also. Now, with regard to the condition annexed to these fees by the common law, our ancestors held, that such a gift (to a man and the heirs of his body) was a gift upon condition, that it should revert to the donor, if the donee had no heirs of his body; but, if he had, it should then remain to the donee. Now we must observe, that, when any condition is performed, it is thenceforth entirely gone; and the thing to which it was before annexed, becomes absolute, and wholly unconditional. So that, as soon as the grantee had any issue born, his estate was supposed to become absolute, by the performance of the condition; at least, for these three purposes: 1. To enable the tenant to aliene the land, and thereby to bar not only his own issue, but also the donor, of his interest in the reversion. 2. To subject him to forfeit it for treason. 3. To empower him to charge the land with rents, commons, and certain other incumbrances, so as to bind his issue.-And thus stood the old law with regard to the conditional fees: which things, though they seem ancient, are yet necessary to be known; as well for the declaring how the common law stood in such cases, as for the sake of annuities, and such like inheritances, as are not within the statutes of entail, and therefore remain as at the common law.

The inconveniences which attended these limited and fettered inheritances, were probably what induced the judges to give way to this subtile finesse of construction, in order to shorten the duration of these conditional estates. But, on the

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other hand, the nobility, who were willing to perE petuate their possessions in their own families, to put a stop to this practice, procured the statute of Westminster the second, (13 Ed. I. c. 1. commonly called the statute de donis conditionalibus) to be made. This statute revived, in some sort, the ancient feudal restraints which were originally laid on alienations, by enacting, that from thenceforth the will of the donor should be observed; and that the tenements so given (to a man and the heirs of his body) should at all events go to the issue, if there were any; or, if none, should revert to the donor. Upon the construction of this act of parliament, the judges determined that the donee had no longer a conditional fee-simple, which became absolute and at his own disposal, the instant any issue was born; but they divided the estate into two parts, leaving in the donee a new kind of particular estate, which they denominated a fee-tail; and vesting in the donor the ultimate fee-simple of the land, expectant on the failure of issue; which expectant estate is what we now call a reversion.

I now proceed to consider, what things may, or may not, be entailed under the statute de donis. Tenements is the only word used in the statute: and this sir Edward Coke expounds to comprehend all corporeal hereditaments whatsoever; and also all incorporeal hereditaments which savour of the reality, that is, which issue out of corporeal ones, or which concern, or are annexed to, or may be exercised within the same; as rents, estovers,

commons, and the like. Also offices and dignities, which concern lands, or have relation to fixed and certain places, may be entailed. But mere personal chattels, which savour not at all of the reality, cannot be entailed. Neither can an office, which merely relates to such personal chattels ; nor an annuity which charges only the person, and not the lands of the grantor. But in these last, if granted to a man and the heirs of his body, the grantee hath still a fee conditional at common law, as before the statute; and by his alienation (after issue born) may bar the heir or reversioner.

Estates-tail are either general, or special. Tailgeneral is where lands and tenements are given to one, and the heirs of his body begotten: which is called tail-general, because, how often soever such donee in tail be married, his issue in general by all and every such marriage, is, in successive order, capable of inheriting the estate-tail, per formam doni. Tenant in tail-special is where the gift is restrained to certain heirs of the donee's body, and does not go to all of them in general.

As the word heirs is necessary to create a fee, so in farther imitation of the strictness of the feodal donation, the word body, or some other words of procreation, are necessary to make it a fee-tail, and ascertain to what heirs in particular the fee is limited.

The incidents to a tenancy in tail, under the statute Westminster 2, are chiefly these. 1. That a tenant in tail may commit waste on the estate-tail, by felling timber, pulling down houses, or the like,

without being impeached, or called to account, for the same. 2. That the wife of the tenant in tail shall have her dower, or thirds, of the estatetail. 3. That the husband of a female tenant in tail may be tenant by the curtesy of the estate tail. 4. That an estate-tail may be barred, or destroyed by a fine, by a common recovery, or by lineal warranty descending with assets to the heir.

By the statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28. certain leases made by tenants in tail, which do not tend to the prejudice of the issue, were allowed to be good in law, and to bind the issue in tail. The statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 36. declares a fine duly levied by tenant in tail to be a complete bar to him and his heirs, and all other persons, claiming under such entail.

Lastly, by statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 39. all estates-tail are rendered liable to be charged for payment of debts due to the king by record or special contract; as since, by the bankrupt laws, they are also subjected to be sold for the debts contracted by a bankrupt. And, by the construction put on the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4. an appointment by tenant in tail of the lands entailed, to a charitable use, is good without fine or recovery.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF FREEHOLDS, NOT OF INHERITANCE.

WE are next to discourse of such estates of freehold, as are not of inheritance, but for life only. And of these estates for life, some are conventional, or expressly created by the acts of the parties; others merely legal, or created by the construction and operation of law.

I. Estates for life, expressly created by deed or grant, (which alone are properly conventional) are where a lease is made of lands or tenements to a man, to hold for the term of his own life, or for that of any other person, or for more lives than one in any of which cases he is stiled tenant for life; only when he holds the estate by the life of another, he is usually called tenant per auter vie.

Estates for life may be created, not only by the express words before mentioned, but also by a general grant, without defining or limiting any specific estate. As, if one grants to A. B. the manor of Dale, this makes him tenant for life. For though, as there are no words of inheritance, or heirs, mentioned in the grant, it cannot be construed to be a fee: it shall however be construed to be as large an estate as the words of the donation will bear, and therefore an estate for life.

1. Every tenant for life, unless restrained by covenant or agreement, may of common right take upon the land demised to him reasonable estovers