inward impulse producing the motion. But when the stone is thrown upwards, the impulse is from without. But some of those actions or motions which proceed from within are those of selfmoving things, others are not. Granting that there is an end or object to be attained by the motion or action, we find that some things act with knowledge of that end; they act on account of, for the sake of, that end. In these there is not only the impulse to act, but to act for the sake of that end. Where there is no knowledge of the end, which nevertheless guides the action, an external principle or cause must be assumed which possesses that knowledge. Such things are not said to be self-moved, but to be moved by others. But those which have knowledge of the end are called voluntary agents. Now man knows the end of his operation, and moves himself; therefore human acts are voluntary. It may be objected, (1) that his desire is moved by what is desirable. But this does not conflict with the definition of the voluntary given above, for the inward principle of action need not be the first principle of action; i. e., if we consider some other kind of motion or action, such as is the presenting ab extra of some object to our desire.* Every new motion or action of desire must have an outward antecedent as a condition of the new existence, but this does not hinder the inward motion being self-caused with knowledge of the end, i. e., voluntary. (2) Man does not act per se, for God is the source of all action or change (S. John xv. 5). It is true that God is the first mover of the will, as He is of all natural motions. But in neither case is the action thereby robbed of its proper character whether as natural or as voluntary. The voluntary may be found where there is no act. For a thing may proceed from the will not only directly but indirectly. So a shipwreck may result from a negative cause, sc., the pilot who desists from his official duty, when he can and ought to attend to it. In this case he is rightly called the cause of the disaster. For if he were not able to direct the vessel or had no charge of it, he would not be the cause of the event. So the will by willing and acting can prevent the not willing and the not acting. And if it ought to do so, but does not do so, then the not willing and the not acting are imputed to it. Thus, then, there may be an interior act without the exterior, as when we will not to act; or even the interior act may be absent, as when we do not will to act. It is plain, therefore, that there is a difference between the privative concept of being *This will be rendered clearer to the student if he considers the seven steps in a consummated act of will; sc. : (a). Natural inclination to the object, which is involuntary; (e). Consent of the will to try to possess the object ; (f). Rational choice of means for attaining the object (g). Voluntary use of those means (Duct. Dubitant., iv. 1, rule 3). See p. 23. CHAPTER II. ON WILL. § 1. What constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary? Human acts are peculiarly voluntary. In some actions or motions the impulse which produces them is to be found in the agent, or thing moved. In others, we find an external impulse. Thus we speak of the attraction of the earth towards a stone, and of the stone towards the earth, as if there were an inward impulse producing the motion. But when the stone is thrown upwards, the impulse is from without. But some of those actions or motions which proceed from within are those of selfmoving things, others are not. Granting that there is an end or object to be attained by the motion or action, we find that some things act with knowledge of that end; they act on account of, for the sake of, that end. In these there is not only the impulse to act, but to act for the sake of that end. Where there is no knowledge of the end, which nevertheless guides the action, an external principle or cause must be assumed which possesses that knowledge. Such things are not said to be self-moved, but to be moved by others. But those which have knowledge of the end are called voluntary agents. Now man knows the end of his operation, and moves himself; therefore human acts are voluntary. It may be objected, (1) that his desire is moved by what is desirable. But this does not conflict with the definition of the voluntary given above, for the inward principle of action need not be the first principle of action; i. e., if we |