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as may appear to justifyor refute it,—such as general opinion,common practice, the authority of skilled or eminent men, the comparison of likelihoods, and the effects these ought to have upon the mere intellect of man. In these objects it comes very near the margin of rhetoric, and in some sort might be said to be included under it, were it not that dialectic, in the Aristotelian sense, eliminates from the problem of the Topics the moral influences or effects of controversy, and merely aims at the imparting of intellectual skill in that one art.
The eight books of the Topics are more wonderful for the fertility, ingenuity, and extent of reflective skill they display, than for their methodicality. They constitute a grand storehouse of acute distinctions and singularly clear and judicious applications of the pure force of the intellect to the investigation of the specific arguments the mind can supply in the conducting of controversy. The teachings of these books are so minute and diffuse, so exact and intimate, so varied, and so punctiliously distinct, that analysis, or the giving of any general idea of the many aphorismic instructions they contain, is impossible. The means by which, so far as the mere power of the mind itself affords them for acquiring victory in debate, are here described with a fulness, ease, and pointedness, which could hardly be excelled. Hints are given for the attainment of arguments, and aids are supplied for conducting controversies, discussions, and judicial investigations, which are quite capable of being highly useful, and which might easily be collocated so as to afford a far higher than a dialectic victory,
-even one over the intricacies of nature and the mysteries of mind. The strongly systematic mind of Aristotle, though it has put forth all its energies in finding the materials for a marvellously planned science of controversial argumentation, has not been successfully applied to the arrangement of the various items, on the thinking out of which so much care has been expended. The eighth book of the Topics is an elaborate series of directions for the conducting of disputes, in which the duties, trickeries, plausibilities, and flimsities of querist and respondent are noted and explained, and full instructions are given for the training of the mind to skill in dialectic discussion. Nor is this the useless and barren art which some wiseacres proclaim it to be. It calls out, trains, and exercises the most potent faculties of the soul. There is scarcely anything “in regard to which notions cruder, narrower, or more erroneous prevail, than in regard to disputation, its nature, its objects, and its ends ; nay, I make bold to say, that by no academical degeneracy has the intellectual vigour of youth lost more, than through the desuetude into which, during these latter ages, disputation as a regular and daily exercise in our universities has fallen.” In this opinion, uttered by Sir William Hamilton, we wholly coincide ; and we believe that the exercised culture arising from the contests of mind with mind provided for in Aristotle's Topics, would be a great safeguard against the waveringmindedness so common in our day. So long as we believe in "the superior utility of disputation as an exercise, and the superior
utility of exercise in general as a mean of intellectual development,” We must regret the neglect with which logicians have hitherto treated the books of the Topics of Aristotle.
VI. On Sophisms, or Fallacies.— The hypocrisy of thought, like the hypocrisy of life, produces evil consequences; and it is no less needful to guard against the latter than the former,---nay, rather more requisite in the case of falsity of idea, for out of it the other hypocrisy most frequently develops itself. Deceptive thought and deceptive speech are both too common in the world. To know the tricks of men and the vagrancy of our own minds, would greatly aid us in guarding against the mistakes and errors into which we may be led by over-confidence in ourselves or others. The object of the book on Sophisms is to make an investigation into the sources of error, the means of detecting it, and the processes by which the mind may be taught to test and assay the thoughts propounded for its acceptance. Truth is man's only sure defence and dependence. If we rely on the false, we must be disappointed; truth alone places us within an impregnable fortress,-alone supplies safety, happiness, and honour. Thought is seldom procurable in unadulterate perfectness, and counterfeits of it are often manufactured. These ought to be instantly swept out of the circulation of thought, and therefore means for their detection must be planned and employed. To this Fork Aristotle sets himself right earnestly in the treatise with which he closes the round of logical instruction and finishes the Organon. It is a production of a most brilliant character, and the author's cleverness as a detective of impostors among thoughts has seldom found a parallel. Scarcely a possible form of faulty thought escapes him; and the devices he uses for gaining the triumph of truth are not even now, in their own place, to be excelled.
To reduce into strict classifiability the various possibilities of error to which the mind in thinking was liable, was of itself a grand idea, -such as no one, possessed of less of the scientific and systematizing genius of Aristotle, could have dreamed of, much less accomplished. Yet there are very few modes of causing an erroneous impression to arise in the mind of any one, of suggesting or expressing an argument so as to be likely to deceive or have all the effects of deception, and of giving an appearance of plausibility or probability to a false or incorrect argument, which he has not analyzed and exposed, as well as expounded, with a perspicuity and keenness of vision which render a student inexcusable if he be taken unawares by unsound or indecisive reasoning. Ordinary works on logic now treat so fully of fallacies, their nature, causes, classes, forms, and detection, that it does not seem requisite here to say more than that the Aristotelic treatise on sophistical proofs has been but little improved in acuteness, expressiveness, or classification, by the subsequent exponents of the science-many as they are- -of right thinking.
It is usual in our day to prefix to the Organon the Introduction of Porphyry, regarding genus, species, difference, property, and accident, their laws, relations, and implications; and most of the Logics of the present day incorporate less or more of the doctrines of the Neo-Platonic successor of Plotinus. The utility of the matter included in this treatise justifies its adoption, as one of the groundworks of modern logic, but its entire harmony with Aristotle's doctrines may be doubted.
It ought to be remembered, in studying the logical treatises of Aristotle, that they were composed, not primarily to present and furnish a complete course of training in the art of reasoning, but were produced and adapted to answer the exigencies and require. ments of his own time. Sophists abounded, and he analyzed the grounds and elements of sophistry. Demonstrative thinkers were urging their way towards science, and he supplied a guide to investigation. Argumentation was the great instrument of dis. covery, and he perfected the theory of debate. Words were the media of enunciating ideas, and he criticized language as an exponent of thought. The perplexing infinity of realities almost overcame the human capacity for recognizing and registering individual things, and he furnished a convenient system of classification, and not only surveyed, but mapped out the whole continent of human reason, while he composed a geography of the thinkable. All this was done with a vigour and grandeur which proves him to have been an almost flawless incarnation of intellectuality.
On commencing the present paper, the writer intended to present a vidimus of the logic of Aristotle in his own words (translated), for which he had made preparations some years ago; but afterconsideration showed him that, unless arranged differently from that in which they appear in Aristotle's works, the tenets of the philosopher could not be usefully submitted to the reader, and that, if otherwise presented, they could scarcely hold a place in a series of articles on European Philosophy.” He has, therefore, adopted the expedient of giving such information regarding the actual works of the Stagyrite on logic as may impart a general idea of their contents, and has reserved for a future opportunity his design of composing an entire and useful compendium of the science of thinking, from the Organon of Aristotle, concise enough to be readily studied, and adapted to modern minds and uses. A few interpolations and annotations will give it such consistency and systematic form as shall, he hopes, commend it to his readers. Meanwhile he may refer such of those as have student inclinations for further informa. tion upon this subject, to Reid's “ Analysis of Aristotle's Logic," 0. F. Owen's translation of the Organon in Bohn's Library, the Art of Reasoning, Introduction, chap. ii., and in the body of the work, chap. xiii., the chapters in Lewes and Maurice on Aristotle, and to the "Fathers of Greek Philosophy," by Bishop Hampden. The works of B. Saint-Hilaire in French, and of F. A. Trendelenberg in German, may also be consulted with great advantage. The Logics of Hamilton, Mansell, the Port Royalists (translated by S. Baynes), G. Moberly, Karslake, Chretien, Spalding, &c., are in many places informed with the true Aristotelic spirit.
WAS THE PENTATEUCH WRITTEN BY MOSES? AND
IS IT HISTORICALLY TRUE?
AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE. --II. WHETHER the Pentateuch was written by Moses, is a question to be decided by proving the statement that it is historically true. For this reason, we devoted our former article to a refutation of Dr. Colenso's objections founded
upon popular statistics ; and now, after noticing the arguments of E. H. K., we shall show that the Bishop's inferences from other portions of the Mosaic history are equally illogical, as those noticed in our preceding paper.
E. H. K. quotes Deut. xxxiv. 5, 6, with other texts, and then affirms, "These, and other similar passages, clearly prove that Moses was not, and could not be, the writer of all the books of the Pentateuch” (p. 21). From certain notes or additions supplementing the history, he illogically concludes that “all the books were not written by Moses. If the editor, as editors often do, had added an explanatory word or clause to the objector's article, it would have ceased to be the production of E. H. K.! Such additions are found in every ancient document, and yet no one can reasonably infer from them that the document is not therefore what it pretends to be. We have at the close of several of the Pauline epistles, as, for example, 1 and 2 Tim., statements known to be from another hand, and yet no one would jump to the really ridiculous inference that they prove Paul was not the author of these epistles.
On page 24 we have, again, the statement that Christ and the apostles do not by “their reference prove the truth of the Pentateuch any more than Paul, when he referred to the games of the athletes, expressed his approval of the games." Let the reader look at Paul's “reference to the Grecian games, and his “references” to the Pentateuch, and say what he thinks of E. H. K.'s use of the word reference. Our Lord and the apostles built Christianity upon the Pentateuch, and this is called a reference by a writer who talks of " logic run mad,” and is so self-satisfied as to foretell that “declaimers" on the affirmative side will adopt this “mad logic” as their “method of proof” (p. 24).
Dr. Colenso has written five chapters on the exodus and its diffi. culties ; of which the one numbered ten in his work is on the insti. tution of the passover. His object is to show that on the very night of the observance, without any “notice several days before. band” (p. 54), Moses directed the Hebrews to keep the passover ; and that on the same night the exodus took place. In Exod. xii. 3, a reference to the tenth day shows that that day was yet future ; in Ver. 6 we find that the lamb was to be kept till the fourteenth day, which again proves that the directions were given several days beforehand; and, yet because when the day anticipated had arrived, God said, “I will pass through the land this night” (ver. 21), Dr. Colenso affirms that time for preparation was not previously allowed.
Having reduced at least five days to one night, he, in profound ignorance of all Eastern customs and manners, "imagines the time that would be required for the poorer half of London going hurriedly to borrow from the richer half” (p. 57) jewellery and raiment. The Hebrews are pictured as hurrying from the east to the extreme west of London by Dr. Colenso, an absurdity of which Moses is not the author. In the Pentateuch we find it was the Egyptians who, under the apprehension of instant and universal death, went hurriedly to the Hebrews, forcing upon them their jewels and garments, and entreating them to depart with whatever they required (Exod. xii. 33, 36). Dr. Colenso reviews all the facts of the case, and then pronounces the history to be absurd. The masses of the people in the East from time immemorial have converted the surplus of their earnings into trinkets, which are worn profusely on every finger and toe, on the arm from wrist to elbow, round the neck and waist, on the forehead and hair, on the nose and the ears, which have as many perforations as possible. To strip themselves of their jewels, and to empty their bags and boxes, was the work of a few moments to the Egyptians ; and to collect them was a process as expeditious to the Hebrews. Dr. Colenso, as if he had never read the statements he criticizes, sends the people from one part of a city like London to another, whereas Moses directs each Hebrew to take from his neighbours and lodgers whatever he desired (Exod. iii. 22). This transfer of the property began some days before the night of the departure (Exod. xi. 2, 3), but the critic confines it to the last moment. Having thus turned the tables, reduced the time against clearest evidence to the con. trary, transferred modern and European ideas to Hebrews living 3,300 years ago, what else can result but a heap of absurdities and contradictions ? Take the Pentateuch as it stands, and there will be no such difficulties as those "imagined” by the Bishop.
His eleventh chapter is founded upon the misrepresentations of the tenth, and falls with it; but as it contains some apparently startling objections, we shall devote a few paragraphs to show what they are worth.
"What,” he inquires—"what of the sick and infirm, or the women in recent and imminent childbirth,” during the march out of Egypt, “in a population like that of London, where the births are 264 a day, or about one erery five minutes ?” (p. 62). Out of 2,500,000 souls, 600,000 are the Bishop's estimate of adult males; and therefore 600,000 represents the number of adult women. Out of this