assent to the truth presented; not, however, in all cases, for the assent to knowledge proper, to truths scientifically demonstrated, is not in our own power. But there are also things apprehended which do not so convince the reason but that we can give or withhold our assent, or suspend our judgment respecting them.

Herein, then, the act of reason is in our own power. (Such are the verities of the Christian faith.)

Are acts of the sensuous appetite subject to our higher nature?

First note that these appetites are connected with bodily organs (the brain and nervous system). The will is not so connected. But every act of a power employing a bodily organ depends not only on the soul's power, but also on the condition of that organ. So far as the former is concerned, it follows apprehension of the object. But the apprehension of the imagination, which is of particular objects, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is of the universal idea of the same object. So far the act of the sensuous appetite is subject to the empire of reason. But the condition of the bodily organ is not (directly) so subject.

Sometimes, also, it happens that the sensuous appetite is suddenly excited through sense or imagination presenting the object to it. Then that motion is not subject to reason, although the higher part of the man might have hindered the motion, if it had been foreseen (venial sin).

The acts of what Aristotle called the "vegetative soul" (hunger, thirst, etc., natural appetites) are not subject to the dominion of reason.

If we consider the bodily organs, we notice that there are some vital organs, nutritive, generative, etc., which are not subject to the empire of reason. They belong to the vegetative soul." (It is different with organs which directly serve the higher part of our nature.)

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CHAPTER III.

ON GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS.

§ 1. Whence are they derived?

Is every human action good, or are some evil?

What S. Thomas proved in Pars Prima is here to be remembered. For good and evil in actions are like good and evil in things, since each thing produces action according to its essential nature. Now it is a fundamental principle of truth, which was shown in Part I., that Good and Being are convertible terms. (Being is good, and the good is Being viewed as desirable.) As much of Being as anything possesses, so much of good it has. God alone has absolute plenitude of being. But each thing which He has made possesses such plenitude of being as He finds suitable for it according to its peculiar nature.

Some things, however, may have being, and yet lack that plenitude of being which they ought to have. Thus a man is compounded of body and soul, with all their suitable organs and powers. If any one of these is lacking, there is defect in his plenitude of being. Such defect is an evil. A blind man, e. g., has the good of life, but he has also the evil of defect, his blindness. But if he lacked everything which belongs to being, we could not apply the words good or bad to him. Where there is defect, the thing is good secundum quid. I conclude, therefore, that every action, so far as it has being, has goodness; but so far as it lacks. that plenitude of being which is due to human action, it is bad; e. g., if it lacks the due quantity, or the due place, etc.

The evil acts by virtue of the deficient good. If there

were no good, there would be no being, no action. If there were no deficiency, there would be no evil in the being or in the action. So the action actually produced is in such a case a defective good, good secundum quid, but simply evil.

Anything may be, in one regard, actual, in another deprived of actuality; and thus deficient action will be caused. A blind man has power to walk (which is a good); but wanting sight, he walks hesitatingly (which is an evil). An evil action may have some effect per se, which is in one way good, but evil as opposed to the due order of reason, e. g., conception following adultery.

Does human action derive goodness or badness from its object?

The kind of action is primarily determined by its object. as the terminus of the action. Not, indeed, the object as viewed in itself, but in its relations to the actor, as in accordance or disaccordance with right reason so far as he is concerned. In this way actions are good or bad in their nature. Thus unjustly taking another's property is malum per se.

In speaking of the object thus, I am not speaking of an external thing which is in itself a good, but of the related action.

The goodness of the action is not caused by the goodness. of its effect; but an action is called good because it can produce a good effect; and so the very relation of an action to its result is a cause of the goodness of that action.

Is human action good or bad according to the circumstances of it?

I answer that the plenitude of being in (individual) action is not totally due to its nature, but also (in part) to the due circumstances. Hence, if anything be lacking in these due circumstances, the action is bad.

Is human action good or bad according to its end?

(Here we speak, not of the intrinsic end which coincides with the object spoken of above, but of the extrinsic object.) This is the extrinsic cause of the action. Due proportion and relation to that end is requisite in order to constitute the action good.

So then, in human action there may be four-fold goodness (1) in its genus, sc., action; because as much of action and being as it has, so much it has of goodness; (2) in the kind of action, according as it has a fitting object; (3) in the accidental circumstances of the (individual) action; (4) according to the end, its relation to the goodness of its cause.

Observe, however, with reference to this last, that this final cause may be only the seeming good, and so evil action may follow from it. And especially, it is to be noted that an action having goodness of one of these four kinds may be deficient in another of them. It may be good according to its species or its circumstances, and bad in the intention of the one who does the action. And an action is not simply good unless all four kinds of goodness are found in it.

Does the end aimed at make an action specifically good or bad?

Some acts are called human inasmuch as they are our voluntary acts.

Now, in the voluntary act is found a two-fold action; one, the interior act of the will, another, the outward act. And each of these has its object. The end is the proper object of the inward voluntary act; but that about which the outward act is concerned is its object. And as the outward act takes its specific character from its object, the inward act gets its specific character (as good or bad) from the end sought for. But the outward acts are only moral so far as they are voluntary. We use our members

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as instruments of our will. Therefore human acts, although they may be described according to their outward object, the "material" part of them, are yet specifically good or bad according to the end, the "formal" part of them. Aristotle, accordingly, observes (Nic. Eth., v. 2) that he who steals in order to commit adultery, is even more an adulterer than a thief.

Indifferent acts.

A human act, i. e., a moral act, gets its species from its object as related to the (directing) principle of human acts, which is reason. Hence, if the object of the act embraces what is in accordance with the order of reason, the species of act will be good, e. g., to give alms. But if it include what is repugnant to the order of reason, the act will be, specifically, a bad act; e. g., to take unjustly another's property. But the object of the act may possibly embrace nothing pertaining to the order of reason, e. g., to pick up a straw from the ground. Such acts are in themselves indifferent.

I say, in themselves; but when we consider the individual who does the act the case is altered. For a moral act has goodness not only from its object, but also from its circumstances. And every individual act has circumstances by which it may be rendered good or bad; the intention at least may produce this result. For since it is the part of reason to direct, an act proceeding from deliberate reason, if not ordered for the due end, is, on that very account, repugnant to reason, and is bad; but if it is ordained for a due end, it is in accordance with reason, and is so far good.

But every act of a man which proceeds from deliberative reason is either ordained or not ordained for a due end; therefore, considered with reference to the individual, it is either good or bad. But if it does not so proceed, as when *Note that what is not intrinsically evil may become such indirectly, through contempt of the law, or of the law-giver, through scandal, etc.