thought. What this element is, an illustration will show. When the first human soul began to exist, that beginning of existence was, in the strictest sense, an effect, of which God was, in the strictest sense, the cause. But it is inconceivable that God should have been the cause of this effect, unless it took place in consequence of his previous action. A previous action of the cause is, therefore, in this instance, absolutely essential to its producing. If then, there is any instance of causation in which a previous acting of the cause is not essential, the idea of causation is no longer a simple idea. Its essential element is different in different instances. Those who acknowledge a causation of this kind, may, therefore, be justly called upon to define the words cause, produce, etc.; nor can they, while maintaining that something else than previous action of the cause constitutes causation, excuse themselves from the obligation of telling what that extraordinary something is.

Furthermore; this previous acting is all that is essential to causation, in the illustration we have adduced. It is inconceivable that the effect should not follow this previous acting of the Divine mind. If, then, there is any instance of causation from which this idea is excluded, some other must be substituted, else the word cause will denote, in that instance, absolutely no idea. All that constitutes causation in one instance, is stricken from the conception in another; some other idea must be substituted, or we have literally nothing left. If, when the word produce does not denote a previous acting of the cause, nothing can be named which it does denote, we confess ourselves utterly unable to perceive that it denotes any thing.

We forego with some reluctance other topics of remark, which would add materially to the force of our argument; but the discussion has been protracted already perhaps too long. If the canon of Edwards has been vindicated successfully from the objection of involving an infinite series of causative acts, our argument for its support will, we trust, be deemed sufficient; if it has not, additional reasoning would scarcely make it so.

The remainder of Prof. Tappan's work is occupied, for the most part, and the last volume exclusively, with an application of his psychological principles to important subjects of morals and theology. His remarks extend to a wide range of topics, and many of them are of a new and pleasing character. The great fact of the mind's freedom is illustrated in a variety of its applications; and frequently with an elevation of thought, a power of language, and a beauty of sentiment rarely surpassed. The reader will find at Vol. III. pp. 89-90, 97, 140-144, and 179-80, passages of uncommon merit in these respects, with which (if the length to which this article has grown, did not positively forbid extracts) we should be glad to enrich our pages. The author's characteristic defects of style and analysis, are unfortunately evident; still, to most readers, this will be a very interesting portion of his work. In its theological relations, the work will furnish to a certain class of divines but scanty satisfaction. Men whose whole system is circumscribed within the limits of a triangle, or even a hexagon; who recognize only the few combinations of thought which depravity and sovereignty and inability can be made to produce, will find food enough in it, or rather troublesome reflection, nor do we profess any unqualified approbation of it. Some of our author's remarks, in respect to decrees, election, and some other topics, we regard as unhappy and erroneous; and to others of them we should take exception as being couched in a phraseology which is needlessly obnoxious, and which gives them, even when true, an aspect of error. But throughout this portion, and indeed the whole of the work, there is a sense of the importance of the truth that man is free, and a lofty and fearless assertion of it, which it is refreshing to witness. Prof. T.'s earnestness in defence of this great fact, carries him not unfrequently beyond just limits; and of this none can be more sensible than ourselves. Still we say, without hesitation, that the great principles he maintains will come with conviction to many a mind dissatisfied with the barren and meagre philosophy to which it is now forced to stoop.

The ardor and enthusiasm with which he has sought to vindicate to the utmost, the weightier matters of human liberty and accountability, ought to secure from every generous mind a lenient treatment for any errors into which they may have betrayed him, and a kind reception for a work, which is destined, we doubt not, to exert a powerful, and on the whole, a healthful influence in the promotion of moral and metaphysical science in our country.

ARTICLE VII.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by Rev. O. T. DOBBIN, LL. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, Eng.

Continued from page 564, Vol. I.

3. The preface of Josephus and the close of his Antiquities explained.

We are now to examine certain ambiguous passages of the great Jewish historian that seem to oppose our opinion. And first of all, in the prooemium of his Antiquities he says that he had undertaken to translate out of Hebrew books into Greek, the history of the Jewish people for the benefit of the Grecians, and then goes on thus: Χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τοῖς μεγάλων ἅπτεσθαι διανοουμένοις, ὄκνος μοὶ καὶ μέλλησις ἐγίνετο τηλικαύτην μετενεγκεῖν ὑπόθεσιν εἰς ἀλλοδαπὴν ἡμῖν καὶ žérns dialéxtov ovryear. That is, "in process of time, as usually happens to those who undertake difficult tasks, serious delays were occasioned by attempting to transfer so great a body of matter into a foreign and unfamiliar tongue.” Then again to the same effect in the end of the Antiquities he writes : Καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων ἐσπουδασα μετασχεῖν,

1 Josephus, in procm. Antiq. p. 2, § 2.

τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀναλαβὼν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν πάτριος ἐκώλυσε συνήθεια: “I gave myself to the study of the Greek language after I had learned the grammar, although the place of my birth forbade the hope that I should ever obtain that exquisite accuracy of pronunciation which distinguishes a native Greek." These statements of the historian, it is owned, seem to establish the point that the Greek language was to Josephus, a native of Jerusalem, §évŋv, καὶ ἀλλοδαπὴν, not vernacular.

But notwithstanding appearances, there is nothing to which a more ready answer is supplied. For in the first place, the difficulty is removed by the own words of Josephus. He does not say μετενεγκεῖν ξένης γλώττης, but ξένης διαλέκτου, which the Latin translator (Hudson) has mistakenly rendered a foreign tongue, whereas it should have been dialect. AiáΔιάLextos properly signifies the peculiarity that marks a particular language the distinctive features of a tongue, that set it apart from others. Now Josephus does not say that the Greek in the general was strange (érny) to him; but that particular dialect which he studied, (eam speciatim dialectum, quam aggressus est.) This is plain enough from his own words: In the tenth book of his Antiquities he repeats what has been said above: Καὶ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἱστορίας, πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιζητήσοντας τὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ μεμψομένους ἠσφαλισάμην, μόνον τε μεταφράζειν τὰς Ἑβραίων βίβλους εἰπὼν εἰς την Ελληνίδα γλῶτταν· photτav "From the very beginning of this history I specially warned those who desiderate something I never intended to give, or find fault with my plan, that my sole purpose was to translate the books of the Hebrews into the Greek language."* Here it will be perceived, where the author uses the word plazzav tongue, he does not speak of it as strange to him, as he did of the more polished dialect which he had occasion to mention above. For the dialect which was vernacular to Josephus, as an inhabitant of Jerusalem, was the Hellenistic or

1 Idem in fine libr. Antiq. p 982.

2 Joseph. in lib. 10, cap. 10, [tom. 1 Huds. p. 458,] § 6, Antiq.

Græco-barbario, and this, as we have repeatedly said, differed both in style and phraseology from the other dialects of Greece more than the Bruttian from the Tuscan, the Gascon from the Parisian, the Welsh from that of London, and the Portuguese from the Spanish. This colloquial dialect, which the other Jews used in writing, appeared too rude to Josephus; and though he studied the Grecian literature from day to day, yet could he not acquire those graces of native Greek style, which persons born and brought up in Greece possessed. If a modern Sicilian were to attempt to write the history of his country in the same elegant dialect in which Francis Guicciardini, the Florentine, composed his history of Italy,what a task would it be to the writer! what study and effort would it demand! Yet, this was the task to be accomplished by Josephus in producing his golden work upon the antiquities of his country, in a more correct and brilliant style than that spoken around him nor does he disguise the fact that in his Greek he availed himself of the aid of others. But in addition to these difficulties must be named the length of the work, the variety of the incidents, the composition of it amid the Romans, who held Judaism and Jewish authors in contempt, as so many circumstances all contributing to retard him in the execution of it. Not the Greek language, then, was the grand obstacle to the historian, but the chaste and accurate dialect in which he desired to write. This presents us with the solution of another difficulty, (prope est alterius nodi solutio ;) namely, the study of the Greek grammar by Josephus. This study was pursued not to obtain a knowledge of a language already known, but to qualify himself for correct composition. The grammar of a language may be studied by both foreigners and natives, but in each case with a different object; the foreigner seeks to learn a language not known before; the native to perfect himself in his own tongue by the discipline of rule and ascertained usage. Thus the Italians, French, English, Germans, Dutch, Spaniards, all make it a point to study in early life the grammar of their own language, if they would speak it correctly; a reason the most imperative, if their native dialect