PART II.-THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

§ 1. Faith.

CHAPTER I.

FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES.

In order to consider rightly the virtue of faith, we must inquire first into its object, then into the act of faith itself.

Faith assents to nothing except as revealed by God, and because it has been revealed by God. Therefore it rests on the primal verity, on God. This is faith's "formal" part, the essence of faith. But if we consider the things which are received by faith, the "material" part, not only God's existence but many other things also are believed, which, however, do not fall under the assent of faith, except as related to God. In both ways, then, the object of faith is primal verity (either God Himself, or the Divine veracity in revelation).

Is the object of faith things or propositions?

Things known are in the knower after his proper manner. Now the proper mode of human intelligence is through propositions which analyze or synthesize. So, then, the object of faith also can be considered in two ways; one, on the side of the thing believed, and so the object of faith is the very thing (or being) concerned; another, on the part of the believer, and so the object of his faith is some inward proposition of his mind. But the act of faith is not ter

minated in the proposition, but in the thing (or being) which is the object of the proposition. And thus we say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty."

Can the false be the object of faith?

No; for nothing can be embraced in the faith which does not stand under that primal verity which is its "formal" object.

(1) Truth is the good of intelligence; therefore all the virtues which perfect it, and chiefly faith, totally exclude the false. Hope and charity may in a certain way be deceived, but these perfect the will, whose good is a different good from that of intelligence.

(2) Human conjectures may be attached to the object of faith, and may err, but this is not error in the faith.

Faith is "the proving of things not seen” (Heb. xi. 1). Faith signifies the assent of the mind to that which is believed. But that assent is given, first, when the mind is moved to it by the object itself, which is either known per se-sc., primary self-evident truths-or known through another object, the necessary inference or conclusion of scientific knowledge. But that assent is given also, secondly, not because the intellect is sufficiently moved by its proper object, but because through some choice the mind voluntarily inclines to one side rather than to the other. And if indeed this is done with hesitation and fear of the other side, it will be opinion; but if with unhesitating certitude, it will be faith. But the things which, per se, move our intelligence to know them, are seen by the senses, or by the mind. Hence it is manifest that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen by sense or by the intellect. A thing may be seen to be credible, to harmonize with the habit of spiritual faith, and so on; but this is not literally seeing with the mind the object of faith.

Can those things which are of faith be known or demonstrated?

All knowledge comes through principles known per se; i.e., they are seen. And, therefore, whatever things are known, in some way are seen. But the same thing cannot at the same time, and by the same person, be known and believed. Still it can happen that what is seen and known by one, may be believed by another. "Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). What we believe, the saints see and know. The same thing may be true in this present state of life. But that which is proposed to all men in general to be believed, is in general not known; it is simply the object of faith.

(1) This is not the ignorance of unbelief; but through the light of faith, not through demonstration, the faithful see what they are to believe.

(2) As science demonstrates its conclusions, so the truth of the faith is argued in two ways; one, not demonstrative but persuasive argument, showing that the things believed. are not impossible; another, deducing the articles of faith from the Holy Scriptures, the foundations of the faith.

(3) Some things are believed which philosophy undertakes to demonstrate, as the being and unity of God, etc. But these are numbered with the articles of the faith, both because they are preambles of the faith, and because where they are not demonstratively known they must at least be believed.*

§ 2. The inward act of faith.

What is it to believe?

If we say that it is thinking with assent, we shall need to examine our terms. What is it to think? (1) An ̧ consideration of a thing by the mind may be called so; and

Other articles on the object of faith, though of great value, are omitted as not essential to Moral Theology.

minated in the proposition, but in the thing (or being) which is the object of the proposition. And thus we say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty."

Can the false be the object of faith?

No; for nothing can be embraced in the faith which does not stand under that primal verity which is its "formal" object.

(1) Truth is the good of intelligence; therefore all the virtues which perfect it, and chiefly faith, totally exclude the false. Hope and charity may in a certain way be deceived, but these perfect the will, whose good is a different good from that of intelligence.

(2) Human conjectures may be attached to the object of faith, and may err, but this is not error in the faith.

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Faith is "the proving of things not seen (Heb. xi. 1). Faith signifies the assent of the mind to that which is believed. But that assent is given, first, when the mind is moved to it by the object itself, which is either known per se-sc., primary self-evident truths-or known through another object, the necessary inference or conclusion of scientific knowledge. But that assent is given also, secondly, not because the intellect is sufficiently moved by its proper object, but because through some choice the mind voluntarily inclines to one side rather than to the other. And if indeed this is done with hesitation and fear of the other side, it will be opinion; but if with unhesitating certitude, it will be faith. But the things which, per se, move our intelligence to know them, are seen by the senses, or by the mind. Hence it is manifest that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen by sense or by the intellect. A thing may be seen to be credible, to harmonize with the habit of spiritual faith, and so on; but this is not literally seeing with the mind the object of faith.

Can those things which are of faith be known or demonstrated?

All knowledge comes through principles known per se; i.e., they are seen. And, therefore, whatever things are known, in some way are seen. But the same thing cannot

at the same time, and by the same person, be known and believed. Still it can happen that what is seen and known by one, may be believed by another. "Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). What we believe, the saints see and know. The same thing may be true in this present state of life. But that which is proposed to all men in general to be believed, is in general not known; it is simply the object of faith.

(1) This is not the ignorance of unbelief; but through the light of faith, not through demonstration, the faithful see what they are to believe.

(2) As science demonstrates its conclusions, so the truth of the faith is argued in two ways; one, not demonstrative but persuasive argument, showing that the things believed are not impossible; another, deducing the articles of faith from the Holy Scriptures, the foundations of the faith.

(3) Some things are believed which philosophy undertakes to demonstrate, as the being and unity of God, etc. But these are numbered with the articles of the faith, both because they are preambles of the faith, and because where they are not demonstratively known they must at least be believed.*

§ 2. The inward act of faith.

What is it to believe?

If we say that it is thinking with assent, we shall need to examine our terms. What is it to think? (1) An ̧ consideration of a thing by the mind may be called so; and

* Other articles on the object of faith, though of great value, are omitted as not essential to Moral Theology.