A paufe enfued; and the converfation feemed to be concluded. But Sophron taking up Locke's Effay on the Human Understanding, which happened to lie on the table before him, read the distinction which that author makes, between moral and metaphyfical truth. This fuggefted fresh matter of difcuffion, and gave rife to a variety of obfervations, on the danger of error, and on the conduct of reafon in our intellectual purfuits. Philocles particularly enlarged on the pernicious confequences of fupporting FALSE OPINIONS, for the fake of argument, in public or private difputations; and reprefented this practice as one great fource of fcepticism and infidelity, amongst literary men. The imagination, said he, is struck with novelty; it appears honourable to shake off the fetters of vulgar prejudice; and pride is doubly gratified, by the humiliation of an opponent, and the triumph over authority. Thus the paffions become engaged, on the fide which the fceptic efpouses; fophiftry is mistaken for found logic; he becomes enamoured of difcoveries, made by his fuperior penetration; and the fingularity of his notions, or principles, which would create doubt and hesitation in a wife man, tends only to ftrengthen his conviction of their certainty. Milton, defcribing the character of Belial, one of the fallen angels, fays in emphatic language, "His tongue "Dropt manna, and could make the worfe appear "The better reafon, to perplex and dash Doe's not the philofopher's maxim, faid Sophron, "Nullius jurare in verba magiftri," seem to recommend a strict scrutiny into every fubject? And what more judicious method can be devised, of correcting our prejudices, in favour of any established opinion, than by fetting ourfelves, boldly, in oppofition to it? Would you free yourself, Sophron, from a trifling malady, by incurring a fevere and dangerous one; then, urged Philocles, you may correct a flight prejudice, by adopting another that is greater! In our inquiries into truth, we ought to divest ourselves, as much as poffible, of every prepoffeffion. But it is furely a reasonable deference, to the judgment of the public, concerning any doctrine or opinion, that we fhould firft examine, with attention, the arguments in its favour, before we admit the objections which may be raised against it. And by this method the mind will be least unfairly biaffed in her decifions; and will reft on them, with a degree of confidence and fatisfaction, which can never refult from partial or preju. diced investigation. Young men of lively parts and acute understandings, when they enter upon the field of controverfy, are fometimes fo proud of their po *Paradife Loft, Book 11. L. 112. lemic fkill, as to engage, indifcriminately, on any fide of the queftion in debate. This is a dangerous practice, and cenfured even by Socrates himself; whofe labours were devoted to the difcuffion of truth, and the detection of error. "If thou continueft to take delight in idle argumentation," said he to Euclides, "thou mayeft be qualified to combat with "the fophifts, but wilt never know how to live with 66 men." And lord Bacon, the great luminary of science, appears to have entertained fimilar ideas : For, fpeaking of the logic of Ariftotle, he terms it, "a philofophy for contention only; but barren in the production of works, for the benefit of life." * Many lamentable proofs have I feen, of the tendency of this habit of altercation to create indifference, not only to intellectual, but also to moral and religious truth. Cato, the cenfor, prophefied the ruin of the Roman conftitution, whenever this fort of learning fhould become the fashionable ftudy of his countrymen. He conceived his dislike to it on the following occafion. "In the year of Rome 599, the Athenians fent three of their principal philofophers, on an "embafly to the republic. At the head of these was "Carneades, a very celebrated leader of the Academic "fect. While he was waiting for an answer from the fenate, he employed himself in difplaying his talents in the art of disputation: And the Roman Biog. Brit. Vol. I. 2d Edit. p. 449. F 2 "youth youth flocked round him, in great numbers. In "one of these public difcourfes he attempted to prove, “ that justice, and injustice, depend altogether on the in"ftitutions of civil fociety, and have no foundation in 66 nature. The next day, agreeably to the manner of "that fect, and in order to fet the arguments on each "fide of the queftion in full view, he fupported with "equal eloquence, the reverfe of his former propofi❝tion. Cato was present at both these disputations; " and being apprehensive that the moral principles of "the Roman youth might be shaken, if they should "become converts to this mode of philosophizing, " he was anxious to prevent its reception; and did "not reft, till he had prevailed with the fenate to " dismiss the ambassadors, with their final answer.” * Perhaps the versatile opinions and principles of the Jefuits may be ascribed to this caufe; for I have been informed by feveral of them, with whom I have conversed, that their academical exercises are chiefly directed to make them fubtle difputants. How far the fame observation may be applicable to the members of a learned profeffion, highly refpected in this country, I will not prefume to determine. But there is too much reason to apprehend, that the custom of pleading for any client, without difcrimi. nation of right or wrong, muft leffen the regard due to those important distinctions, and deaden the moral fenfibility of the heart. *Plut. in Vit. Caton. Melmoth's Cato, p. 190. I have been too strongly impreffed with the love of truth, replied Sophron, to debate with indifference about it; and therefore to guard againft deception, from "what the nurse, and what the priest have taught," I would examine my most serious opinions, and try whether I cannot, by direct oppofition, or by the test of ridicule, invalidate their authority. The I have already given you my reasons against this practice, anfwered Philocles; and I could enforce them by many examples of the pernicious confequences of it, which have fallen under my observation. But private history is invidious; and I fhall therefore confine myself to one cafe of public notoriety. academy of Dijon, many years ago, propofed the following whimsical prize queftion, viz. "Whether the "sciences may not be deemed more hurtful, than be"neficial to fociety?" M. Rouffeau became a candidate for the laurel, and affumed the affirmative fide of the question; probably because it furnished him with a better opportunity of displaying his genius, and powers of perfuafion. * His difcourfe was received with the highest applause; he became the dupe of his own rhetoric; and adopted as a philofopher, the maxims which he had delivered as an orator. From this period commenced his fame, his paradoxes, and his misfortunes. † He combated the common *Major eft ille qui judicium abftulit, quam qui meruit. Cic, |