then a wandering, scattered race; no fociety among them except families; and family fociety alfo very imperfect, as their mode of living, by hunting or pafturage, must have separated them frequently from each other. In fuch a condition, how could any one set of founds or words be univerfally agreed on, as the figns of their ideas? Suppofing that a few, whom chance or neceffity threw together, agreed by fome means upon certain figns; yet by what authority could these be fo propagated among other tribes or families, as to grow up into a language? One would imagine that men must have been previously gathered together in confiderable numbers, before language could be fixed and extended; and yet on the other hand there feems to have been an abfolute neceffity of speech previously to the formation of fociety. For by what bond could a multitude of men be kept together, or be connected in profecution of any common intereft, before by the affiftance of fpeech they could communicate their wants and intentions to each other? So that how fociety could fubfift previously to language, and how words could rife into language before the formation of focicty, seem to be points attended with equal difficulty. When we confider farther that curious analogy, which prevails in the construction of almost all languages, and that deep and fubtile logic, on which they are founded; difficulties increase so much upon on all fides, that there feems to be no fmall reafon for referring the origin of all language to divine inspiration.

But, fuppofing language to have a divine origi nal, we cannot imagine that a perfect fyftem of it was at once given to man. It is much more natural to fuppofe that God taught our first parents only fuch language, as suited their present occasions; leaving them, as he did in other refpects, to enlarge and improve it, as their future neceffities fhould require. Confequent

ly those rudiments of fpeech must have been poor and narrow; and we are at liberty to inquire, in what manner, and by what steps, language advanced to the ftate, in which we now find it.

Should we fuppofe a period exifted, before words were invented or known; it is evident, that men could have no other method of communicating their feelings, than by the cries of paffion, accompanied by fuch motions and geftures, as were farther expreffive of emotion. Thefe indeed are the only figns, which nature teaches all men, and which are understood by all. One, who faw another going into fome place, where he himself had been frightened, or expofed to danger, and who wished to warn his neighbor of the danger, could contrive no other method of doing it, than by uttering thofe cries and making thofe geftures, which are the figns of fear; as two men at this day would endeavour to make themfelves understood by each other, if thrown together on a defolate ifland, ignorant of each other's language. Thofe exclamations therefore, by grammarians called interjections, uttered in a strong and paffionate manner, were undoubtedly the elements of speech.

When more enlarged communication became requifite, and names began to be applied to objects; how can we fuppofe men proceeded in this application of names, or invention of words? Certainly by imitating as much, as they could, the nature of the object named by the found of the name given to it. As a painter, who would represent grafs, muft employ a green color; fo in the infancy of language one, giving a name to any, thing harsh or boisterous, would of course employ a harsh or boisterous found. He could not do otherwife, if he defired to excite in the hearer the idea of that object, which he wished to name. To imagine words invented, or names given to things, without any ground or reason, is to fuppofe an effect without a caufe. There muft always have been fome motive, which led to one name, rather than another; and we can fuppofe no motive, which would more generally operate upon men in their firft efforts toward language, than a defire to paint by fpeech the objects, which they named, in a manner more or lefs complete, according as it was in the power of the human voice to effect this imitation.

Wherever objects were to be named, in which found, noife, or motion was concerned, the imitation by words was fufficiently obvious. Nothing was more natural, than to imitate by the found of the voice the quality of the found or noife, which any external object produced; and to form its name accordingly. Thus in all languages we discover a multitude of words, which are evi

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dently conftructed on this principle. A certain bird is called the Cuckoo from the found, which it emits. When one fort of wind is faid to whistle, and another to roar; when a ferpent is faid to hifs; a fly to buzz, and falling timber to crash; when a stream is faid to flow, and hail to rattle; the refemblance between the word and the thing fignified is plainly difcernible. But in the names of objects, which addrefs the fight only, where neither noise, nor motion is concerned; and still more in terms, appropriated to moral ideas, this analogy appears to fail. Yet many learned men have imagined that, though in fuch cases it becomes more obfcure, it is not altogether loft; and that in the radical words of all languages there may be traced fome degree of correfpondence with the objects fignified.

This principle however of a natural relation between words and objects can be applied to language only in its most fimple and early ftate. Though in every tongue fome remains of it may be traced, it were utterly in vain to fearch for it through the whole conftruction of any modern language. As terms increase in every nation, and the vast field of language is filled up, words by a thousand fanciful and irregular methods of derivation and compofition deviate widely from the primitive character of their roots, and lose all resemblance in found of the things fignified. This is the present state of language. Words, as we now use them, taken in general, may be confidered, as fymbols, not imitations; as arbi

trary or inftituted, not natural figns of ideas. But there can be no doubt, that language, the nearer we approach to its rife among men, will be found to partake more of a natural expreffion.

Interjections, it has been fhown, or paffionate exclamations, were the elements of speech. Men labored to communicate their feelings to each other by thofe expreffive cries and geftures, which nature taught them. After words, or names of objects, began to be invented, this mode of fpeaking by natural signs could not be all at once difufed. For language in its infancy must have been extremely barren; and there certainly was a period among all rude nations, when converfation was carried on by a very few words, intermixed with many exclamations and earnest gestures. The small stock of words which men then poffeffed, rendered those helps entirely neceffary for explaining their conceptions; and rude, uncultivated individuals, not having always ready even the few words, which they knew, would naturally labor to make themselves understood by varying their tones of voice, and by accompanying their tones with the most expreffive gefticulations.

To this mode of fpeaking neceffity gave rife. But we must obferve that, after this neceffity had in a great degree ceafed by language becoming in procefs of time more extenfive and copious, the antient manner of speech still subsisted among many nations; and, what had arisen from neceffity, continued to be used for or