rection, and in excess of what would have occurred under ordinary circumstances, amount to no less than 15 per cent. of the whole strength of the force; that is to say, in 1857, the deaths were septupled, 174 out of every 1,000 officers died, the experience of half a century having led us to conclude that only twenty-six out of every 1,000, would die. What the increase may have been during the same period to the average deaths amongst other Europeans and East Indians, it is impossible to say, but we observe certain of the Calcutta Life Offices estimating it, as at 30th June last, at an excess of 250 per cent on the lives assured, for the year then ended. But this point settled, and order entirely re-established, the difficult and solemn question remains-Will there be more risk to Christian life in India than there was before the outbreak? No man can answer that enquiry, and all must be mere conjecture. Amidst the din of conflicting opinions, we can only hope, that with the diffusion of somewhat more exalted ideas of the true mission of Englishmen in India; a disarmed native population and permanent European force of 80,000 men; colonization to such an extent as is practicable; a thorough development of the railway and telegraphic systems; and a Christian Government directly responsible to the people of England, European life will be more secure in this country than it has ever been before. Our non-Indian readers will be liable to misunderstand the term "East Indian." In India and throughout this article, it is exclusively applied to Christians of mixed European and Native parentage, or the descendants of such. The term is thus applied to all who are not of pure European blood. These constitute a large and important element of Indian Society, and, notwithstanding the ignorant assumptions of some, they are a most valuable and worthy class. The term Eurasian is often used in the same sense, and by themselves and all who respect them, the term 'half-caste,' is avoided. The higher class of East Indians has always gained the respect of the Europeans who have been connected with them, by their integrity, intelligence, usefulness and high respectability. Too little has been done in the way of Christianising and elevating the lowest. classes of East Indians, who have been always degraded. Like the European proletari of our large cities in England, they need a special agency. ART. IV.-1. Rough Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow. By LIEUTENANT J. J. MCLEOD INNES, Bengal Engineers. Calcutta, 1857. 2. 3. A Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow, from the The Defence of Lucknow, a Diary from 30th May to 4. A Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow. By CAPTAIN R. P. ANDERSON, 25th N. I. London, 1858. 5. A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow, written for the perusal of Friends at Home. London, 1858. 6. Day by Day at Lucknow a Journal of the Siege of Lucknow. By MRS. CASE. London, 1858. HE siege of Lucknow is one of the most remarkable inci Tents in the military history of the world. It shows the energy and fore-thought of the great man who was at the head of affairs in Oudh when the disturbances broke out, as well as the daring bravery and patient fortitude of those under him, and at the same time, it shews the perseverance and personal courage, mixed with want of purpose and cowardice, of the besiegers. Nine hundred Europeans (many of them not before trained to arms) aided by seven hundred natives, in the midst of a hostile city, successfully resisted an army of almost countless multitudes, who were well equipped and provided with guns and all the munitions of war, and who had the whole country at their command. Well may the survivors of the siege be proud to think that they, for three months, and with all means of communication and of obtaining supplies wholly cut off, defended a post like the Residency, which, until within a few weeks before the siege commenced, was nothing but an unconnected series of common dwelling-houses, with their out-houses and gardens, -and that they did so, encumbered as they were by some eight hundred women and children, to provide for whose safety was throughout their first care. Never were the advantages of thorough combination and unity more clearly illustrated. Had there been, in the armies which besieged the Residency, but a small part of the discipline and spirit which pervaded its defenders, the siege could not have lasted as it did; SIEGE OF LUCKNOW. for, through mere force of numbers, the besieged must have been overwhelmed and destroyed, long before any relief could have reached them. What saved the garrison was that the enemy had no good leaders, that they were deficient in true discipline and spirit, and unable to bring themselves to persevere in the attack, when they saw their comrades fall beside them. The story of the defence of Lucknow consists of three principal parts; the first relates to the preparations made, and measures of safety adopted, by Sir Henry Lawrence prior to the 30th of June, on which day the siege commenced; the second comprises the siege itself, from that day down to the relief by Generals Havelock and Outram, on the 25th of September; the third is the defence under Outram, from the 26th of September until the relief by the Commander-inChief, nearly two months later. Of these, the first two are the most interesting, the last being merely a repetition and continuation of the second, on an extended scale and slightly varied. It does not appear whether, before the beginning of the month of May, Sir H. Lawrence was more alarmed as to our position in India than were his superiors in office. The mysterious circulation of the chappaties must have attracted his attention. But then nothing perceptible had followed, except the mutinies of the 19th and 34th regiments of native infantry. The disbanding of the 19th regiment seemed to have settled matters for the time, and the extent of the disaffection of the native army continued to be ignored by the heads of the Government. Why it was so, it is difficult to conceive, for the disaffection and danger were perceived by of the best officers in the army and others, who attempted to call attention to the subject, but in vain. many As On the 2nd of May, however, Sir H. Lawrence received a very distinct warning that all was not right in his own proOn that day, the 7th regiment Oudh vince of Oudh. local infantry stationed at Moosa Bagh, within four miles of Lucknow, refused to bite the cartridge and mutinied. large a force as was available was immediately marched against the mutineers. They were overawed, and did not wait to be attacked; a few fled under the cover of darkness, and the remainder were perfectly submissive, and did as they Of those who ran away, some were made were ordered. prisoners, and many came in afterwards of their own cord. None were punished as mutineers; the policy which had been adopted by the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor General, in the case of the 19th and 34th Regi SEPT., 1858. ments, was followed, and no executions took place. The prisoners were set at liberty, and the regiment was not even disbanded, although many of the men were dismissed from it. Sir Henry, now alive to the critical state of things, did all to check disaffection that could be done by mild measures. He had meetings with the native officers, instituted enquiries into the state of regiments, and did his utmost to re-assure the wavering, and to recall the disaffected to their duty. A few days after the mutiny, he held a durbar or levee in the Residency. Attended by his European staff, and by many of the principal natives of the city, he gave kheluts or dresses of honor and other rewards to two men, who had proved their fidelity by giving information of the mutinous spirit of the 7th regiment. One of them, a havildar, was promoted to the rank of subahdar, and another, a private, was made a jemadar. Sir Henry at the same time made a most spirited and stirring address to the assemblage, shewing the actual state of things, and that there was no foundation for the disaffection which, he found, prevailed among the regiments. He enlarged upon the confidence England hitherto had placed in the native troops, but at the same time pointed out her perfect ability to do without them, and to supply their place by Europeans, a measure which, if adopted, would, he said, produce any thing but agreeable results, so far as the class of persons to which the sepoys belonged were concerned. No white man ever had a greater knowledge of natives, or more influence with them, than Sir Henry Lawrence. His speech on this occasion was admirably adapted for the purpose for which it was intended, and at the time it seemed to have its effect. But the evil was then far too deeply seated to be cured by words, or even by the conferring of gifts and honors; and what he said was, in fact, wholly thrown away. Within a month from the day on which he held his durbar, Sir Henry Lawrence signed the death-warrant (consequent on his conviction for open mutiny) of the subahdar, who had received a khelut, and been promoted by him from the rank of havildar as a reward for fidelity. So little did he, or any of the Europeans in Lucknow, understand their true position, or the depth of the treachery of those by whom they were surrounded! On the 15th of May, intelligence of the outbreaks and massacres at Meerut and Delhi was received, and steps were at once taken to prevent the like fatal results following any rising which might occur at Lucknow. It was thought desirable to put in a state of defence a post, which might afford a safe retreat for all, in the event of a sudden attack, and in which all the public stores and magazines might be securely housed. A large building called the Mutchi Bhawn (situated some little distance to the westward of the Residency, on the same side of the river) was capable of being made defensible against any sudden attack, and its many large buildings were well suited for the purpose of store-rooms. It was accordingly at once occupied by our troops, and by degrees repaired and strengthened : From "The preliminary move taken by Sir H. Lawrence, as already mentioned, was to make a military post of the Mutchi Bhawn. its position, it completely commanded the stone bridge, one of the two entrances from the cantonments to the city, while it and the Residency together made it a dangerous operation to force the iron bridge, the other entrance into the city. From its height and solidity it was well fitted to oppose the attack of infantry and mobs, and tradition gave to its garrison the possession and control of the city; while the variety and extent of its buildings, and of the adjacent ones incorporated with it, made it capable of containing 300 or 400 Europeans, and an equal number of native troops, as well as arsenal and magazine stores to a very large amount. Hence, from the 17th May, Sir H. Lawrence placed a garrison there under the command of Major Francis of the 13th native infantry, and began to arm it with artillery, strengthen it with defences against musketry, repair its rooms, and open out fresh communications, remove into it all the powder and ordnance stores, and lay in commissariat supplies. At first these operations were on a small scale, but as the buildings were gradually repaired and cleansed, (and especially after the mutiny of the 30th May) the garrison was much increased, and the Mutchi Bhawn became the depôt for all stores that could be accumulated."* At that period it was not so much a regular siege that was dreaded, as a sudden rising which would not last long. The Mutchi Bhawn was well suited to withstand any attack by a mob, though it could scarcely have been rendered defensible against artillery. But it was quite invaluable on account of the size of its buildings, as it could receive immense quantities of stores, for which there was then no room in the Residency. All commissariat supplies were in the first instance sent to the Mutchi Bhawn, as they were collected; and all the powder and ordnance stores were brought over there from the Dowlut Khana, an old building some little distance off, which had viously been used as the magazine. Eventually, as matters assumed a more serious aspect, it was resolved that the Residency, and the houses and compounds around it, should be fortified, and that both it and the Mutchi Bhawn should be held as long as possible. If concentration, however, became necessary, it was to be on the Residency, which was capable of being made much the stronger position of the two. Lieut. Innes, page 2. pre |