long suspended; that the present deliberation should be remitted as usual to the commissary of his imperial majesty; that he should be requested to impart to the French ministers the decision of the deputation, and to express its ardent desire to concur in all possible efforts for a speedy and lasting peace. The imperial commissary did not entertain the same pacific dispositions as the majority of the deputation. He informed the members, by a note, transmitted 4th of March, that the imperial commission could not approve the conclusum, since, from the actual situation of affairs, their answer should have been restrained to the simple acknowledgment of having received the French ministers' note, and of having com. municated it to the general diet; and that all further declaration should have been suspended till the ulterior decision of the emperor and the empire, agreeably to a former conclusum of the deputation. From this declaration it was almost officially clear, that the cabinet of Vienna, by throwing obstacles in the way of the congress, by hindering the opening of the protocole at Ratisbon, not only had decided on war, but was also resolved to force the empire into hostilities. A still more overt act on the part of the emperor was the expulsion of Bacher and Alquier, the one the French resident at Katisbon, and the other embassador at Munich. This expulsion was not effected without opposition on the part of certain members of the diet, and the elector of Bavaria; but as the order was accompanied by military force, the ministers were compelled to obey the requisition... But hostilities between the emperor and France had actually begun. The army of Jourdan, a mounting to 40,000 men, had crossed the Rhine at Kehl and Ba sil, (1st of March); the vanguard, commanded by general Vandamme, followed by the column of the centre, had already passed the Hornberg, and reached to Villingen; the column of the left, under ge neral St. Cyr, was at Frendenstadt; and the right, commanded by general Ferino, marched by the towns of Rheinfeld and Waldshut. An army of observation, under the command of Bernadotte, had advanced into the Palatinate, at the same time that Jourdan crossed the Rhine. Manheim was occupied by the French; Philipsburgh was summoned to sur render, but protected by inundations, and otherwise in a state of respectable defence, was out of the reach of farther insult. Bernadotte, leaving Philipsburgh, marched upon Heidelburgh, and penetrated into the valley of the Neckar, as far as Heilbron. As the war was now finally decided on by both parties, the advantage which the cccupation of Switzerland gave the French could not fail of determining the government to act offensively; there was. no other method of preventing the junction of the Russian and the Austrian army on the Adige, thản to dislodge the latter from the strong position which it held on that river. The benefit resulting to the French from this operation depended on the success of the attack which should be made on the frontiers of the Tyrol; but to secure its execu tion, it was necessary to seize on the passes of the mountains, and divert the attention of the imperialists, by drawing their principal forces towards the Danube. In covering this central attack, Switzerland was likewise to support the right of Jourdan's army, which was now called the army of the Danube. This vast but well connected plan was developed with singular precision and rapidity. The important point was to gain possession of the Grisons, and of the valley of the Rhine, in order to penetrate into the valley of the Inn; and as the principal effort of the French armies was to be directed by their centre, which was sufficiently strong, their movements on the Rhine began by the left, at the farthest distance from the real theatre, on which the French were interested in carrying on the war. The French had taken advantage of their position in Switzerland, to get rapidly on the eastern side of the mountains of the Black Forest, and gain the heights of the Lake of Constance, in order to unite and support their attacks; when the archduke, who had assembled the greatest part of his forces on the right side of the Lech, passed this river on the 5th of March. His first care was to throw a body of troops and provisions into Ulm, which was threatened, and which was to flank the right of his army. That part of his army which was cantoned on the left side of the Danube, marched by Donawerth upon Memmingen, where he fixed his headquarters. The imperialists had no less an interest than the French in endeavouring to make their lines contiguous. The archduke took a position on the Inn, parallel to the general line of the operations of the French. The left of the army was at Kempten, the centre at Memmingen, and the right extended to Ulm; which position had the advantage of being both offensive and defensive, and gave him the means of supporting the operations of the left in the Voralberg, in proportion as he advanced: the lake which formed the principal obstacle to the operations of the French, covered the marches and countermarches which he was obliged to make, and doubled the force of this wing. Such was the distribution of the different divisions of the Austrian army in the circle of Suabia and the Tyrol. General Sizarray commanded a detached corps on the left of the Danube, which covered the right of the army, and watched the movements of Bernadotte. Kerpen commanded at Ulm; Hote at Feldkirch; Bellegarde and Lau dohn in the Tyrol, Auffenberg commanded a detached body in the Grisons, and Nauendorf the corps of the vanguard of the main army. The French forces in Switzerland and in Suabia amounted at this time to about 80,000 men, the Austrian forces from the Tyrol to the left of the Danube were about 110,000. The French and Austrian divisions on the lower Rhine amounted each to about 25,000 men. The French general, perceiving that the Austrian army, instead of bending its forces towards the Danube, kept a middle line between this river and the eastern side of the Lake of Constance, hastened to seize on s such positions in the in tervals as secured him the means of keeping up his communication, by Schaffhausen, with the army in Switzerland. He called in his left wing, under general St. Cyr, which marched from Frendenstadt by Rothwell, and advanced as far as Moskirch. Thus in a few days, after going out of winter-quarters, these formidable armies were in face of each other, and occupied parallel positions almost in a con tiguous line of battle, from the gulf. banks of the Danube to the Adriatic ful attack on Feldkirch, be detached a whole division by his right towards the sources of the Inn. Casa Bianca entered the Haut-Engadin with superior forces, and compelled Laudohn to fall back. Such were the first movements of the French army in Switzerland; but in order to give the army of the Danube the means of profiting by the success, the intrenchments of Feldkirch ought to have been forced, and the communication opened between Massena and Jourdan by Bregantz, Lindau, and the eastern side of the Lake of Constance. Until these operations had been effected, Jourdan could not dare to risque the safety of his army, but remained quiet in his positions, to watch the moment when he could draw off the left of the archduke's army, to turn the lake himself, and facilitate a decisive attack on Feldkirch. With this view, Jourdan manoeuvred by his left wing, which he extended to Sigmaringen on the Danube, while his centre was at Moskirch, and his right at Uberlingen, on the borders of the lake. To counteract this movement, the archduke ordered the vanguard of his army to take a position before his left, and passing the Iller, established his head-quarters at Wurzach (11th of March), the line of his advanced posts extending from Lindau to Ulm, passing by Ravensburg and Biberach. The first hostilities began on the right of the two French armies, which were opposed to the main army of the imperialists, and the divisions detached to the left under the orders of the Archduke. Massena had established his head quarters at Alstatten in the Reinthal, where, with an army of 45,000 men, he threatened the entrance of the Grisons; whilst Jourdan was drawing bis forces close to the Lake of Constance, and had advanced as far as Stockach, Massena marched to Sargans, and summoned general Auffenburg to evacuate the Grisons. On Auffenberg's refusal, Massena, in order to cover his operations, directed a feigned but vigorous attack to be made on Feldkirch, in order to divert Hotze from giving the necessary assistance to Auffenberg at Coire; while he detached a column on the right, to turn Coire by the heights, and attack the bridges and posts on the forks of the Rhine above the town at Reichnaw. The centre column at the same time passed the Rhine, and taking possession of the post of Baltzars, cut off the communication between the Grisons and Feldkirch. The post of Mayenfeld and Zollbruch at the entrance of the valley, were forced, after considerable resiatance. The fort of Luciensteg was taken by assault, and the French having forced another passage across the river at Ragatz, and taken the post of Holdenstein, Auffenberg, who was nearly surrounded, and who had no means of receiving succour. or making good his retreat, was compelled to surrender Coire, and his whole division, which consisted of seven thousand men." While Massena, in possession of the Crisons, directed an unsuccess In these positions, between the lake of Constance and the Feathersea, the two armies were but a day's march from each other, and guarded their positions with great precaution and reserve. This state of observation related on both sides to the important post of Feldkirch, which the archduke was anxious to re inforce, and put out of the reach of attack, and which Jourdan, on the other hand, was as anxious to see reduced before he made any further advance. He was besides conscious of the superiority of the forces of the archduke, whose army consisted of 66,000 men, whilst his own was only 38,000. He had sent frequent messages to Bernadotte to demand reinforcements from his army of observation, and propose to him to join him by the left; but as Bernadotte had general Stzarry's army before him, these orders were disregarded. The entrenchments of Feldkirch were at length attacked (12th of March) by the French, with the greatest impetuosity; they threw a bridge under the fire of the Austrians, carried two intrenchments, renewed the attack six times, and were repulsed with considerable loss. Two days after they made new attempts, and were equally unsuccessful. After this defeat, the archduke confiding in the force of his defensive line, which, consisting of 18,000 men, and extending from Feldkirch to Lindau, in an oblique direction, covered his left, pushed on his vanguard in the direction of Stockach. Jourdan, who waited for reinforcements, and who had not despaired of the success of Massena's attack on Feldkirch, fell back on Engen, concentred his forces, called in whatever detachments were behind on his left, and feigned waiting, in a more concentrated position, between Hohentwiel and Dullingen, the attack of the Austrian army. A general action between the two armies was now become inevitable; they observed and measured each other so near, that scarcely space enough was left between them to manœuvre their advanced guards. Jourdan was unwilling to lose the advantages of the first attack, and was bound indeed, in conformity to his plan, to support the general system of the offensive. He marched his vanguard on to Prallendorf, where he formed his head-quarters (18th March). His left, under St. Cyr and Vandamme, was posted on the left of the Danube. His centre occupied the space between the right side of the river and Moskirch, and his right under the orders of Ferino, extended to the lake of Constance, pushing his advanced posts as far as Mersburg and Buchsal. The archduke took his positions with his vanguard (20th March) on the heights of Sulgau and Aitschausen, and fixed his head quarters at Schawndorf. The main body was a short day's march in the rear. This position was in sight of that of the French. A valley and the little river of Ostrach separated the two armies. One of Jourdan's adjutants presented himself before the camp of the Austrian vanguard, to ask if the dispatches from the court of Vienna, expected by the directory had arrived. Oo receiving an answer from the prince in the negative, he proclaimed the rupture of the armistice. This formality was followed by a very brisk attack. The Austrian vanguard was forced back beyond Klostersussen, to a position where detachments from the main body came up to support it. After this first engagement, the French took an advantageous position on the heights of Ostrach and Mengen. The next day the archduke made an attack in return, and in order to dislodge Jourdan from before Pfallendorf formed his army into three columns; the right passed along the Danube near Mengen, the lett took the road of Altschausen to Pfallendorf, the centre he headed himself himself across the marshy valley of Ostrach, on the road from Salgau, Jourdan, after an obstinate resistance, on the whole front of his line, unable to support his left, which was already flanked, abandoned his position at Ostrach, and retreated in good order during the night to the heights of Pfallendorf. But the progress of the right column of the Austrian army, in the direction of Moskirch, did not permit him to keep this position, and the dispositions which the archduke made the following day to surround the whole of the left wing with superior forces, decided him to retreat during the night (23d of March) to Stockach and Engen. The head of the French_column, which had advanced to Buchorn, was cut off and made prisoners. These two first engagements were bloody; both armies displayed a formidable artillery, and more numerous, in proportion to the number of troops, than had been seen in any preceding wars, The imperialists particularly had a light or horse artillery, much stronger and better exercised than in the last campaigns, in which the French had brought this weapon to perfection, and employed it with the greatest success. The object of the first effort of general Jourdan against the arch duke was evidently to draw him off from the Lake of Constance, in order to facilitate the project which he had combined with Massena, and attack in the front and rear the entrenchments of Feldkirch. It was to prevent the execution of this plan, that Hotze, at the instant of the first attack of Jourdan, left the defence of Feldkirch to the generals who commanded under him, and marched on to Lindau with 10,000 men to oppose the movements of the right wing of Jourdan's army. Scarcely had Hotze left Feldkirch than Massena took advantage of the diversion made by Jourdan on the Danube, and renewed his attacks against that fortress. The batteries which commanded the left flank of this position were carried by the Austrian general, Jellachich, sword in hand. Nevertheless, the retrograde movement of Jourdan before the archduke leaving Massena but one favourable moment before the return of Hotze, he attacked Feldkirch on several points with a considerable body of grenadiers united to the division of general Oudinot. This last attack, led on by Massena himself, was repulsed by the imperialists with considerable loss on both sides: the French general did not withdraw the remainder of his troops till he left the flower of the division at the foot of the entrenchments. Forced to repass the Rhine, the corps of general Oudinot took post at Rheineck, an important po sition at the entrance of that river into the Lake of Constance ; and Hotze returned to his position at Feldkirch. The archduke following up his late success, continued to press upon the army of Jourdan, who, having fallen back upon his strong position beyond Stockach, secure of making good his retreat by Schaffhausen, and the defiles of the black mountains, was determined to make a last effort to draw off the imperialists from the Lake of Constance, on which enterprise depended the success, as has been observed, of the general plan of the campaign resolved therefore to hazard another general engagement in order to obtain that success, which neither the rapidity of his marches, nor the advantages gained by Massena in the Grisons, nor the repeated T4 attacks |