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to and a basis for philosophy, an organon, or efficient instrument, a tentative and critical art, a rigorously examinative system of investigation, was requisite; and this Aristotle undertook to supply. Reason affirms or denies the absolute or necessary, and the contingent or relative connection of thought with thought. In doing so, it proceeds in accordance with certain definite forms, and under distinctly fixed laws-laws as imperatively operative in right thought as the rules of health in right bodily action ; capable, too, like them, of instinctive activity, but like them also capable of intelligent investigation, systematic arrangement, and so of being made effective for general guidance in the practical duties of life.

The intellective faculty (reason) is the beginning of science; and the operations of the intellective faculty (reasonings) are the means of science, and bring it into substantive existence. Science is organized truth, therefore the activity of the intellect, in accordance with its own inherent laws, results in and produces truth. Rightthinking is the efficient instrument of a sufficient philosophy; and the laws of right-thinking, when duly and truly systematized, constitute a primary science-one upon which allothers depend; and result in an art by which, if the soul be guided while thinking, its operations will be such as shall bring before it the truth regarding the matter of investigation, so far as it is possible to be known or discerned.

To this investigative, instrumental, efficient science, Aristotle gave no distinct name. The Stoics, of which sect Zeno of Citium was the founder, first employed the word Logic as significative of the science of the laws of thought. Aristotle had no such pure idea of reasoning as a distinct and formal activity as this implies. With him logic meant the syllogistic expression of demonstrative thought; while dialectics signified the thorough examination by question and answer of any popular or prevalent idea, that out it the truth might be eliminated, and the false elided. This want of a distinctive appellative for the science of argumentative discourse led the early commentators to collect together such treatises of the Stagyrite as seemed specifically devoted to that subject, and to name them the Organon of Aristotle-meaning thereby the efficient instrument of philosophizing

In modern editions, the logical treatises of Aristotle-which are, however, merely a collection of separate compositions. dealing in some measure with the science of argumentation, and arbitrarily arranged to form a first philosophy--consist of six distinct works, of which four may be said to be devoted to pure, and two to applied, logie, viz. :

1. " The Categories,” in which Aristotle arranges and explains the most general notions under which ideas may be classed. The categories are, as Bacon calls them, cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions. They constitute an attempt to form a complete theory of classification. The Aristotelic categories are not only logical but metaphysical, and are intended by him to apply to things as well as words. Logically they may be resolved

Being.

2. Accident

into two main divisions-substance and attribute ; and metaphy. sically they are reducible to two also-being and accident: but they may be, perhaps, most advantageously exhibited in the following form, in which the words printed in italics and followed by Greek terms in brackets are the names of the categories of Aristotle, viz.:

S Substance. 1
1.
[Ovoia.]

Matter or Quantity 2 (Mócov.] a Real

Form or Quality 3 [Noiov].

Action 5 (Iloceiv].
Attribute or

Passion 6 [Πασχειν].
6 In Relation 4 Where, 7 Space (110v).
[Ilpos ti] When, 8 Time [ĪTótɛ].

Posture, 9 Manner (Kelolai).

Possession, 10 Habit ("Exeiv]. These categories, which are a classification of objects as represented by words in or to the mind, were, we think, intended more as practical exemplifications of the clear light in which a well-trained mind could set its ideas, than an exhaustive classification of things and thoughts. Taken in this view, they are not amenable to the contemptuous criticism of Mill, the apologetic censure of Ritter, the condemnation of Bacon, or the emphatic rejection of Kant. A more elaborate, though scarcely more satisfactory table of the categories of thought has been propounded by Sir William Hamilton. But in regard to this early attempt to bring the immense diversity of phenomena into some sort of manageable classification, this attempt to dissect sensations and arrange them into usable forms, and to bundle up, as it were, the appearance of things into orderly groups, we may use the words of Aristotle himself, viz.,—"Perhaps the beginning of everything is the greatest, according to the common saying; and for this reason it is also the most difficult. For just as in its efficiency it is the most powerful, so, as to its magnitude, it is the least, and the most difficult to discover. When the beginning is once made, it is easy to add.”

II. On Interpretation, as it is usually translated, or as it might be rendered, on the enunciation of reasoned thought. This is mainly a treatise on grammar, in so far as regards the nature and uses of nouns and verbs. Logic and grammar here take their way side by side. The management of this theme is so subtle, so acute and clear, that the old logicians said it was written with a pen dipped in pure intellect,-it dazzles the mind with its unmixed transparency of thought, expression, and criticism.

Logic begins its examinative process with enunciated thought, with knowledge claiming to be truth, It does so in a propositionin a decision of the intellective faculty, in a judgment. The judgment and its various forms are critically examined, the nature of speech is discussed, the qualities of affirmation and negation, contrariety and contradiction are determined, and the modes in which the mind regards reality, possibility, chance, necessity, contingency, &c., are noted. In some measure it would be advisable to read the Hermeneutics before the Categories.

III. The Prior Analytics, or, as it is more expressively named by the author, a treatise “concerning the syllogism." This is a masterpiece of skilful exposition; all the energy, vigour, and perceptive accuracy of his acute mind are lere expended on a critical investigation of the possible forms of assertion, and of the conclusions which may or must result from their various relations, connections, and collocations. The internal nature and the external form of syllogistic reasoning are examined, described, and legislated for with an intellectual coherency and sustainedness rivalling the processes of mathematics. The whole doctrine of the syllogism is expounded with a felicity of exactness such as ought to have had more influence on subsequent logicians. The forms of syllogistics may have been by others more palpably, and effectively placed before men's minds, but the whole basis and ground of every valid form of reasoned (syllogized) thought is to be found in this tractate. The premises, assumptions, conditions, figures, relationship, laws, and modes of syllogism, are all specifically treated. The inductive form of finding premises, from which we may reason, is also noted and explained. It may here be as well to notice that while modern "logics" supply four forms or figures, Aristotle only considers three. This does not result from any incompleteness in the analysis of the syllogism contained in this portion of the organon, but from a misconception in the later logicians--who have constructed their figures according to the external position of the middle term in the premises, whereas Aristotle regarded only the internal relationships the various terms could assume. The fourth figure, while a possible, is an unadvisable form of syllogism ; a defence of its validity as a form of reasoning is, however, contained implicitly in the doctrines of the prior analytics. As Reid has remarked, * Aristotle omitted the fourth figure, not through ignorance or inattention, but of design, as containing only some indirect modes, which, when properly expressed, fall into the first figure."

IV. The Posterior Analytics, or treatise on the principles of proof, is a highly important section of the “Organon.” Its chief object is to ascertain and explain how science is established through the conclusions arrived at by syllogistic reasoning. It treats of demonstration, the rules and conditions of certainty, as well as the general and particular principles of scientific thought, and its results-science. It shows how thought leads to thought by a conscious necessity; how, from the simplest elements of sensation, the orderly and sequent expositions of phenomena and their laws are worked out by the regulated activities of the mind; and how, from the presented concrete, the representative abstract is obtained, -how sensations lead to hypotheses, and hypotheses to sciences.

One of the most remarkable parts of this treatise is that regarding the definition, in its power of determining the nature of a thing, or the meaning of a term. Language arises from, consists of, and contains the recorded though common-place inductions of mankind. Words express the impressions made on mind, and are the signs of thoughtful observation. Their contents and meaning are made known by definition. Definitions are concentrated knowledge; they are statements of the limitations which the intellect perceives in ideas, and the means of fixing the signification of any given word or idea. Aristotle strives to prove that the forms of thought correspond with, and are determined by, the forms of things; and endeavours to test the logical by the real. The functions and the efficiencies of the intellect appear to him not to be excited only, but compelled to certain modes of activity by the outward and ordinary manifestations of phenomena. He had not reached the Kantean abstraction of form and matter now common among logicians, but believed that the instinctive necessities of human reason lead men to measure thought by things, and to test the accuracy of these thoughts by a comparison with the material phenomena of which they were, or seem to be, the explanations. His logic is not a bare, formal skeleton or scaffolding, into which thought uselessly builds itself, as a means of exercising and educating itself. It sought to insinuate itself into nature, to permeate the whole fabric of creation with an active intelligence; and this intellective faculty, when it returned into itself again, he supposed would bring into the inner recesses of the mind the results of its investigations, and tell the secrets it had learned in its excursive and discursive survey and critique of the various material forms and elements it bad examined and operated on.

A far deeper and more abstruse purpose dwelt in the logic of Aristotle than that of the mere formal unfolding of the contents of the mind's own ideas, and in this treatise especially be supplies an outline of a metaphysic as well as a science of apodictic or demonstrative reasoning. "Demonstration is, with Aristotle, not only & series of necessarily connected thoughts, a detailed and consecutive process of argumentation; it is also, in some respects, an interpreter of the laws of the understanding, inasmuch as it treats of truth as it affects the intellect, simply and apart from the will; for wben we seek to influence at one effort both the understanding and the will we employ rhetorical, not logical phraseology. Science, as it was thought of by the earlier philosophers, was very different from the view we commonly take of it in our day. The results of observation and experiment, theorized upon, and compared in their ultimate inferences with the realities of nature, life, or mind, and thereafter systematically collocated into a series of progressively advancing statements or truths, we now denominate science. By the elder thinkers, science meant positive, trustworthy knowledge ; hence it was essential with them that it should rest upon and emerge from truths, not only known, but known to be incapable of being other or else—in fact, necessary truths. The definition thus became the keystone of science; and Aristotle's ideas of induction permitted full scope for acquiring a knowledge of matters of l'act from experience, and so of founding upon inductive truth a series of demonstrations which would have constituted a science. But the ancient notion of science obscured his own mind, as well as that of his disciples, and this form of thought has been less developed in scholastic logic and by the continuators of the syllogistic system than it might and ought, so that an unjust opprobrium lies upon the memory of Aristotle, and his logic has been contrasted with and opposed to that of Bacon, when in reality the Verulamic induction is a complement and a supplement to the Stagyric. In the latter it is as emphatically taught as in the former, that “we attain certainty in all things through syllogisms, or by induction;" and “we learn either by induction or demonstration, and demonstration proceeds from generals, but induction from particulars." It is scarcely true that Aristotle canonized theory as the highest effort and aspiration of the soul, or that he set aside methodical experiment and inventive investigation ; though, in his age, the fashion of philosophic thought did indeed tend towards talk, disputation, and words, rather than to experiment, invention, and discovery, and Aristotle was not wholly exempt from the errors of his time. It might, however, be articulately proven that he saw the essential truth and utility of induction by a collection of passages, of which the following may, as crucial instances, suffice : "Induction is progress from the particular to the universal;” and, “ Induction is very persuasive, clear, and intelligible to sense, and more in vogue among the multitude, though the syllogism has more force, and is more effective against opponents in argument." "It is manifest, therefore, that it is necessary for us to know the prime elements by induction, for perception through this also produces the universal in the mind."

Induction with him is, indeed, more a means of definition-a mode of arguing-than a method of inquiry into facts and evidence ; but this is only an accident of the state of philosophy in his age. There is nothing in his theory of demonstration really opposed to the Baconian induction; and there are many parts of his doctrine which require development in the inventive element to acquire the definite validity of a science. No specimens of the inductive logic are extant more strictly accordant with the Baconian view of a ground. work of experience, and a constant testing by experiment or reference to observation, than the rhetoric, the poetic, and the ethics of that philosopher whom common minds stigmatize as the corruptor of science by syllogism, and the inventor of false methods of thought The Posterior Analytics are a profound and scientific exposition of the method of demonstrative reasoning, -of the disciplinary processes of thought for attaining truth, and communicating it to the understanding

V. The Topics.-A treatise on the principles and proofs by which we can dispute about things, and an analysis of the various probabilities, likelihoods, and experiences from wbich arguments may be derived. It contains exquisite dissections of the forms and appliances of dialectics, for the purpose of teaching “a method by which a man may be able to reason with probability and consistency on any question that may arise;" it is a compendium of controversy, or the art of attacking or defending any given thesis by such arguments

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