the Church, according to the plain and full meaning of the Articles in the points disputed." HEYLYN. (Hist. Quinquart. Part ii. ch. viii. p. 31.) "The Articles of the English Protestant Church . . . were drawn up in general terms, ... meaning that these holy men did prudently discover that differences in judgment would unavoidably happen in the Church, and were loth to unchurch any, and drive them off from an ecclesiastical communion for petty differences, which made them pen the Articles in comprehensive words, to take in all, who differing in the branches, meet in the root of the same religion." Nor was this doctrine of the Laudian School on the faith of the Church new; the Puritans had already admitted to the full that the meaning of the Articles was ascertained by the intention of the Church. They argued that the doctrine or intention of the Church had changed, and as the intention of the Church regulated the meaning of the Articles, they must withdraw their subscription. ROGERS, Chaplain to Archbishop Bancroft. (Preface to his Faith, Doctrine, &c. expressed in the Thirty-nine Articles,' sec. 34.) "Again, of these brethren [the Puritans] that will subscribe but unto which they please of these Articles, there be some who fain would beat into men's heads... that the doctrine of our Church is altered from that it was in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. But this assertion being too gross, &c., ... they secondly give out and report... how the purpose, if not the doctrine, of our Church is of late altered from what it was. And, therefore, though they can be well content to allow of the old doctrine and ancient intention; yet unto the old doctrine and new intention of our Church they cannot subscribe," &c. where all that is sought to be established is, the absence of any recognition and this holds good of both parties in the disputeof authority in the belief of the writers of the Articles: the dispute turns on the current belief of the Church, not on the sentiments of the compilers of the Thirty-nine Articles. So also ARCHBISHOP BRAMHALL. (Schism Guarded, p. 476, vol. ii. New edition.) "He (Serjeant) might even as well let our thirty-nine Articles alone for old acquaintance' sake ('dissuenda non dissecanda est amicitia') as to bring them upon the stage and have nothing to say against them. Some of them are the very same that are contained in the Creed; some others of them are practical truths, which come not within the proper list of points or articles to be believed; lastly, some of them are pious opinions or inferior truths, which are proposed by the Church of England to all her sons, as not to be opposed; not as essentials of faith necessary to be believed by all Christians, necessitate medii,' under pain of damnation." Two other passages are cited from the same great authority by Mr. Newman, (Letter to Jelf, p. 20, et seq.) who also quotes 6 * Dr. Faussett, in his Lecture on the Articles, p. 40, seems to say that these passages from Stillingfleet and Bramhall only refer to Lay Communion,' and BISHOP BULL. (Vindication of Church, 27.) BISHOP STILLINGFLEET. (Grounds of Protestant Religion, i. ch. 11.) BISHOP SANDERSON. (Pax Ecclesiæ, pp. 51, 52.) "That particular Churches would be as tender as may be in giving their definitions and determinations in such points as these... especially where there may be admitted a latitude of dissenting without any prejudice done either to the substance of the Catholic Faith, or to the tranquillity of the Church, or to the salvation of the dissenter. In which respect the moderation of the Church of England is much to be commended." A passage important, because Dr. Faussett, (Lecture on the Articles, p. 10,) has extracted one from Sanderson's 'De Juramenti Obligatione,' Prælect. iv. [vi.] sect. 9, which he thinks conclusive the other way. Indeed, Dr. Godfrey Faussett is not quite the person to decide cases of casuistry from Sanderson. Sanderson had said, in the passage cited by the Margaret Professor, that the terms of an oath must be understood according to the intention of him to whom the oath is made.'* Well: but what is said elsewhere by this writer, our safest guide in such questions? BISHOP SANDERSON. (Nine Cases of Conscience, p. 94.) "All expressions by words are subject to such ambiguities, that scarce anything can be said or expressed in any words, how cautelously soever chosen, which will not render the whole subject capable of more constructions than one. . . . Where one construction binds to more, another to less, the true sense is to be fixed by the intention of the imposer. For that all promises and assurances wherein faith is required to be given to another, ought to be understood ad mentem imponentis [which seems exactly what Dr. F. and the Hebdomadal Board want], according to the mind and meaning of him to whom the faith is given, so far forth as the meaning may reasonably appear. . . . . Reasonably appear, I mean, by the nature of the matters about which it is conversant, and such signification of the words wherein it is expressed, as, according to the ordinary use of speech among men, agreeth best thereto... If the intention of the imposer be not so fully declared by the words and nature of the business, but that the same words may, in fair construction, be still capable of a double meaning, so as, taken in one sense they shall bind to more, and in another to less, I conceive it is not not to subscription. But Stillingfleet, in his Conferences' (Works, vol. vi. pp. 58, 59,) written expressly to vindicate the Rational Account,' when he again reviews the passages quoted from Bramhall, (cited by Newman in his extract from Stillingfleet, Letter to Jelf, pp. 23, 24,) says, What doth SUBSCRIPTION imply less than agreeing with the sense of the Church?' Compare, from the same book: Sunt ergo res aliquæ ita comparatæ ut benignam sibi interpretationem suo quodam jure concedi postulent: quæ sc. non sit interclusa verborum angustiis, sed cum quodam (ut Ciceronis verbo utar) laxamento liberior.' De Juram. Præl. ii., sect. 8, F. 29. o 2 necessary, nor always expedient (but rather for the most part otherwise) for the promiser, before he give his faith, to demand of the imposer, whether of the two is his meaning? But he may, by the rule of prudence, and that, for aught I see, without the violation of any law of his conscience, make his just advantage of that ambiguity, and take it in some sense which shall bind him to the less. . . . Since the faith to be given is intended to the behoof of him to whom it is given, it concerneth him to take care that his meaning be expressed in such words as will sufficiently manifest the same to the understanding of a reasonable man. Which if he neglect to do, no law of equity or prudence bindeth the promiser, by an over-scrupulous diligence, to make it out, whereby to lay a greater obligation upon himself than he need to do." * PULLER. (Moderation of the Church of England, c. xvi. §3, p. 119). "These articles of religion are generally exhibited as articles of peace and consent, not as articles of faith and communion . . . for the avoiding of diversities of opinions (as the title of the Articles is). . . the consent designed to be established is such a consent as may keep the peace of our Church undisturbed." HAMMOND. (Discourse of God's Grace, § 24.) "This I suppose the reason both of our Church's moderation in framing the article of predestination, and of our late King's Declaration." THORNDIKE. (Just Weights and Measures, ch. ix. p. 62.) "The Articles of this Church, setting forth justification by faith alone, for a most wholesome doctrine and full of comfort, for the sense of it, refer us to the Homily. I will not say that my position is laid down in the Homily.... But in the Church Catechism, and in the office of Baptism, it is so clearly laid down as will serve for ever to silence any other sense. And though that which the clergy subscribeth, be as it ought to be, a wholesome doctrine; to wit, if soundly understood; yet that by which Christian people are saved, ought to be that which the offices of the Church, and the instruction which it proposeth, contain." BISHOP PEARSON. (Minor Theological Works, vol. ii.) [It will be enough to refer to his answer to Cornelius Burges; whose line of argument was that the words of the Articles are ambiguous and therefore they ought to be reformed by an orthodox explanation.'] BENNET. (Essay on the Thirty-nine Articles, chap. xxxv. p. 439.) "If it be inquired with respect to the particular sense of each Article, and the several propositions contained therein, how much we are confined by our subscription, or what liberty is still indulged us; my answer is short and plain. When an Article, or any proposition contained therein, is fairly capable of different interpretations, that man may undoubtedly be said to believe the truth of that Article or proposition, who believes it true in any such sense as it will reasonably admit, without doing violence to the words, and contradicting what our Church has elsewhere taught, and required us to acknowledge. Wherefore, any such sense in which the Article or proposition may fairly be understood, is to be admitted, and may honestly be meant by the subscriber. This author quotes "Sancta Clara" for the same purpose. Because the Church requires only the belief of the Articles in general, and does not restrain us to the belief of any one Article or proposition in any particular sense, further than we are confined and determined by the words themselves. And therefore, where the words themselves do allow a liberty, the Church does also allow the same; nor are we bound to abridge ourselves, where the Church has left us free. "Had the Church so much as intended otherwise, it was in her power to have penned the Articles more strictly, and to have determined every proposition absolutely. . . . Wherefore, till the Church exerts such an authority, her first design, or present permission (either of which is sufficient, and of equal consideration, in this case), is manifest: nor is any person bound, either in law or conscience, to inquire farther, or to make any other compliance. "Besides, when an Article or proposition is fairly capable of two different senses, I would fain know who has power to determine which is the Church's sense. The Church determines no farther than her words do necessarily mean; and when her words do not abridge our liberty, can a private person give an authentic explication of her words, and oblige his equals to admit the same? . . . . "It may be pretended, perhaps, that the concurrent sense of the first writers ought to interpret the Church's words, and to restrain the sense of the Articles: but to this the answer is easy. It will, I fear, be difficult to get (what may truly deserve the name of) a concurrent sense of writers in the far greater number of cases. A single writer or too will not do. For did they write by authority or were all that lived in their time of the same opinion? Might not the convocation themselves differ as much as the words are capable of admitting and must we be determined only by a very few that happened to write, when the rest had equal authority? For my part, I think it much more reasonable to suppose, that the Church intended a liberty, and was resolved to determine no more than she thought necessary; and that when she had secured such truths as she was most concerned for, and had chiefly at heart, she was content to leave matters of inferior moment undetermined." BISHOP CONYBEARE. (On Subscription. Enchiridion Theolog. vol. ii. p. 68. Ed. 1825.) "It may happen in some instances that the meaning of words may not be certainly determinable, either by common use, or by the circumstances of the article. If this prove the case, then we are to understand them in such a sense as is consistent with other articles of religion. . . . But if expressions should occur which cannot be determined by passages in other articles, then will it be proper to inquire whether they may be fixed by our public liturgy, or by any other monuments which bear the sanction of ecclesiastical authority. The propositions set forth in our Articles ought to be understood in such a sense as is consistent with every other determination of the Church... If the meaning cannot be fixed by [these]... then men of different sentiments may fairly subscribe them... Such a latitude of expression must certainly admit as great a latitude of interpretation; and if a liberty of this kind had not been originally intended, we may fairly presume it would, by some act, have been restrained." GLOCESTER RIDLEY. (Answer to the Confessional, p. 137, 2d letter.) "I suppose, therefore, that you [Blackburne] would have the original sense of the compilers followed. But might it not as well be asked then, what pretence there can be for construing subscription into a declaration of the subscriber's opinion, in a certain original sense different from the original sense of another subscriber? . . . The compilers might be, and certainly in some things were, of different opinions. (Nichols on Articles, p. 3.) And supposing them men of temper also, they would of course agree to use terms expressing in what they agreed, without determining anything on matters in which they did not agree... Even supposing that in these cases they designedly used ambiguous ones, where they knew that either sense was consistent with Christianity: nay, supposing the terms leaned rather to one sense than another, yet supposing them to know that they might, in their literal and grammatical sense, fairly express either; they might well and wisely take this method, on purpose, to preserve their own Christian liberty, and that of those who should come after them." BISHOP CLEAVER. (Sermon on Subscription, p. 156, et seq.) "It is contrary to all rule that reference should be had to the imposers for their sense of the Articles; a method which would be preposterous, if it were more practicable... The sense of the compilers... will not be less preposterous; whilst the manner in which it has been practised is open to more objections; for the reference has been most often made, not to the compilers collectively taken, but particularly to individuals; ... and again, not so much to the actual language of their writings, as to such of their known tenets as have best coincided with the sentiments of those who make the reference." Of the writers in the recent controversy, it may be enough to quote one who strongly objects to Tract 90. Not from its principle, but for the application (sic) of that principle, as contended for in the Tract.' The principle of interpretation itself is thus laid down by BISHOP PHILLPOTTS. (Charge, 1842, pp. 33, 34.) "The only sound principle of interpreting them is to understand them in the sense in which he, who subscribes, has sufficient reason to know that they are understood by the authority which imposes the subscription... This authority is the Convocation of 1571... Now the Convocation of that year, in the very canon which imposed subscription to the Articles, tells us what is the sense which they were designed to bear, namely, the Catholic sense [and then the well-known canon on Preachers is cited.]... If this statement asserts the very principle propounded in the Tract, namely, that the Articles are to be understood in the Catholic sense, and will be found, on consideration, to be utterly irreconcilable with the application of that principle, &c." For obvious reasons we have not availed ourselves, on the one hand, of such documents as Forbes, (Considerationes, &c.) Sancta Clara, and the Essay towards a proposal for Catholic Communion; or in later times, Mr. Wix's pamphlets; neither have we referred to the Non-jurors; nor, again, to the school of Burnet, followed by Powell, Balguy, and Hey; nor, again, do we rest, though the testimony to fact is not without its weight, on the assertion of [Tindal] Preface to the Rights of the Church. It has obtained with High Church, that our Articles are not articles of belief, |