cially that Calvin, and those who followed him, borrowed both the sentiment and the language contained in the disputed passage. But as they certainly did not understand this text to teach the actual damnation of all men, so neither is the language to be supposed to teach it, which they employ to express the meaning of the text. This language seems to have been used technically, to express the condition into which the fall brought mankind-the sin of one man subjecting all men to sin and condemnation to eternal death" wrapping them up in eternal death" which, in respect to any capacity in the subject to deliver himself, is "eternal death without remedy." A similar phraseology is employed by most approved theological writers now, to express the same thing. Hopkins, describing the effect of the fall-an effect which he considers common to Adam and all his posterity-says, "They were condemned, and fell into a state of complete eternal ruin, being totally and forever undone and lost, without any help or hope." Thus also Edwards describes the effect of the fall:"All mankind do constantly, in all ages, without fail, run into that moral evil which is, in effect, their own utter and eternal perdiDo Hopkins and Edwards teach the actual damnation of all mankind? But they teach it in much stronger terms than Calvin teaches the damnation of "so many nations, with their infant children." And yet, they only describe, as he did, the effect produced, provided it be not averted. But a passage from Calvin himself establishes the point, that by dainnation he meant the condemnation which infants are under from their birth; and that by absque remedio, he meant to represent this condemnation as irremediable in itself considered. This passage is contained in his reply to the fourth objection of Servetus against infant baptism, which was, Because "that which is past is natural, we ought to wait the proper time for baptism, which is spiritual." To which Calvin replies, "Ego autem, etsi fateor omnes posteros Adae, ex carne genitos, ab ipso utero gestare suam damnationem, id tamen obstare nego quominus statim remedium Deus afferat."* "Now, though I grant that all the posterity of Adam, born of the flesh, bring their damnation from the womb itself, I deny that to hinder that God may not, nevertheless, immediately bring remedy." Here damnation means, not actual eternal damnation; for how, in that case, could God "immediately bring a remedy "? And to be without remedy means, not eternal damnation without remedy, but a condemnation irremediable in itself, and from which none but God could deliver.

It is in this sense that Turrettin asserts that original sin is "sufficient for condemnation, on account of which we are born

children of wrath, and are said to die in Adam ;" and that infants, which have been infected with original corruption only, are subjected to condemnation and death,"--that is, like all others, they are brought under the dominion of sin, and the sentence of a just condemnation.

It is in this sense only, as describing the effects of the fall on the entire race, adults included, and infants not excepted, that Calvin is to be understood in all the quotations first produced by the reviewer of my note. "We all, in the sight of God, are pollued"-" by nature children of wrath"-" accursed from the very womb" and so infants themselves "bring their damnation with them from their mothers' womb."

If, then, by tot gentes, particular nations were meant, and not all mankind; the language no more teaches their actual eternal damnation, with their infant children, without remedy, than omnes a salute exciderent unius parentis culpa, teaches that all mankind are actually and forever cut off from salvation by the fault of one man; and cunctos mortales, in unius hominis persona, morti æternæ mancipatos fuisse, means that all mankind were, in the person of one man, given over to actual eternal death. What reason can be given why these passages should be restricted to teach only the condition into which the fall brought the race, and "involveret in æternæ morti" be made to cut through all the laws of analogical interpretation, and teach the actual eternal damnation of so many nations, with their children? What if " iterum quæro were the commencement of a new argument? Has a new argument the power to abolish the analogical use of terms, by the same author, and in the same paragraph, and in the sentence next but one preceding? But the pretence is both unsustained and contradicted, that "iterum quæro" is the commencement of a new argument. This is not the phrase most commonly used to introduce a new subject or topic of argument, but that which is most naturally and commonly employed to enforce or illustrate a sentiment which has preceded. Besides, the argumentation in the paragraph is too compact and uninterrupted to admit of a new topic of argument at "iterum quæro.' The question is, "Was it DECREED that Adam should perish by his defection?" And the following is the order of ideas in the reply: God works all things according to the counsel of his will. Man is his noblest work. Is it possible he should make him without any determinate end? They (the Pelagians) maintain that God only decreed to treat him according to his desert. What then becomes of his omnipotence, by which he executes his secret counsels? But predestination appears in the posterity of Adam. The loss of salvation by all, through the guilt of one, was not in the natural course of cause and effect, but by a divine constitution or decree, as my opponents reluctantly admit. Why

then should they deny the operation of a decree in respect to one man, who admit it in respect to all his posterity?' He calls them absurd who object thus, overcoming great difficulties, and perplexing themselves with trifles; and after rallying them for their stupidity, he reiterates upon them the argument which their past dulness had failed to perceive.

Besides, he is reasoning from a concession-premises which his antagonists reluctantly admit, viz. that the posterity of Adam fell by a decree; and when he has pressed upon them "so many nations, with their infant children, involved in eternal death by a decree," he thinks he has stopped their mouths. But this can be only upon the supposition that by "tot gentes" Calvin meant all mankind. For his antagonists, the Pelagians, did not admit that whole nations, with their infant children, are finally damned; and Calvin, if it be a new argument, had only asserted, but not proved it. If it is the conclusion, as no doubt it is, of his accumulating argument brought down upon them, it does indeed stop their months. But how an inference from premises which Calvin only asserted, and had not proved, and which his antagonists denied, could stop their mouths, does not seem so plain.

To conclude, if "iterum quæro" is the commencement of a new argument, what is this argument? An attempt to prove by the less, what he had already proved by the greater, viz. that Adam fell by a decree, from the fall of some nations, after he had proved it, by the concession of his opponents, from the effect of the fall on all mankind. Besides, as understood by the reviewer, there is no connexion of the premises with the conclusion. For what if so many nations, with their children, were sent to hell by a decree? how can a general conclusion be drawn from limited premises? It no more proves that Adam fell by a decree, than the swallowing up of so many parents, with their infant children, in Lisbon, by an earthquake, and in Herculaneum, by a volcanic eruption, proves that Adam fell by a decree.

Whether the reviewer and his friends will regard his witticism, and exultation over me, as being "absque remedio," with as much satisfaction as they have done, it is not for me to predict. I am still, however, of opinion, that the inspired caution which I suggested, and the reviewer disregarded,- Let not him that putteth on the harness boast as he that putteth it off'-was not superfluous advice, and, if observed, would have saved him and his friends from the mortification of premature boasting.

In respect to Turrettin, the reviewer claims, 1. That he quotes, with approbation, some of the most offensive passages in Calvin's writings, and says, "Had Dr. B. looked at the passages to which we referred him, he might have found among them iterum ," &c. quæro

The reviewer will perceive that Dr. B. has looked at this most offensive passage, and shown that it does not teach that infants are damned.

2. The next evidence from Turrettin, as at first quoted, is his interpretation of Romans v. 14. Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.' By the persons here referred to, be understands infants; and by the death that reigned over them, eternal death; and therefore the reviewer infers that he taught, in the passage, actual infant damnation. But does he not know that death, eternal death, reigning over men, was a common phrase for expressing universal liableness to punishment-the condition of guilt and condemnation into which the fall brought the race-and that it was applied to all adults, and to all infants, and could not have been meant to teach the actual damnation of those to whom it was applied, because, assuredly, Turrettin did not hold that all adults and all infants were, through death, from Adam to Moses, actually sent to hell.

Not a particle of evidence, therefore, did the reviewer produce from Turrettin in favor of infant damnation.

The passage at first quoted and relied on from Edwards to prove infant damnation, is as follows:

"But this to me appears plainly a giving up that grand point of the imputation of Adam's sin, both in whole and in part. For it supposes it to be not right for God to bring any evil on a child of Adam, which is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with good; so that still the state of the child shall be as good as could be demanded in justice, in case of mere innocence. Which plainly supposes that the child is not exposed to any proper punishment at all, or is not at all in debt to divine justice, on the account of Adam's sin." vol. vi. p. 462.

This passage the reviewer admits does not teach the doctrine expressly; but insists, that, in its connexion, it shows that he believed it. His argument is, that Edwards opposed some more tender-hearted Calvinists, who held to a partial imputation, and a mitigated punishment of infants, and therefore he must have held to a full imputation, and full punishment. But the fact is not so. Edwards does not oppose these more tender-hearted divines, in respect to the actual condition of infants, but objects to the arguments by which they opposed a full, and contended for a limited imputation.

1. Original sin, by a full imputation, is the subject of his controversy with Taylor; and his words are not needlessly to be carried beyond the exigence of his argument.

2. It is a full imputation, and complete liability to punishment on the part of infants, for which Edwards contends, and concerning which he says, that the opposite view "relieves nothing;" -i. e. if full imputation and full punishment be unjust, partial

imputation and mitigated punishment is unjust-the only difference being the degree of injustice. That infants are, on either supposition, actually punished, his argument does not require him to say, and he does not say.

But, says the reviewer, that very circumstance proves that he believed it; for Watts was distressed on the subject, and Edwards had a fine opportunity to relieve him; and why did he not do it?' Suppose we could not tell why? does it follow, therefore, that he believed in infant damnation? Perhaps he had not time, aside from his main argument, to speak as fully on so difficult a subject as he wished to do, if he spoke at all. Perhaps he had nothing to say, believing, with many others, that some infants certainly are saved, and concerning the rest, as he knew nothing, he said nothing, but left them in the hands of a merciful God. And possibly he may have chosen to write to Dr. Watts a private letter, saying that he agreed with his friend Dickinson," that all those who die in infancy may, for aught we know, belong to the election of grace." Such is the reviewer's evidence that Edwards believed in infant damnation. He did not deny it, where his argument required no denial; therefore he believed that infants are damned.

To corroborate past deficiency, the reviewer gives the following quotation :

"It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are justly viewed and treated as sinners, truly guilty and children of wrath on that account: nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression: at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself." vol. vi. pp. 462, 463.

The only thing in this extract which even appears to teach anything but full desert, is the phrase, infants " are justly viewed and treated as sinners." But Edwards is here speaking, not of their actual eternal doom; for he speaks of all infants, and all men, as affected by original sin. Did he believe then, and teach that all men are damned? Besides, the phrase, "viewed and treated," has reference, in this passage, to their being viewed and treated as sinners in what happens to them in the present life, and not to their treatment in the future state.

The next corroboration in his second attempt is the following passage:

"We may well argue from these things, that infants are not looked upon by God as sinless, but that they are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes so heavily on mankind in infancy. But besides these things, which are observable concerning the mortality of infants in general, there are some particular cases of the death of infants, which the Scriptures set before us, that are attended with circumstances in a peculiar manner giving evidence of the sinfulness of such, and their just exposedness to divine wrath As particularly,