which nature is sufficient. It is not necessary, then, that they sin in whatever they may do. But whensoever anything is done from unbelief, then they sin. For as one who has faith can commit some sin in an act which he does not refer to the end of his faith, so also the infidel can do some good act in that which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.

Faith, indeed, directs the intention with respect to the supernatural end, but the light of natural reason can direct the intention with respect to some connatural good.

Heresy: is it a species of infidelity ?

He who rightly holds the Christian faith, of his own will assents to Christ in those things which truly pertain to His doctrine; and any one can deviate from the rectitude of Christian faith by refusing to assent to Christ. Such an one has an evil will respecting the end itself. This is the infidelity of those who reject the Church altogether, as heathen and Jews. Or, in another way, one may intend indeed to assent to Christ, but fail in choosing those things in which the assent is given. Heresy is this evil choice. The heretic does not choose those things which are truly delivered by Christ, but those which his own mind suggests to him. Therefore heresy is a species of infidelity pertaining to those who profess the faith of Christ, but corrupt its dogmas. (It may be defined as "pertinacious error manifestly repugnant to the faith, in him who has professed that faith in its verity.")

It is counted among the works of the flesh (Gal. v. 19), by reason of its remote cause, which is pride, cupidity, etc., the desire of some wrong end.

This evil choice may be made in what directly and principally pertains to the faith, as the articles of the Christian creed; or indirectly and secondarily, in those things from which follows the corruption of any article.

Not all differences among theologians are to be called

heretical, because, as S. Augustine says (Ep. 43), "If any one defend his judgment, although it be false and perverted, without pertinacious obstinacy, and seek the truth with careful solicitude, ready to be corrected (by it) when he shall have found it, by no means is he to be counted among heretics," because he makes no choice contradicting the doctrine of the Church. Differences, then, which are not heretical may concern those things which will not affect the faith whichever way they are decided (e.g., the historical or scientific value of the Holy Scriptures), or those things which, though they are connected with the faith, have never been determined by the Church.

(Articles against toleration of infidels and heretics are omitted.)

Apostasy.

It is an aggravated form of infidelity, since it is a departure from, a casting off of, the faith after it has been received (2 Pet. ii. 21).

Blasphemy: what is it?

Whoever denies of God anything which belongs to Him, or asserts respecting God that which does not belong to Him, derogates from the Divine goodness, for He is the very essence of goodness, and whatever, therefore, belongs to Him, pertains to His goodness. But this derogation from the Divine goodness may be only in the intellect, or it may be also accompanied by a certain detestation in the affections (which constitutes the perfect sin of blasphemy). If this is found in the heart only, it is blasphemy of the heart; if it is also uttered, it is blasphemy of the lips.

It is a mortal sin, because it is repugnant to Divine charity, inasmuch as it is derogatory to the Divine goodness which is the object of charity.

It may be venial sin only when one does not observe that he is speaking blasphemy, in sudden heat bursting out in words whose significance he does not consider.

But in itself it is aggravated infidelity, because a detestation of will is directed against the Divine honour. It is worse than homicide, because the latter is sin against our neighbour, but this is directly against God. Of course, if we speak of injurious effects, the case may be different, but the gravity of sin depends more upon the perversity of the will than on the effects of the action.

The "sin against the Holy Ghost" takes various forms; but, in general, we may understand it as a casting off in contempt that which might have hindered the choice of evil, as hope is rejected through despair, and godly fear through presumption. But all these hindrances to the choice of evil are the effects of the Holy Ghost in us. And this malicious wickedness is sin against the Holy Ghost. There are six forms of it: (1) despair, (2) presumption, (3) that impenitence which implies a purpose of remaining impenitent, (4) obstinate adherence to sin, (5) impugning of known truth in order that one may more freely sin, and (6) envy not only of a brother's prosperity but of the grace of God in him.

Spiritual blindness and dulness of heart are vices opposed to spiritual knowledge and understanding.

Mental blindness is privation of the principle of mental vision. Now this principle is three-fold: (1) The light of natural reason, of which the rational soul is never deprived, although it may be hindered from its proper activity through impediments in lower mental powers which the mind needs for thought. (Note this view of ordinary forms of insanity.)

(2) Another principle of mental vision is an habitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, and this light indeed is sometimes taken away from the soul. This is penal blindness, the light of grace being taken away as the penalty of sin.

(3) Another principle of mental vision is a certain men

tal principle by which a man understands other things, at which principle the soul can aim, and is able not to aim. And this not aiming at it is due sometimes to a will spontaneously turning itself away from its consideration, of which the Psalmist speaks (Ps. xxxvi. 3). But sometimes, also, this blindness is due to mental preoccupation with things which are loved more, and this blindness of concupiscence, like the preceding, is sin. To understand the truth is, indeed, in itself agreeable to every one; but it may become hateful, if a man is hindered thereby from things which he more loves.

Instead of absolute moral blindness, there may be a dulness of moral feeling in the consideration of spiritual goods, and both are opposed to that gift of spiritual understanding through which man apprehends and knows spiritual goods, and keenly penetrates into their deepest recesses. And this dulness of vision is sin just so far as it is directly or indirectly voluntary, as in him who, strongly affected towards carnal pleasures, feels disgust for spiritual things, or neglects them.

These are especially the sinful fruits of fleshly sins, because the soul is most strongly drawn to that in which it finds the intensest pleasure, and consequently the mind is enfeebled with respect to spiritual things; while, on the other hand, the opposite virtues of abstinence and chastity especially dispose a man's soul for spiritual activity. And this is more or less true even of those who have a natural gift or an acquired habit of intellectual speculation.

§ 1. Hope.

CHAPTER II.

HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES.

Why is hope a virtue?

Virtue has already been defined in Aristotle's words, as "that which makes him who has it good, and renders his work good" (Eth. Nic., ii. 5). Therefore, wherever any good act of man is found, some human virtue corresponds thereto. But in all things which are subject to rule and measure, the good depends on their attaining that proper rule; as we call a coat good which neither exceeds nor falls short of the due measure. But we have seen (see page 80) that there is a two-fold measure of human acts, one proximate and homogeneous with those acts, sc., reason; another, supreme and transcendent, sc., God. And on this account every human act which attains to reason or to God is a good act. But the act of hope, of which we are now speaking, attains to God. For the object of the natural passion of hope is future good, difficult of attainment, yet possible to be had. Now, anything is possible for us either through our own selves or through others. But in so far as we hope for anything as possible to us through Divine aid, our hope attains to God, on whose aid it rests. And so it is plain that such hope is a virtue, since it makes good, attaining to its due rule and measure. theological virtue, then, as "a habit of soul, Divinely infused, through which with sure confidence we expect to obtain the spiritual good of eternal life by Divine aid.") This hope is not the natural passion (though grounded in that), but a spiritual habit, purely the gift of grace.

a man's act (Define this