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There can be no

ment of the things that are present with us. ground to persuade men to renounce the pleasures of life, and expose themselves to troubles, which are often the companions of virtue, in hopes of future glory, unless this glory be great enough to recompense them for the losses and sufferings sustained in its pursuit. If the rewards of Heaven be infinitely preferable to the things of this world, then it is the part of wisdom to choose the greatest, though not the present good, and to prefer the severe duties of religion to the soft allurements of pleasure; since our present afflictions are but momentary, and will work for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. On this principle the Apostle argues in the text, and justifies his own practice and behavior: he suffered persecution gladly for the sake of Christ and his truth: he suffered on the prospect of future glory; and though not dead to the sense of nature, or void of feeling, yet knowing the value of the rewards for which he labored, he made this choice. The Apostle's argument is founded on the different duration of the things of this world and of the other. It must be allowed that we have the same evidence for the uncertain, and, at best, for the short duration of the things of this life, as for their existence; that is, the evidence of sense: this point enlarged on. Let us then examine what are the conclusions of reason from this head, that the things which are seen are temporal. To estimate the happiness of man, we must take into account the nature of his desires and inclinations, and that of the objects which he pursues: if there be such a due proportion between them, that the object is capable of satisfying the desire, then the object obtained is capable of making a man happy: uneasiness, and the want of something which we have not, cannot do so; which must always be the case when our desires are fixed on objects which do not answer to them, and afford not such a pleasure as may fill and content the mind. There are different passions and desires incident to man; not the same in all, but varying

according to temper, habits, age, and the like: these, being so uncertain, enter not into this inquiry, which is after man's natural happiness: this must be estimated by his natural and constant desires; among which the greatest is the desire of life: this point enlarged on, showing that as life is but short, and must end in death, the life of this world cannot be an adequate object of desire, or make a man happy; because it does not answer to his natural desire, but leaves him restless and uneasy. Another natural and constant desire, grafted on the former, and springing from it, is that of happiness uninterrupted by afflictions of any kind hence the fear of losing what we possess often equals the pleasure of the possession; which shows that no temporary possession can satisfy the mind of man; thus proving that the natural desire is that of perpetual uninterrupted happiness: nothing less than this can make a man happy; and this the world does not afford. To place our happiness therefore on this life, and the things of it, is, at best, to place it where it cannot be had. We can never free ourselves from the natural desires of life and happiness: this point enlarged on in the case of an atheist, who, retaining the desire of eternal happiness, but denying the possibility of it, reduces himself to a state which cannot afford him happiness: so that to have desires which cannot end in enjoyment for want of suitable objects, is to have desires only to make us miserable. If then this world has nothing that can make us happy, it cannot be the effect of wisdom to seek it there: so that the first conclusion of reason is, that the things of this world being temporal, and our desires adapted to the fruition of things eternal, this world can never make us happy: we must therefore seek where we may meet with objects suited to our desires, and thus arrive at perfect happiness: so that the voice of nature speaks the same language as our Saviour, (Matt. vi. 19. 20): these verses explained. That the things which are seen are temporal, is no sufficient proof that there are things which are not seen which are eter

nal; though it is a great presumption that God, not having fitted this world to our desires, has fitted our desires to another world, and has not given us these cravings of nature merely to vex us without the possibility of their being satisfied. The things of this world however being temporal, is a proof that they cannot make us happy. Hence religion becomes a very serious concern, since it alone can furnish objects adapted to our natural desires. Is it not then very unnatural to see a man rejoice and triumph in the thoughts that there is no eternal life or happiness? It is indeed better not be, than to be miserable; the thoughts therefore of dropping into eternal silence may be the refuge of guilty fear, but never can be a natural joy to the soul of man, which longs for 'everlasting life. The only reason why any man can wish there may be no other world is, that he may more freely enjoy this; a wise reason, if we consider the value of this world, and how fleeting the things of it are. So little do men gain by gaining this world, or lose by losing it, that its concerns would weigh but light in this question, were not men guided more by the violence of passion than either by reason or the regular desires of nature. For, secondly, suppose that religion were very uncertain, and a man liable to be deceived in his hopes of future rewards; let us again examine by this rule, that the things which are seen are temporal, the consequence of this mistake, and how much a man would suffer by it. In ordinary life the pleasures that are consistent with innocence will be found to afford more real satisfaction than the vicious man can ever receive from the gratification of his sensual desires. But we will waive this topic, as the text supposes us to give up this world, and submit to many hardships in order to obtain the other; and it is always difficult to submit to the restraints of religion, till men have mastered their appetites, and learned to use this world as not abusing it. Say then, that a man loses the pleasures of this

world in pursuing those of another; his loss must be valued according to the worth of the thing lost. Now the things of this world being very uncertain possessions, their loss cannot be set very high ill-success and disappointments often render all our labor in pursuing them abortive; and few attain to the end of their desires. This being the case, he that pursues the glories of another world to the neglect of this, may perhaps lose just nothing at all: this point enlarged on. We may learn then, from the nature of worldly possessions and our own experience, what chance a man has of being satisfied with the enjoyments of life, even if he takes the utmost pains for them: possibly he may never get them; for there are many pretenders who are ever jostling one another out: possibly too, if he does get them, they may leave him before he has half done with them, or he may even not relish them; for many things are proved by possession to be but empty and vain allurements. Now this chance for worldly happiness is all that a man quits for religion : this point enlarged on. On the other side, if religion reaches no farther than this life, still it makes men easy under its disappointments; so that whatever the loss of the world may be to a worldly man, yet to a truly religious one it is inconsiderable, as he is comforted and confirmed against such losses by the hopes of more solid enjoyments. Add this therefore to the account, and religion will appear to be the surest step, if not to happiness, yet to ease and contentment: this topic enlarged on, showing that, as things go, it is well if the pain and uneasiness of losing the world be not all we get by pursuing it; whilst religion teaches us that not to enjoy its pleasures is no great mischief: so that, if there be no other world but this, we are sure by religion to get the second best thing that can be had, that is, contentment. Admit that the principal thing is to have and enjoy the things we want; the next best is to be easy without them: the first the world rarely grants; the next

religion never denies. And thus far we may argue from the nature of worldly things, without making any comparison between them and those of another life; for this comparison will even make it reasonable to choose the sorrows of life for the sake of future glory; since the things which are not seen are eternal. Of the nature of future happiness we know but little : the descriptions of it in Scripture are figurative, and lead not to the true knowlege of its glories: possibly this world affords no notions proper to express the happiness of Heaven, which therefore can be described only by figures taken from our present sense of pleasure; from hence we only argue that the happiness is very great: but we have a clear notion of duration; here therefore the Scripture speaks plain, and tells us that this happiness is for evermore. Whosoever, says our Saviour, believeth in me shall live, though he die; and whosoever believeth on me shall not die eternally. This is the natural happiness of man, since this alone can answer his natural desire of eternal life; and nothing can be more evident to sense than this is to reason, that something has been from all eternity, and shall continue to all eternity; so that our desires of eternity are not loose ill-grounded desires, but have objects in nature fitted to them. This being the case, is it not agreeable to the very instinct of our nature to seek those things which can alone make for our happiness, if by any means we may attain to them? To lead us to them is the work of religion: to be employed in it therefore, is to be employed in the work of nature, which is to seek its own happiness and perfection. If religion be attended with difficulties, yet the glories we attain thereby are worth the purchase: this point enlarged on. It is wise to retire from the pleasures of the world, if it were only to guard against this certain evil consequence, that if we follow things present to the neglect of future happiness, the time will come when our present enjoyments will be past, when things future will be growing into things present: then this evil thought

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