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along the viewless atmosphere at a public meeting. Introspection is too active in him, and his own consciousness is too much developed to permit the usual and requisite concentration of ideas to which habit inclines him; and the disturbing play of the outgoing emotions is too active and engrossing to allow him to use his whole faculty of thought upon the topic under consideration. An orator, on the other hand, feels a passivity and inertia of mind congealing and frost-fixing his whole intellect; unless the glow and animation, the living excitement and inducement of a crowd be before him. The tension of his thoughts cannot be wrought up to effectiveness unless the emotions are under the influences of a circle of anxious hearts ready to be subjected in turn to the controlling charm of his invigorated enthusiasm,-unless an atmosphere of livingness environs him, into which he can impel the vivacious energy of an excited and exciting mind. Few have such perfect and unalloyed command of thought, feeling, pulse, frame, physical habit, and mental idiosyncrasy, as to enable them to give full scope to the actual effervescence of the intellect, and in the mere extemporaneity of their mental activity utter the impassioned thought which springs in fresh-born exuberance from the living spirit. The reticence of modern manners against it. It is voted extravagance and rhodomontade. It is rashness, volubility, volatility, bombast, rant, froth, turgidity, and magniloquence,-not vigour, raciness, piquancy, and eloquence. The cause of this may be said, in a great measure, to be in the multiplication, in our times, of printed matter,-matter to be read in quiet, and apart from the play and display of passions and the consequent tendency in every mind to compare the spoken words with the written style to which we all are so much more accustomed. This comparison operates to cool and depress the emotions of the speaker, and to incline the hearers to judiciality and calmness. It has a sedative effect on both. It makes Eloquence, in its ancient sense,-outspokenness,--less possible, and, therefore, more rare in modern than in ancient times.
Hence a great error committed in our age in regard to public speaking. In our efforts after the attainment of an oratorical style, --in our criticisms upon those who aim at occupying the senatehouse, or the forum, the platform, the lecture-desk, or the pulpit, we refer to the old oratory with all its stir, its fearlessness, its passion, fervour, power, flash, vigour, invective, glow, point, polish, and antithesis, as our model and pattern, forgetful in this of our own altered days and ways. The elder orators had no such dampening practicality as we have to contend against; had no such mere reference to business, fact, interest, and section to gratify; no such intricately collocated questions to unravel; no such general culture to address; no such comparison with books, treatises, and serials, to fear; and no such criticism of men wielding the vast powers of the daily press to risk, endure, and run the gauntlet of. If we say, then, that modern Eloquence ought to be considerably different from that which moved the aggregated masses of past centuries, we say what facts warrant and experience proves, that ancient Eloquence cannot rightly be cited either as our “ensample,” or used as the given premises of a just criticism. Ancient Eloquence was impassioned thought; modern Eloquence is thought impassioned: the former kindles thought by the emotions; the latter illustrates it by the glare, or lights it on the way by the glow of passion: the one excited passion to incite or induce thought; the other induces thought by reflection, but excites to active ulterior objects by the stimulation of the passions. Ancient Eloquence per. suades; modern Eloquence not only persuades, but convinces.
Conviction is the complete vanquishment of a resistent state of mind by the presentation to it of such evidence as compels the acceptance of that which is proven by it as true, conclusive, and satisfactory. It is the necessary assent of the intellect that sufficient proof has been afforded to warrant action upon the matter subjected to the criticism of the reasoning powers. Conviction exercises a regulating, guiding, and restraining influence on human actions and their issues. It is that state of thought in which a man is able to say, “I have made up my mind.” To convince is to employ the means of producing belief,-of causing the mind to regard certain principles or ideas as true, and of inducing the intellect to consider them as fixed, settled, and certain. Persuasion is something considerably different. Conviction is not always followed by action, and may only induce in the mind a calm and dispassionate acquiescence in the mere accuracy of a statement and an intellectual resting in the truths determined by the reason, but neither operative upon the conscience, nor initiative upon the active powers. Suasion is the excitement and direction of the sensibilities of men to the exercise of deliberation and to the employment of choice; it is the induction in the mind of a proneness or readiness to assent to and comply with any proven obligation or duty ; it is the prompting of the inclinations to acknowledge and to act upon the ideas of right and wrong which are lodged in the conscience or determined on by the reason. Suasion seeks to promote activity of conduct, by adding the notion of advantageousness to that of right, and so inducing the poised and indeterminate mind to give itself to that course of conduct on behalf of which the suasion is used. Persuasion is the thorough and entire mastery of the whole nature, appetites, instincts, passions, inclinations, habits, impulses, intellect, conscience, and will; the conquest by some truth of all the various powers of humanity; the concentration and excitement of the whole personality to the accomplishment of a proposed end; the affecting of the guiding, governing, and determining capacities of the man by the authority of some great idea, and the creation of an imperious desire to vindicate and effect the active success of that idea. It produces a oneness of aim in the entire being, a simultaneousness of exertion, and an undivided loyalty to a given dictate of the feelings, the will, or the intellect. For this is the point requiring particular note here, that in persuasion any one of the trine of activities, of which the soul is the single unity, may acquire the over-urging force, and compel the aid and agency of the others; while in conviction, the intellect alone, though sometimes induced by the allies, determines and fixes, decides and dictates the ambition, pursuit, or intent, in furtherance of which it shall act. As, then, persuasion was the sole end of ancient Eloquence--and conviction requires to be superadded to that in the efforts of the modern orator-it is evident that the intellect must receive a larger share of interests, activities, arts, and influence of the modern than of the ancient orator ; and hence, that modern Eloquence must be characterized in the main by a much greater amount of intellectuality than that of the ages and times when men in general thought and read less, were more impulsive, and more easily stirred to passionate activity, and quickened to exerted life. Then the good, the advantageous, the politic, the plausible, were more frequently urged; now the true, the right, the just, the honourable, and the elevating, are more strenuously maintained. The progress of man has imported into the possible motives by which men may be stimulated higher and holier, nobler and clearer truths ; has made effective for active excitement a wider area of his being; and has brought within reach of the orator a much more exalted species of mind. The passions are probably not less active now than then, but they are less exclusively subject to bestirment; the sensibilities are not only more acute, but more refined ; the intellect is subjected to bigher culture and to holier laws; the will is less excitable and more easily controlled :-in fact, the whole nature of man has been more duly exercised, and less left to barren wastefulness and idle inanity. The centuries have not passed without distilling into society influences of a diviner character than Homer sung, Plato taught, Demosthenes employed, or Sophocles represented; than Virgil could conceive, Horace act upon, or Cicero express. As these have permeated and pervaded life, politics, society, books, talk, and men, they have induced changes in them all. These changes again, by action and reaction, have impressed the individual natures of men, and made them more susceptible of the kindlier touches of humanity, more prompt to move to the measures of charity, more decided in their love of freedom, not as a mere personal possession, but as affording a possibility for the outgrowth and development of man in the entirety of his being. These changes demand from the modern orator full recognition; and, if rightly comprehended, would aid him greatly in the adaptation of his means to the ends he proposes. The Eloquence of the present day must make the conviction of the intellect its peculiar care, and use suasion and persuasion upon the emotions and the will only in subordination to the conviction of the reasonable nature of man.
In subsequent papers we propose to note the application of the ideas heretofore expressed to the Eloquence of the pulpit, the parliament, and the platform, with a view to afford our readers the means of judging our theory by the tests of experience. S. N.
WAS THE PENTATEUCH WRITTEN BY MỌSES? AND
IS IT HISTORICALLY TRUE ?
AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-I. MORE room is required to refute than to advance an objection. We are allowed in the British Controversialist about a tenth of the space taken by Dr. Colenso, to answer his arguments. In medias res must, therefore, be our motto. His introductory and concluding remarks, embodied in the first and last chapters, require no particular examination. We commence with his second chapter; and as his arrangement of subjects is arbitrary, we shall examine them in the order of their connection.
The second chapter is on the family of Judah, and the third on the explanation of expositors. His refutation of what commentators have said, is no concern of ours; and the third chapter may be dismissed with the first and the last. The basis of his work is the construction put upon the expression-" which came into Egypt” (Gen xlvi. 8), and the assumption, of which he is “ certain,” that the writer “means to say,” in Gen. xlvi. 12, "that Hezron and Hamul were born in the land of Canaan, and were among the 70 persons (including, Jacob himself, and Joseph_and his two sons) who came into Egypt with Jacob” (p. 17). The statement, that Hezron and Hamul were born in the land of Canaan, is vouched so positively by the many passages which sam up the *70 souls," that to give up this point is to give up an essential part of the story (p. 19). Now, after all this “certainty” and
positiveness," he gives up one point, and proves the impossibility of the other.
" Which came into Egypt," means nothing more than—“which settled in Egypt." Moses absolutely shows this by including Joseph, who went down before Jacob, and the two sons of Joseph, who were born in Egypt. This is denied on pages 17 and 19, but admitted on page 27 ; thus :—“Evidently the sons of Joseph are not reckoned with those who went down into Egypt with Jacob, because they were born there,” &c. He may, if he chooses to be hypercritical, add, “ This description is, of course, literally incorrect;", but as he admits that “the writer's meaning is obvious enough,” that is all we care about. But if so obvious in relation to three in the family register, it is equally obvious in relation to Hezron and Hamul. There is nothing in that register to prove that these sons of Pharez were born in Canaan, except the phrase, "came into Egypt,” and that Dr. Colenso admits is equivalent to settling in that country. That they could not have been natives of Canaan, is proved by himself (pp. 18, 19), by showing the impossibility that various events recorded could have occurred before the immigration into Egypt. From this impossibility he should have judged of Gen. xlvi. 12, and not have forced a meaning upon it, in order to fasten a charge of inconsistency upon the Pentateuch.
On a fair construction of the writer's meaning, it has long been a settled point with theologians that Hezron and Hamul were natives, not of Canaan, but of Egypt. The absurdities which Dr. Colenso infers are, however, the result of his own inadmissible assumptions. In the note on p. 18, we are told that “Judah was forty-two years old when Jacob went down into Egypt.” This is assumed; and upon the assumption is grounded the opinion, that “Judah was about three years older than Joseph," which is too low a disparity of ages, as seen from the following facts. Jacob spent twenty years in Padan-aram (Gen. xxxi. 41). About the expiration of fourteen years, Joseph was born, and Jacob asked permission to return to his father (Gen. xxx. 25). Hence, on leaving Laban, Joseph was six years old; therefore, on Dr. Colenso's view, Judah was then only nine years old. Now, mark the consequences of this assumption :-between Judah's birth and that of Issachar, by the same mother, there was a more than usual interval, for which an allow. ance of twelve months is much too small, as seen by comparing Gen. xxix. 35 with xxx. 9—12, 17, 18. Between Issachar, Zebulun, and Dinah (Gen. xxx. 17-21), intervals of two twelvemonths are also as low as can be admitted. It follows, then, that Dinah, on the lowest possible computation, was only three years younger than Judah, and therefore only six years of age when Jacob left Padan-aram. Now, on this journey home, Shechem violated Dinab, and then wished to marry her; that is, on Dr. Colenso's view, a girl six years old was mature enough for these occurrences ! But this is not all. If Judah, the fourth son by Leah, was nine, and, as stated by Dr. Colenso, was born in the fourth year after Rachel's marriage, Simeon was about eleven, and Levi about ten. Now these lads, not in their teens, were old enough to entrap and slay the whole body of men forming the city of Shechem!
Such are the absurdities which flow from the gratuitous assumption that Judah was only three years older than Joseph, and, therefore, only forty-two when he accompanied Jacob into Egypt. He was, therefore, many years older than made out by the Bishop; and, if only fifty-two, the impossibilities asserted by him on pages 18 and 19, become possibilities. If, again, the forced construction put on Gen. xlvi. 12, is exchanged for what he admits to be the obvious meaning, then as many more years can be allowed as may be required for the events turned into fiction.
One reads again, with some astonishment, the following passage:“I assume, then, that it is absolutely undeniable that the narrative of the exodus distinctly involves the statement that the 66