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oath is required by a law which is null and void, on account of its violation of constitutional or fundamental principles, no legal consequences attach to its violation-the violator being left to settle the matter with his own conscience. Hence, also, if our naturalization laws require allegiance to institutions which oppose the fundamental principles of Christianity as maintained by the papacy, and are therefore, in the opinion of the pope, invalid, the papal hierarchy readily infer that the violation of this allegiance would involve no crime whatever, but, on the contrary, would arise out of the obligation of duty to God and the Church. And hence, again, if this violation be merely a matter of conscience, and the pope possesses the power-as standing in the place of God-to dispense with all merely conscientious obligations, then a dispensation from him would place all Roman Catholic violators of the oath of allegiance right before God and the Church. To comprehend properly the results which might ensue from this mode of reasoning, it is necessary to inquire into the doctrines and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church in relation to oaths-their nature and obligation.

The reader will remember the reference heretofore to a controversy carried on, some years ago, between the Right Rev. John England, Roman Catholic Bishop of Charleston, South Carolina, and the Rev. Richard Fuller, a Baptist minister of Beaufort, in the same State. (3) Being afterward published in book form, under the auspices of Bishop England, it is proper to assume that what he has there said is a just and fair exposition of the doctrines of his Church.

(13) Ante. This book, entitled "Concerning the Roman Chancery,” etc., was published in 1840, by Fielding Lucas, Jun., of Baltimore, and by John P. Beale, Charleston.

A book was published as late as 1874, at Rome, with the special indorsement of Beckk, the General of the Jesuits, and with the approbation of the Propaganda Fide, and therefore of the pope, wherein the obligation of a promissory oath is thus stated: "Nunquam obligatur juramento, qui rem malam juravit; imo dupliciter peccat, si juramentum adimpleat, nempe contra religionem, et virtutem, cui opponitur materia juramenti.-S. Lig., n. 176." TRANSLATION: One is never bound by an oath who has sworn to do an evil thing, for he sins doubly if he shall perform his oath against religion and virtue, to which the substance of the oath is opposed.—Theologia Moralis, P. Joannis Petri Gury, S. J., Rome ed., vol. i., p. 310.

Among other accusations made against this Church by Mr. Fuller, this was a prominent one, which could not fail to arrest public attention and excite inquiry: that the Third Lateran Council, held in 1179, made not only falsehood, but perjury, a virtue when practiced in behalf of the Church. So grave a charge as this greatly excited Bishop England, and drove him, after some ingenious equivocation, to an expla nation of the doctrines which had been established by his Church. He endeavored at first to parry, with true hierarchical adroitness, the home-thrusts of Mr. Fuller; but the latter was too able and learned a disputant to allow this, and the bishop was at last driven to a degree of particularity which, in all probability, he did not contemplate at the beginning of the controversy. His language should command the most serious attention. He said:

"Among Catholics, sir, perjury is the violation of a lawful oath, or the taking of an unlawful one. Thus, if we swear to declare the truth, and do not declare it, it would be per jury; and should a man attempt to bind me by the form of an oath to declare a falsehood, I would be guilty of perjury, in going through the form to tell a lie, but I am obliged to go against the words by which I appeared to be bound, be cause it is no oath, but a perjury. An oath can not be a bond of iniquity. A conspirator who has sworn with his fellows to commit robbery or murder is not bound by his oath. In fact, it is no oath; to be an oath it must have three qualities, viz., truth, judgment, and justice: the defect of either renders it no oath." (")

Here the distinctive principle is announced that an unlawful oath can not be taken without perjury; but if taken, he who takes it must go against it, because it is no oath in the opinion of the Roman Catholic Church. With this as his postulate, Bishop England proceeds to explain what the direct action of this Church has been upon this important subject. He quotes Canon XVI. of the Third Lateran Council, which he calls "the legislature of the Church," wherein this

sentence is found:

"For they are not to be called oaths, but rather perjuries,

(") "Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery," p. 157.

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which are in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers."(')

Then, addressing himself directly to Mr. Fuller, the bishop defends these principles as follows:

"I need not inform you that the first obligation of every citizen is the law of God; the second is the constitution of his State; and as no form of oath could bind him to the violation of the divine law, so, except the constitution of his State should conflict with the divine law, no form of oath could bind him to violate that constitution; and should there be such a conflict, he is bound to the State in every other point save that in which the conflict exists: and his exemption in this instance arises from that sound maxim of legal interpretation that where two laws are in irreconcilable conflict, that of the first or highest authority must prevail. These are the principles which I have been taught from Roman Catholic authors, by Roman Catholic professors; they are the principles which I find recognized in all enactments and interpretations of councils in the Roman Catholic Church, from the council at Jerusalem, held by the apostles, down to the present day."(16)

To make the matter so clear that no room for misapprehension should exist, he quotes from chapter xix. of the Roman Catholic catechism the following questions and an

swers:

"Q. What else is commanded by the second commandment?

"A. To keep our lawful oaths and vows.

"Q. What is forbidden by this commandment?

"A. All false, rash, unjust, and unnecessary oaths; also cursing, swearing, blaspheming, and profane words (Matt. v., 34; James v., 12).

"Q. Is it ever lawful to swear?

"A. It is when God's honor, our own or our neighbor's good, or necessary defense, requires it.

(15) Non enim dicenda sunt juramenta, sed potius perjuria, quæ contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam et sanctorum patrum veniunt instituta."—Ibid., p.

158.

(16) "Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery," pp. 162, 163.

"Q. What do you mean by an unjust oath?

"A. An oath injurious to God, to ourselves, or to our neigh

bor.

"Q. Is a person obliged to keep an unjust oath?

"A. No; he sinned in taking it, and would sin also in keeping it.

Q. Is a person obliged to keep a lawful oath?

"A. Yes; and it would be perjury to break it.

"Q. What is perjury?

"A. The breaking of a lawful oath, or the taking of an unlawful one.

"Q. Is perjury a great crime?

"A. It is a most grievous one."(")

And then, summing up his argument and putting the doctrine in the most compact form, he says:

"My argument, sir, would have been more fairly put in this way: Man's first duty is to observe the divine law; but the divine law requires that an oath shall bind when it is taken in truth, in judgment, and in justice, and that it shall not bind when either of these conditions is wanted. The divine law is paramount to every other law, constitution, tribunal, or authority. Therefore, no law, constitution, tribunal, or authority can allow a man to swear falsely, to swear in support of injustice, or to swear rashly, or injudiciously, or profanely. No tribunal, civil or ecclesiastical, can do what God himself could not do!-he can not do what is incompatible with his divine attributes: the sanctioning of perjury would be incompatible therewith, and therefore no tribunal could sanction it."(1)

The language here employed by this distinguished prelate has the merit of simplicity and frankness, and it requires no critical analysis to understand its meaning. It lays down the following propositions as settled and established by the Roman Catholic Church:

1. An unlawful oath can not be taken without perjury.

(17) "Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery," pp. 190, 191.

(1) Ibid., pp. 194, 195. This argument is found, as set forth in the text, in all Roman Catholic publications on the subject; but the manner in which Bishop England makes it is preferred on account of the authority which his name and office carry with them.

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2. He who takes an unlawful oath is not obliged to observe it, but should go against it.

3. An oath can not be a bond of iniquity; that is, in opposition to the divine law.

4. To be a binding oath it must have the three qualities. of truth, judgment, and justice; the absence of either renders it no oath.

5. They are not oaths, but perjuries, which are in opposi- · tion to the welfare of the Church, and the enactments of the holy fathers.

6. The first obligation of every citizen is the law of God; the second is the Constitution of his State.

7. The obligation of a citizen to the constitution of his State is only binding when it does not conflict with the divine law.

8. The obligation of a citizen to the constitution of his state is not binding when it does conflict with the divine law.

9. The divine law is of higher authority than the law of the State, and must always prevail when they come in conflict.

10. A person is not obliged to keep an unjust oath; he sinned in taking it, and would sin also in keeping it.

11. An oath is not binding when it lacks the element of either justice, judgment, or truth.

12. No law, constitution, tribunal, or authority can bind a man to act unjustly; God can not even do it.

From this recapitulation it will be seen that in order to determine upon the binding obligation of an oath, it is necessary, in any given case, to understand its character. If it is unlawful, it is not binding. To this, as an abstract proposition, there may be no special objection; but the difficulty lies in agreeing upon what is lawful and what unlawful. Let us give the doctrine a practical application as it is understood by those whose minds are trained in papal polemics.

Having separated the Church from the State, and made the latter entirely independent of the former, we have provided in our National Constitution that it and all the laws passed pursuant to it are "the supreme law of the land," binding alike upon all citizens. In order, therefore, to de