66 fential branch of good affection, or moral rectitude. If a human creature could not be faid to be rightly difpofed, that was deftitute of affections towards its natural parents, can he be said to be rightly difpofed, who hath not a due affection towards the Common Parent, as Lord Shaftesbury calls him, of all intellectual beings? This noble writer defcribes virtue to be that which is beautiful, fair, and amiable in difpofition and action. And he afks, “Whether there is on earth a fairer matter of fpeculation, "a goodlier view or contemplation, than that of a beautiful, pro"portioned, and becoming action*?" And is there any thing more beautiful, more juftly proportioned, and more becoming, than the acting fuitably to the relation we bear to the Supreme Being, and the ferving, adoring, and honouring him, as far as we are capable of doing fo? Is there such a beauty and harmony in good affections towards thofe of our own fpecies, and must there not be still more beauty and excellency in having our minds formed to proper affections and difpofitions towards our Maker, Preferver, and Benefactor, the fource and principle, to use our author's expreffions, of all being and perfection, the fupreme and fovereign beauty, the original of all which is good and amiable? His Lordship speaks in the highest terms of the pleafing consciousnefs which is the effect of love or kind affections towards mankind. But certainly there is nothing that can yield more of a divine fatisfaction, than that which arifeth from a confciousness of a man's having approved himself to the best of beings, and endeavoured to promote his glory in the world, and to fulfil the work he hath given us to do. And it will be readily acknowledged, that a neceffary part of this work is the doing good to our fellow creatures. The very notion he fo frequently gives of virtue, as having an effential relation to a fyftem, seems, if understood in its proper extent, to include religion, and cannot fubfift without it. His Lordship indeed frequently explains this as relating to the fyftem of the human fpecies, to which we are particularly related, and of which we conftitute a part. But he alfo reprefents the human fyftem as only a part of the universal one, and obferves, that as man must be considered as having a relation abroad to the * Characterift. vol. ii. p. 105. "fyftem ' 66 fyftem of his kind; fo even the fyftem of his kind to the animal fyftem: this to the world (our earth), and this again to the bigger world, the universe*." And that "having recognized "this uniform confiftent fabric, and owned the univerfal fyftem, "we must of confequence acknowledge an univerfal mind t." He afferts, that "good affection, in order to its being of the right kind, must be intire:" and that " a partial affection, or focial "love in part, without regard to a complete fociety or whole, is "in itself an inconfifiency, and implies an abfolute contradic"tion." But how can that affection to the fyflem be faid to be intire, or of the right kind, which hath no regard to the author of it, on whom the whole fyftem, the order, and even the very being of it, abfolutely depends? and without whom indeed there could be properly no fyftem at all, nothing but diforder and confufion? On this occafion it will be proper to produce a remarkable paffage in his third volume; where he obferves, that "if what he had advanced in his Inquiry, and in his following Philofophic Dialogue, be real, it will follow, that fince man is fo "conftituted by means of his rational part, as to be conscious of this his more immediate relation to the universal system, and "principle of order and intelligence, he is not only by nature fociable within the limits of his own fpecies or kind, but in a yet more generous and extensive manner. He is not only born “to virtue, friendship, honesty, and faith, but to piety, adoration, "and a generous furrender of his mind to whatever happens "from the Supreme Caufe or order of things, which he acknowledges intirely just and perfect §.” 86 86 66 I have infifted the more largely upon this, because many there are among us that talk highly of virtue, who yet feem to look upon religion to be a thing in which they have little or no concern. They allow that men are formed and defigned to bè ufeful to one another; but as to what is ufually called picty towards God, or those acts of religion of which God is the immediate object, this does not enter at all into their notion of virtue or morality. They flight it as a matter of no confequence; and think they may be good and virtuous without it. But not to p. 286. * Characterift. vol. ii. Ibid. p. 110. 113, 114. + Ibid. p. 290. urge, urge, that religion or a true regard to the deity is the best fecurity for the right performance of every other part of our duty, and furnifheth the ftrongeft motives and engagements to it (which certainly ought greatly to recommend it to every lover of virtue), there is nothing which feems to be capable of a clearer demonfiration, from the frame of the human nature, and the powers and faculties with which man is endued, than that he alone, of all the fpecies of beings in this lower world, is formed with a capacity for religion; and that confequently this was one principal defign of his creation, and without which he cannot properly anfwer the end of his being. To what hath been produced from the Earl of Shaftesbury, I fhall add the teftimony of another writer, whom no man will fufpect of being prejudiced in favour of religion, the late Lord Viscount Bolingbroke: who, though he fometimes feems to make man only a higher kind of brute, and blames those who suppose that the foul of man was made to contemplate God, yet at other times finds himself obliged to acknowledge, that man was principally defigned and formed for religion. Thus, in the fpecimen he gives of a meditation or foliloquy of a devout theift, he talks of feeling the fuperiority of his fpecies; and adds, "I fhould roufe in myfelf a grateful fenfe of these advantages above all others, that I am a creature "capable of knowing, of adoring, and worfhipping my Creator, capable of difcovering his will in the law of my nature, and capable of promoting my happiness by obeying it *.” And in another paffage, after inveighing, as is ufual with him, against the pride and vanity of philofophers and divines, in exalting man and flattering the pride of the human heart, he thinks fit to acknowledge, that "man is a religious as well as focial crea"ture, made to know and adore his Creator, to difcover and to obey his will: That greater powers of reafon, and means of improvement, have been measured out to us than to other animals, that we might be able to fulfil the fuperior purposes of "our deflination, whereof religion is undoubtedly the chief: And that in thefe the elevation and pre-eminence of our fpe"cies over the inferior animals confiftt." I think it plainly 66 66 66 * Lord Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 390, 391. Sce alfo to the fame purpofe, ibid. p. 349. + Ibid. p. 470. followeth followeth, from what Lord Bolingbroke hath here observed, and which feems to be perfectly juft and reafonable, that they who live in an habitual neglect of religion, are chargeable with neglecting the chief purpose of their being, and that in which the true glory and pre-eminence of the human nature doth principally confift: and that confequently they are guilty of a very criminal' condu&t, and which they can by no means approve to ` the great author of their exiftence, who gave them their noble powers, and to whom, as the wife and righteous Governor of the world, they must be accountable for their conduct. I have been carried farther in my obfervations on this fubject than I intended; but if this may be looked upon as a digreffion, I hope it will not be thought unfuitable to the main defign I have in view. I am, Sir, &c. LET L LETTER VII. Mr. Collins's Difcourfe of Free-thinking-He gives à long Catalogue of Divifions among the Clergy, with a View to fhew the Uncertainty of the Chriftian Religion-His Attempt to prove that there was a general Corruption of the Gospels in the fixth Century-The Abfurdity of this manifefied-His Pretence that Friendship is not required in the Gospel, though ftrongly recommended by Epicurus, fhewn to be vain and groundless-An Account of his Book, intitled, The Grounds and Reasons of the Chriftian Religion-The pernicious Defign and Tendency of that Book fhewn-He allows Chriftianity no Foundation but the allegorical, i. e. as he understands it, the falfe Sense of the Old Teftament Prophecies-His Method unfair and difingenuous-Some Account of the principal Anfwers publifhed against that Book, and against the Scheme of Literal Prophecy confidered, which was defigned to be a Defence of it. IN SIR, The N the year 1713 came out a remarkable treatise, which it will be necessary to take some notice of, intitled, A Difcourse of Free-thinking, occafioned by the Rife and Growth of a Sect called Free-thinkers. It was written by Anthony Collins, Efq. though publifhed, as his other writings are, without his name. fame gentleman had in 1707 published an Effay concerning the Ufe of Reafon in Propofitions, the Evidence whereof depends upon human Teftimony: in which there are fome good observations, mixed with others of a fufpicious nature and tendency. In this effay there are animadverfions upon fome paffages in a tract written by Dr. Francis Gafirel, afterwards Lord Bishop of Chefter, intitled, Some Confiderations concerning the Trinity, and the Way of managing that Controverfy, published in 1702. To the third edition of which, publifhed in 1707, that learned and judicious divine fubjoined a vindication of it, in answer to Mr. Collins's effay. This gentleman alfo diftinguished himself by writing against the immateriality and immortality of the human foul, as |