if this be necessary to salvation, whether it be an act or a circumstance of the act, there will be mortal sin. And again, if the will is so remiss regarding what belongs to God that it totally loses charity, such negligence is mortal sin, and this happens especially when the negligence follows from contempt. Otherwise, if the negligence consist in the omission of some act or circumstance which is not necessary to salvation, and if this be not done through contempt, but from lack of fervour which is sometimes impeded by some venial sin, then the negligence is not mortal but is venial.

Craftiness: is it a special sin?

S. Paul says (2 Cor. iv. 2), "We have renounced the hidden things of shame, not walking in craftiness." That answers the question. Sin against prudence may have some resemblance to the virtue in two ways: either the efforts of reason may be directed to some end which is not truly good, but only apparent good; or one in seeking some end, whether good or bad, may use, not the true paths, but feigned and seeming right. This is craftiness.

(1) This is not the "subtlety" offered to the simple by the Proverbs of Solomon (Prov. i. 4).

(2) A good end does not sanctify the bad means.

Guile (" dolus")

pertains to the carrying out of crafty designs, chiefly indeed by words, but also sometimes by actions. He that meditates evil, tries to find the way to fulfil his purpose, and usually the guileful way is an easier one than open violence.

Fraud

also pertains to the carrying out of crafty designs, but if we make any distinction between it and guile, it may be that fraud proper has to do with actions.

Is it lawful to have solicitude respecting temporal things? The Lord said (S. Matt. vi. 31), "Be not anxious, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed?" Solicitude leads to anxious endeavour to obtain something. Where there is fear of failing, there is more zealous endeavour; but where there is security respecting the end, there is less solicitude. So, then, this anxiety about temporal things may in three ways be unlawful: (1) On the side of what we are anxious about, if we seek temporal things as our end; (2) on the side of the anxiety, if it be such as to withdraw a man from those spiritual things which he ought chiefly to follow; "the care of the world chokes the word " (S. Matt. xiii. 22); (3) on the side of the needless fear, when one fears lest necessaries fail him through doing what he ought to do. This fear the Lord excludes by three arguments addressed to his timid disciple: first, that greater benefits, without any anxiety of his, are Divinely conferred, viz., on soul and body; next, that God provides for beast and plant without human labour; and lastly, that it is ignorance of Divine Providence which makes an infidel, an atheist, or a heathen man anxious about this world's goods.

(1) Man, by Divine ordinance, has the use of this world, but not that he may make it the end of his life.

(2) Man must work in order to live; but this is moderated care, not superfluous anxiety.

May one be anxious for the future?

The Lord answers (S. Matt. vi. 34), "Be not anxious for the morrow." No work can be virtuous unless it be clothed with due circumstances, among which is the fit time. "There is a time to every purpose which is under the heaven." Each day brings with it its own proper care, the time to plant or the time to reap. If in the time of planting one is anxious about the harvest, that may be the superfluous care which the Lord prohibited. "Sufficient

unto the day is the evil thereof;" i.e., the trouble and

care.

This does not prohibit prudence with respect to the future, providing what is needed for the future, since Christ Himself taught us that by His example (S. John xii. 6).

These vices of craftiness, guile, fraud, and inordinate anxiety are especially the daughters of avarice.

§ 1. Right.

CHAPTER II.

JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE.

(See Supplement, Chapters IV. and V.)

Right (jus) is the object of justice, for it is what is just. Now it is peculiar to justice among the virtues that it ordains man in those things wherein he is related to another man. Other virtues perfect him in what belongs to himself; but in just action, the right considers not only the agent, but also another person. For that is called just action in which there is a certain relative equality, as when work is paid for with its due wages. The just action does not necessarily regard the manner in which the thing is done (e.g., whether freely or not). And thus justice is distinguishable from other virtues.

Because justice implies a certain equality, and we can recompense God by no equivalent for His bounty, properly speaking, justice is between man and man; yet justice tends to this, that man requite His Heavenly Father as much as he is able, by entire subjection of his soul to God.

Right is either natural or positive right.

One thing may be adequate to another, (1) according to its very nature, as when any one gives as much as he has received. This is natural right. (2) It may be adequate or commensurate according to some compact or common agreement, when one deems himself compensated if he receive so much. This may be either a private agreement between two individuals, or it may be by public consent, the

whole people, with or without legal ordinance, agreeing that some one thing is adequate and commensurate to another.

(1) But it might be objected that what is natural is immutable, and is the same among all men; but no such thing is found in human affairs, because all the regulations of human right are defective in some cases and do not prevail everywhere. And this is true of what has an immutable nature; it must be always and everywhere the same. But man's nature is mutable, and so what is natural to man can sometimes be deficient. Thus it is naturally just and equal that what has been left in our charge be returned to its owner; and if human nature were always what it should be, this law would be immutable. But because it sometimes happens that the will of man is depraved, a case may occur in which such deposit is not to be returned; say, if a madman or an enemy of the republic demand the arms which he has left with us.

(2) Another objection, whose solution will help in clearing up the matter. Positive right proceeds from human will; but such a thing is not necessarily just; otherwise the will of man could never be unjust. I reply that the will of man, by the common consent of the people, can make something to be just where there is no natural repugnance to natural justice. Positive right is concerned with such things. "The legally just is that which in the beginning might have been thus or thus, and it mattered not which. But when it is decreed, then it does matter" (Nic. Eth. v. 7). But if anything has in itself repugnance to natural right, it cannot be made just by human will; say, if it be decreed lawful to steal or to commit adultery. "Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees" (Isa. x. 1).

(3) Divine right (jus divinum) is divisible in the same way. It is what is promulgated by God. But that is partly what is naturally just, though its justice

may not be seen