he passed three years in close retire

ment.

An interesting, though highlycoloured description of him as he appeared at this time, by the Russian Count Uwaroff, is quoted by Professor Seeley, but is too long to reproduce here. Varnhagen von Ense saw him also in his exile, and has left another remarkable account of him, in which occurs the following paragraph, which explains a great deal.

"His rapidity and impatience were closely connected with his bodily organisation. He once asked me the rate of my pulse, and then, with a laugh, held out his wrist, and bade me count the beats. They were more than a hundred to the minute. He declared that that had always been his ordinary pulse when he was in perfect health. He seemed to regard this peculiarity as a charter from nature, allowing him to indulge in more fiery ebullitions than other people."

Meanwhile things took their course. Austria was crushed; Schill was killed; the Walcheren expedition, badly conceived and badly executed, turned out a hideous failure.

Hardenberg came back to carry on the reforms which were in the air of Prussia, and to write as it were a second chapter to Stein's introduction, dealing at first chiefly with finance and administrative organisation, and, afterwards, improving the position of the Treasury, and even creating a shortlived national representation, while even before that W. von Humboldt had done a greater ultimate good to mankind than either of them by founding the University of Berlin.

"In him," says Professor Seeley, with profound truth, "meet and are reconciled the two views of life which found their most extreme representatives in Goethe and Stein."

Unhappily Prussia had not yet reached the lowest depth. That came when she was forced by the decision of the king, formed in the teeth of the advice of his principal ministers, to take the side of Napoleon against Russia-a proceeding of which, however, we may perhaps use the old phrase "felix culpa," for without it the

catastrophe of the French Empire in 1812 would certainly not have been nearly so great.

Ere long the relations between Russia and France, which had long been getting from bad to worse, ended in open war, and the Emperor Alexander, who had been impressed some years before by Stein's conversation and knew his character, summoned him from his retreat. The ex-minister, who had at a previous period thought of taking service in Russia, obeyed the summons, but wisely declined any regular employment, preferring to be a sort of adviser without portfolio, especially trusted in all that related to Germany.

This began the third period of his activity. We have seen him as the provincial administrator and as the reforming minister; we are now to see him as the adviser of the Czar, exercising a considerable influence on European affairs, for the advantage of what his friend Arndt, who became connected with him immediately after he went to Russia, would have called "the Fatherland."

What may have been the amount of the influence exercised by Stein over the mind of Alexander must remain an open question, but it certainly was, as far as it went, applied in a right direction.

The following extract from a letter to Count Münster does great credit to his statesmanlike insight, an insight sharpened by his Imperial-knightly jealousy of the minor princes and his dislike to the Prussian ministers:

"I am sorry that your Excellency spies a Prussian in me and discovers a Hanoverian in yourself. I have but one Fatherland, which is called Germany, and since, according to the old constitution, I belonged to it alone, and to no particular part of it-to it alone, and not to any part of it, I am devoted with my whole heart. To me in this great moment of transition the dynasties are completely indifferent; they are mere instruments. My wish is that Germany should become great and strong, that she may recover her independence, her self-government, and her nationality, and may assert them in her position between France and Russia; that is the interest of the nation

and of all Europe. It cannot be maintained in the routine of old, decayed, and rotten forms; this would be like desiring to ground the system of an artificial military frontier on the ruins of the old castles of the knights, and the towns fortified with walls and towers, while the ideas of Vauban, Coehorn, and Montalembert were rejected. My confession of faith is unity, and if that is not attainable, then some shift, some transition stage.

"Put what you will in the place of Prussia, dissolve it, strengthen Austria by Silesia and the Electoral Mark and North Germany, excluding the banished princes; bring back Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden to their condition before 1802, and make Austria mistress of Germany. I wish it, it is good, if it is practicable; only cease to think of the old Montagues and Capulets, and those ornaments of old knightly halls. If the bloody contest which Germany has maintained with bad fortune for twenty years, and to which it is now challenged again, is to end with a farce, at any rate I would rather have nothing to do with it, but shall return with joy and haste into private life."

Very curious in its bearing on the events of 1866, and less creditable to his sagacity, is Count Münster's reply:

"You say that the dynasties are indifferent to you. They are not so to me. There rules in them a spirit which can be traced through centuries. Read what Johannes Müller says in his League of Princes about the Guelfic House. May I refer to the glory of the Guelfs, whose unbending heroism has made their name a watchword of freedom? &c. Even England has never been so free as under the Three Georges, and the Fourth will bring the same mind to the throne. Compare with that the Prussian cudgel and ramrod! I honour Frederick the Great, and yet he has caused the ruin of Germany by aggrandising her, and that of his own state by creating a body which could only be kept alive by a great spirit which departed with him. When I showed this passage of your letter to the Regent, he said: If the dynasties are indifferent to Stein, why does not he name us instead of Prussia?'

I should like to put the same question. 66 'Prussia's power survives only in memory. She may continue between the Weichsel and Elbe as a power of the second or third rank. Why should not Russia have the Weichsel as a reward for her deeds? Why should Prussia receive back the possessions she ceded in former treaties, only to extend the area of her vexations, and to intrigue with France? On the other hand, consider what I have said to your Excellency on the formation of a great state between the Elbe and the Rhine out of possessions left without a master. It was in

tended to find in this region an indemnity for Norway; but Denmark's want of sense and the opposition of the Germans will, it is to be hoped, prevent that."

Right however as was the direction in which Stein wished to move, his first efforts were not very successful. He tried to organise a resistance to the French in Germany, working through secret agents, pamphlets, proclamations, and the like; but they all came to very little.

Meantime the hosts of Napoleon advanced successfully, and for a moment it seemed likely that Alexander would yield. This, as we all know, did not happen, and some have found in Stein the cause of his unwonted firmness. Professor Seeley is candid enough not to take this view. The firmness of Alexander was due to the haps also to a gust of mystical feeling. pressure of public opinion, and per

Important events now succeeded each other with great rapidity. Yorck, finding himself in an impossible position, declared against the French, and concluded a convention with the Russians, thereby going far to force the hand of the King of Prussia and his ministers, who denounced him more energetically than sincerely. Stein, appointed by the Czar to organise an insurrection in the eastern provinces of Prussia, gave, inter alia, the first impulse to the summoning of a Parliament, an impulse which worked underground until it became irresistible in 1848.

Soon direct negotiations were opened between the courts of St.Petersburg and Berlin, which resulted in the appointment of Stein, who had just escaped with his life from a severe illness, to be the head of an administration which comprised nearly all the minor states of Germany. In bringing about this reunion of Prussia and Russia, Stein had unquestionably a very great share.

For a brief period he now exercised very considerable influence. That influence, however, tending to call forth the energies of the people by a levée en masse, was feared by the minor

princes, hated by Austria, and distrusted as well by the Czar himself as by the King of Prussia. Such as it was it rapidly waned, and we soon find Arndt writing as follows:

"You may pretty well understand my position here that is, at the side of affairs, and not in them; and this is really the position of those also who fancy they are in them. I wish we had one who really was in them. Stein is not-for with honest intentions he -does no more than make leaps, or sometimes thrusts too: bolder than the boldest on the whole, but in particular cases often painful. My relation to Stein was originally formed and serves me now only as a name under which I diffuse certain ideas. He is almost always kind to me, but never or seldom confidential, which in fact he scarcely knows how to be; birth, indeed, is necessary for that. He could do much more if he had military notions, and if his hot temper allowed him in general to form and keep before him comprehensive views. But this he does not and can not. He knows how to be stern, and underrates tranquil powers and virtues. But, after all, he is very much to be praised."

A few weeks later, Stein again came to the front, receiving extended powers, becoming almost in reality what he was jokingly called-the Emperor of Germany-Germany, be it observed, without Prussia, but including those parts of France which were occupied by the Allies.

Professor Seeley takes us through this time in some detail, but leaves after all a very indefinite impression on the mind as to what Stein really did that would not have been done without him. He is entitled however to have his own words cited.

"Stein arrived in Paris on April 9th, which, as he remarks, was the anniversary of his arrival in Dresden, and felt now for the first time that his own deliverance and that of Europe was secure. 'Only when I compare,' he writes, the feeling that begins to prevade my whole being with that of oppression and suffering which has held me for nine years (this goes back, it will be noticed, beyond the Battle of Austerlitz), only this comparison enables me to estimate the degree of my present happiness and of my past suffering.'

"And thus we close this interesting passage in Stein's life. Reckoning from his arrival in Königsberg, it covers a period about as long as his Prussian ministry, and it is far more fall of striking incident. If I have compressed the narrative of it into less than half the space,

this has been because I neither wished nor was able to travel so far from Germany, and go so deep into Russian, French, and English history as a complete account of the fall of Napoleon would require. It has also been because Stein, whom I have selected as the most central figure of the German politics of that age, is during this year less near the centre than usual.

"He was not allowed the position to which he had a certain right, that of principal leader and manager of the rising of Germany. Hence in my narrative the most memorable German occurrence of the year is necessarily almost passed over. I mean the levée en masse of Prussia. For this Stein had worked in 1808, and yet he was not allowed to take part in it. He was allowed to appear in Königsberg and give the signal, but then he was called away.

"Some fatality seemed always to dash this cup from his lip. In 1809 he had been disappointed by the King's irresolution and by Napoleon's Decree of Proscription; this time the rising of Germany actually took place and triumphed over all opposition, and when Stein came to Breslau with Alexander's testimonial his hand must have seemed to touch the golden prize. But it was not to be. Those who had laboured most for Prussia in 1808 were forbidden to enter into the full fruition of 1813. Scharnhorst indeed was not allowed even to see the triumph. And Stein, who had gone forth bearing good seed, looked on from bringing their sheaves with them. a distance, while others returned with joy

"I may mention that this reflexion which the history suggests is not made by Stein himself. Not one word of complaint or regret is to be found in any of his letters. And if he does not complain that he has not been allowed a larger share in the work, still less does he regret the loss of deserved fame. Yet it is somewhat melancholy that in the great story of the liberation of Germany the one man whose heart was truly in the cause, and who represented Germany alone, is little mentioned. Prussian writers have little occasion to name him. Austrians are hostile to him. Russians are jealous of him. Yet there is little exaggeration in the words of Uwaroff quoted above. He wanted the liberation of Germany, and was unquestionably the principal author of it.'

"Let us leave him for a moment in Paris, where Gneisenau thus describes him on the 11th of May :- Herr vom Stein is as brilliant as ever, and, provoked as he has been by frequent contradiction, a little more prickly and irritable. We are very much indebted to him. Maybe without him the Russian armies would never have crossed the Memel. How welldisposed he is to Prussia will not be known till later.""

Put in another way, does not this mean that although Stein had a good

deal to do with bringing about the war of liberation, he had not so much to do with it as it has been sometimes supposed, or as his biographer would like to believe?

He was present at the Congress at Vienna, and took an active, although by no means a very prominent or interesting part in the controversies and consultations of that memorable gathering. He was a strong partisan of the annexation of Saxony by Prussia, attempted to curb the liberal inclinations of the Emperor Alexander in Poland, did what he could to influence his mind against the minor princes-chiefly of course in the interest of that "anc ent noblesse, distinguished by its military achievements, its influence in the council, and eminent position in the Church," to which he himself belonged-and pressed for the creation of really efficient assemblies in the small states, partly from an idea that they would cause their governments to be more active, but to some extent also it is to be feared from his hatred of

the natural foes of an Imperial knight. Whatever may have been the motives of some of his advice he at last deserves the credit of having desired a more united and national Germany than that "contradiction of thirtyfive wills" which came out of the diplomatic crucible.

With regard to the securities to be taken against France after the final overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, Stein's opinion was midway between that of Hardenberg and the Duke of Wellington, which were respectively as follows::

"As soon" (said Hardenberg) " as a nation has overpassed the defensive position assigned to it by nature or art, its activity, its power, its policy, its arrangements, its national spirit, its public opinion-all take the direction suggested by its geographical position, and it will retain this spirit so long as the geographical position remains.

"France has been in this condition since the time of Louis XIV.

"Therefore, if we want a durable and safe peace, as we have so often announced and declared, if France herself sincerely wants such a peace with her neighbours, she must

give back to her neighbours the line of defence she has taken from them-to Germany, Alsace and the fortifications of the Netherlands, the Meuse, Mosel, and Saar. Not till then will France find herself in her true line of defence, with the Vosges, and her double line of fortresses from the Meuse to the sea; and not till then will France remain quiet.

"Let us not lose the moment so favourable to the weal both of Europe and France which now offers of establishing a durable and sure peace. At this moment we can do it. The hand of Providence has visibly offered us this opportunity. If we let it slip streams of blood will flow to attain this object, and the cry of the unhappy victims will call us to give an account of our conduct."

Memorable words, which should redound to the credit of a remarkable man whom Stein did not like, whom his biographer heartily dislikes, and who doubtless had his failings.

"I prefer," said the Great Duke, "the temporary occupation of some of the strong places, and to maintain for a time a strong force in France, both at the expense of the tion, to the permanent cession of even all the French Government and under strict regulaplaces which in my opinion ought to be occupied for a time. There is no doubt that the troops of the Allies stationed in France will give strength and security to the government of the king, and that their presence will give the king leisure to form his army in such manner as he may think proper. The expectation also of the arrival of the period at which the several points occupied should be evacuated would tend to the preservation of peace; while the engagement to restore them to the king or his legitimate heirs or snccessors would have the effect of giving additional stability to his throne. This term of years, besides the advantage of introducing into France a system and habits of peace after twenty-five years of war, will enable the Powers of Europe to restore their finances; it will give them time and means to reconstruct the great artificial bulwarks of their several countries, and to settle their governments, and to consolidate their means of defence. France, it is true, will still be powerful, probably more powerful than she ought to be in relation to her neighbours; but if the Allies do not waste their time and their means, the state of security of each and of the whole in relation to France will, at the end of the period, be materially improved, and will probably leave but little to desire.

Stein held it possible to combine what was most essential in both

schemes.

"There might be," he thought, "a temporary occupation of a sufficiently long line of for

knowledge, nor wisdom, nor vigour, but is perhaps more potent than any of them in swaying the minds of

men.

Perhaps, too, in a few years it will be possible for those Englishmen who are attached to Germany to read this book with less irritation than they do at present. The truth is that although it would be unjust to Stein to put him in the same category as the statesman before whom united Germany is now contented to bow down, there is nevertheless a sufficient amount of superficial resemblance between the two characters to remind us at every few pages of the sayings and doings of the Imperial Chancellor. Then, too, in these days, when all that is worst in Germany seems coming to the front, when those who sympathised most intensely with her struggles for unity are beginning to ask, with a mixture of bewilderment and disgust, whether what we now see was really the inevitable outcome of the sad mistake she made when she cast in her lot with those who said, "Through Unity to Freedom," rather than with those who said, "Through Freedom to Unity," it is hardly fair to read the story of a man who, like Stein, was above all things a German patriot.

In justice, however, to Professor Seeley, we must remember that he began his work at a time when all the best men in this country could hardly speak too highly of Germany, before the intoxication which followed the military successes of 1870-1, before the great swindling period, before the blundering Culturkampf, before the panic about Socialism, before the rigorous laws against the expression of unpopular opinions, before the determination, avowed in the highest quarters, to return to the exploded fallacies of protection.

Of course observers at a distance are subject to optical illusions. We see much that is alarming and distressing in the state of Germany, and

our attention is not attracted to the large amount of faithful work and intelligent happiness which forms the counterpoise to it. An honest foreign observer, looking at Beaconsfieldian England, probably thinks it a far worse place than it really is. He sees much that is dishonest, much that is stupid, much that is contrary to sound policy in our public action, and draws from what he sees many unduly severe conclusions as to what he does not see.

Still, when all allowance has been made, the condition of Germany is not one which her friends can contemplate without misgiving. But dangerous as is the slope on which the German people finds itself, we may hope that it may be arrested, before it is too late, on that Descensus Averni down which it is being pushed, to a great extent by evil personal, and therefore temporary influences. Then perhaps we shall be able to look more charitably than we can do now at the life of Stein. For the next age too there must be another English account of him. A hundred octavo pages in a twovolume book, in which he may stand side by side with Hardenberg, Altenstein, Schön, Scharnhorst, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Radowitz-a man whose life was in his own opinion a failure, but who was in some respects much more interesting than any of them is all that can reasonably be asked for Stein twenty years hence. Professor Seeley's three immense. volumes will form a quarry of admirable materials for such a work. Several of the lives above alluded to, and a good deal else, will be more easily written for his labours, and a Professor of History is perhaps fulfilling his function distinctly better when he is sowing the germs of good historical work in the minds of others, than when he produces a book more perfect in itself, which has not that particular merit.

M. E. GRANT DUFF..