one rubs his beard, or moves his hand or his foot, such an act is not, properly speaking, human or moral, and is indifferent.

Does any circumstance constitute a specifically moral act, bad or good?

I answer yes; because the species of moral acts, as species, depend upon the concepts or forms, as framed by the mind. And so what in any act is viewed as a supervening circumstance, may again be viewed as one of the chief conditions of the object. Thus taking unjustly another's property is theft in general; but we may also consider some circumstance which adds a special deformity contrary to the order of reason, as the place, the time, the person, the manner. And so theft may be robbery or

sacrilege.

§ 2. The good and evil of the inward acts of the will.

A good will depends upon its object.

Good and evil per se pertain to the will, as the true and the false pertain to the intellect. But in human acts different objects make a difference in kind. Good and evil, therefore, in acts of the will depend upon the object of it. It is true that the will can only seek the good; but what seems so may be only the apparent good. And so the act of will is sometimes evil.

The goodness of the will depends upon the object alone, not on the circumstances of the act. This object is the end sought; we are speaking, therefore, of the intended end.

If the will is for the good, no circumstance can make that a bad will. If you say that any one wills any good when, or where, or as he ought not to do, your words are equivocal. For you may mean that that circumstance is willed. And so he does not will the good. Because the willing a good when, or where, or as, one ought not so to

do, is not willing the good. But again, you may mean the very act of willing; and so it is impossible that any one. should will the good when he ought not to, because he ought always to will it; unless, perhaps, accidentally, when in willing this good, he is hindered from willing some good which he ought to will. And the evil does not arise from his willing that good, but from his not willing the other.

It may be objected that ignorance of circumstances excuses the evil of the will; and that this proves that the goodness or the evil of the will depends upon those circumstances, and not upon its object only. But this excuse regards the circumstances as a part of the thing willed, i. e., we are ignorant of the circumstances of the act which is willed. Thus the objection falls to the ground.

The goodness of the will depends upon reason also.

For the object of the will is proposed to it by the reason. This is not the good of sense or imagination. That is offered to the sensuous appetite, not to the will. The object of reason and will is the good as viewed in its general conception.

The goodness of the will depends, still more, upon eternal law.

The light of reason which is in us can show us the good, and regulate our reason, only so far as it is derived from the eternal light (Ps. iv. 6). This shines on us in the form of eternal law. We do not know it, indeed, as it exists in God; but our reason is the image of God in us, and naturally, or by supernatural revelation, sees in part that eternal law which orders our reason itself as the measure of our acts.

Every will discordant with reason, whether that reason is correct or erring, is a bad will.

By conscience I understand the act in which we apply our moral judgment: (1) testifying concerning what we

have done or left undone; (2) judging that something is to be done or not to be done; (3) judging that what has been. done was rightly or not rightly done, sc., an accusing or excusing conscience. So understood, the question before us may be otherwise stated, sc., does an erroneous conscience create obligation? In things indifferent (in their own nature) a will discordant from reason, an erroneous conscience, is, in a certain way, bad on account of the object on which good or evil in the will depends; not indeed on account of the object as it is in itself, but as it is regarded by reason, being viewed as good or bad, to be done or to be shunned. And because the object of the will is that which is proposed to it by reason, if anything is presented by the reason as evil, a will following that is a bad will.

But this is true not only of things indifferent, but also of those which are in themselves good or bad. For that which is good may be viewed as evil, and that which is evil may be regarded as good. To abstain from fornication is a moral good. But we do not seek this good as a good, except as it is presented by our reason. If, therefore, it is presented by an erroneous conscience as evil, we follow that abstinence under the idea of its being sin. And the will is bad because it wills what we regard as evil. To believe in Christ is per se good and necessary to salvation. But if our reason judges that faith to be an imposture, we accept it as an evil thing; our will is a bad will. Therefore S. Paul says (Rom. xiv. 23), "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin."

It may be objected, (1) that reason is the rule of human will because it is based on eternal law, but an erring reason is not derived from eternal law, and so is not the rule of human will; neither is the will bad if it does not agree with an erring reason. But, nevertheless, that erring reason proposes its judgment as true and based on God's law.

(2) Erroneous conscience sometimes proposes what

is contrary to the command of God, and therefore imposes no obligation. But if any one believes that the order coming from a subordinate officer is the command of the chief, in despising the one he despises the other. So if we were aware that our reason dictated something contrary to God's command, we would not be bound to follow that. But, in that case our reason would not be totally erroneous. But when erring reason presents anything as a commandment of God, to despise that dictate of reason, and to reject the commandment of God, are one and the same.

Is a will which agrees with erring reason a good will?

This is the same as the question whether an erroneous conscience excuses. It has already been shown (qu. vi., art. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes the involuntary, sometimes does not. And since moral good and evil imply a voluntary act, it is evident that that ignorance which makes action involuntary, totally removes from it the notion of good or evil; but not that ignorance which does not cause the involuntary. And it has also been shown that ignorance which is directly or indirectly willed, does not produce the involuntary; such ignorance is directly willed, when it is intentional; it is indirectly willed when it results from negligence, from our not willing to know that which we are bound to know. If then reason or conscience err through directly or indirectly voluntary ignorance, such error being with regard to that which we are bound to know, it does not hinder a will which agrees with erring reason or conscience from being a bad will.

The will of those who slew the apostles was a bad will; but they thought that their action was one of reason and piety towards God. The Lord himself said, "The hour cometh that whosoever killeth you shall think that he offereth service unto God" (S. John xvi. 2).

But if the error be that which causes the involuntary, coming from ignorance of some circumstance, in which

error there has been no negligence, then such error excuses and the will agreeing with erring reason is not a bad will.

But if the will discordant from erring reason is bad, why is not the will which agrees with it good? I answer, because the good requires the full, complete conditions indicated already, and defect in any one is evil. The will is bad in following that which is actually evil, or that which is deemed such; but that the will be good, both are requisite.*

Eternal law cannot err, but human reason can err; therefore a will agreeing with human reason has not always rectitude, nor is it always in accordance with eternal law.

This truth produces no perplexity, nor any necessity of sinning. Suppose that one does what he is bound to do. out of a spirit of vainglory. He sins, whether he does it or leaves it undone. But there is no perplexity, no need of sinning; he can cast away his bad intention. From vincible and voluntary ignorance follows evil in the will; but the error can be removed; therefore there is no necessity of sinning.

Does the goodness of the will respecting the means depend upon the intention or end aimed at ?

This intention may be viewed as preceding or as following the act of the will which we are now considering. It precedes causally the act of the will, when we will something on account of our aiming at a certain end. And then this relation to the end is regarded as one reason why the thing. willed is good. Thus one may will to fast out of a sense of obligation towards God; and that fasting is so far good, viz., because it is done for God's sake. Since, then, the goodness of the will (as we have seen) depends upon the

* See Bishop Sanderson's fourth Serm. ad Clerum, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin."