thoughts or ideas to their minds, and our not being able particularly to explain how this is done, is no juft objection against it. This writer himself elsewhere, fpeaking of that extraordinary. action of God upon the mind which the word Infpiration is now ufed to denote, exprefsly acknowledges, that "it is no more incomprehensible than the ordinary action of mind on body, or "body on mind." And indeed it cannot without the highest abfurdity be denied, that God can work upon the spirits of men by an immediate influence, and yet in fuch a way as is perfectly agreeable to their rational natures, and which may not put any conftraint upon the freedom of their wills. And many cafes may be supposed, in which his doing fo may answer valuable ends. It may also be cafily conceived, that he can make impreffions upon men's minds by various other means, which he may make use of in his wife and fovereign providence to this purpose, without at all infringing the order of things in the natural or moral world. 66 He farther argues, that to fuppofe a providence extending to individuals, and particular occafional interpofitions, "is to fuppofe that there are as many providences as there are mén:" or, as he elsewhere expreffeth it, that "common providence "would break into a multitude of particular providences for "the supply of wants, and grant of petitions t." But there is no real foundation for this pretence. There is one universal providence, which may be confidered as extending to particular perfons and cafes, all of which are perfectly known 'to God, and (as was before hinted) occafion no confufion or diftraction. in his infinite mind. Our author indeed declares,' that "they "who have attempted to fhew that God may act by particular "and occafional interpofitions, confiftently with the preferva"tion of the general order, appear to him quite unintelligible." If it were fo, our not being able diftinctly to fhew how particular occafional interpofitions may consist with the doctrine of a general providence, would be no argument at all against it: since, as he himself observes upon another occafion, "It is impertinent "to deny the exiftence of any phænomenon, merely because we *Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. p. 468. Ibid. p. 414. VOL. I. H h +Ibid. p. 420. cannot "cannot account for it *." And yet we may eafily conceive in general, that they are perfectly reconcileable, fince, as hath been already hinted, these occasional interpofitions are usually no more than the applications of the general laws of providence to particular cafes and circumstances. That there may be, or that there have been, fuch interpofitions, he does not pretend abfolutely to deny but, he fays, that "we have no foundation for them in "our own experience, or in any history except that of the bible +." And yet foon after obferves, that "every religion boasts of ma"ny inftances, wherein the divine providence has been thus ex"ercifedt." And certain it is, that this hath been the general fentiment of mankind. Befides the ordinary courfe of things, which is to be regarded as under the conftant care and direction of a fovereign providence, there have been events of a remarkable and uncommon nature, though not properly miraculous, of which there are accounts in the most authentic hiftories, and in which men have been apt to acknowledge a special interpofition of divine providence. The moft important events have been brought about by the feemingly smallest and most unlikely means. Things have been often ftrangely conducted through many intricate turns to produce events contrary to all human expectation. Actions have been over-ruled to effects and iffues quite oppofite to the intentions of the actors. The moft artful schemes of human policy have been ftrangely baffled and disappointed. Surprising changes have been wrought upon the fpirits of men, and restraints laid upon their paffions, in a manner that can scarce be accounted for, and upon which great events have depended. Such things have naturally led mankind to acknowledge a divine hand, and a providence, over-ruling human affairs. I am fenfible many of thofe who honour themfelves with the title of free-thinkers will be apt to afcribe this to fuperftition or enthufiasm. But what right have they to pronounce against the general fentiments of mankind, and which feem to have arisen from the obfervation of events which argue the over-ruling interpofition of a fuperior invifible agency? He obferves with a fneer, that " there is many an old woman Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. p. 468. ↑ Ibid. vol. v. p. 414. "whe "who is ready to relate, with much fpiritual pride, the particular "providences that attended her and hers*." As to the charge, of spiritual pride, it is no more than he hath advanced against all that believe a particular providence, interesting itself in the affairs of men; the belief of which he imputeth to high notions of human importance. That he himself had high notions of his, own fagacity cannot be doubted; but the fentiments he is pleafed to ascribe to the old woman, seem to me to be more reasonable, and would, if generally entertained, have a much better influence on mankind than his own. Is it not much better, and more agreeable to reason and nature, for dependent creatures to regard the benefits they receive, and the good events which befall them, as owing to the interpofition of a moft wife and benign providence, and to acknowledge with thankfulness the condefcending care and goodness of God, in fuch inftances; than to pafs them over with a regardless eye, from an apprehenfion that God doth not concern himself with the affairs of men; that he is utterly unmindful of individuals, and taketh no notice of their actions, or of the events that relate to them? And this is the goodly scheme which this author hath taken so much pains to establish. 66 But he urgeth, that it is of no ufe to acknowledge particular interpofitions of divine providence, fince they cannot be diftinguished from events that happen in the courfe of God's general providence.." The effects," faith he, " that are affumed of par"ticular providences, are either false, or undistinguishable from "those of a general providence, and become particular by nothing more than the application which vain fuperftition or pious fraud makes of them f." And he obferves, that this holds with respect to the cafe not only of particular perfons, but of collective bodies. "Their circumftances are fo nearly alike, "and they return fo often to be equally objects of these fuppofed providences, that no man will dare to determine where thefe providences have been, or should have been employed, and "where not." It appears then, that though he fometimes feems to acknowledge the care of divine providence as extending to collective bodies, though not to individuals, yet in reality 66 *Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 413. Ibid. p. 460.. Hh 2 Ib. p. 420. See also p. 450. he he does not admit that providence interposes with regard to the one more than the other; or that in either cafe we can juftly afcribe any of the events that befall men, whether individually or collectively confidered, to divine providence; fince we cannot difcern or diftinguifh in what events providence has been employed, and in what not. But the truth is, we need not be put to the difficulty of thus diftinguishing, if we believe that providence is really concerned in them all. It over-ruleth both the affairs and events relating to nations and to particular persons, difpofing and governing them in the fittest matter, according to what feemeth most fit to his infinite wisdom, to which all circumftances are perfectly known. And even where the events feem contrary, profperous to one nation or particular perfon, adverfe to another, providence is to be regarded in both. For we can never err in judging that all events what foever are under the wife direction and superintendency of a fovereign providence, though, when we undertake to affign the particular reafons of God's providential difpenfations, we may eafily be mistaken. Our author farther obje&teth against the doctrine of a particu lar providence, that it fuppofes all mankind to be under an univerfal theocracy like the Jewish; and he obferves, that even in that cafe it would not have the effect to engage men to virtue, or deter them from vice and wickednefs, any more than it did the Jews. But he here confoundeth things that are of diftin& confideration. The heathens, and all mankind in all ages, have been under the care and fuperintendency of divine providence, and even of a particular providence, in the fenfe in which we are now confidering it; i. e. a providence, which extendeth to the individuals of the human race, infpecting their actions, and difpofing and governing the events relating to them. But they were not under the Jewish theocracy, which was a peculiar constitution, established for very wife purposes, the reasons and ends of which I fhall afterwards have occafion more particularly to confider. At prefent I fhall only obferve, that though under that conftitution we may juftly fuppofe there were extraordinary interpofitions in a way of mercy and judgment, both national, and relating to particular perfons, more frequently than there *Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 430. would one. would have been under another conftitution; yet the design of it was not, as our author supposes, that providence should interpofe for giving a present immediate reward to every good man, and every good action, and for immediately punishing every bad We find frequent pathetical complaints even under that difpenfation, of the calamities and fufferings of good men, and the profperity of the wicked. This gave occafion to the 37th and 73d Pfalms. See also Plasm xvii. 14. Jer. xii. 1, 2. The proper ultimate reward of good men, and punishment of the wicked, was ftill referved for a future ftate of retributions, which, though not exprefsly mentioned in their law, was believed and expected; as appeareth from what Solomon hath faid concerning it, Ecclef. iii. 16, 17. xii. 14. 186 66 66 I fhall conclude this letter with taking notice of an obfervation of our author, which is defigned to take off the force of an argument that Mr. Wollafton had offered. "It will be of little fer"vice," faith he, "to the scheme of particular providences, to fay, like Wollafton, that there may be incorporeal, or at least invifible beings, of intellect and powers fuperior to man, and capable of mighty things: and that thefe beings may be the "minifters of God, and the authors of those providences." He pretends, that there is no proof that there are fuch beings; and ridicules the doctrine of Genii or Dæmons, as having been owing to ancient aftrologers, and the knaves or madmen that profeffed theurgic magic." And he argues, that "if these "angels act by the immediate command of God, it is in oppofi"tion to his general providence, and to fupply the defects of 66 it; and that it is to give up the government over mankind to "thofe beings." But it is with an ill grace that this writer feems here to queftion the existence of angels, when yet he frequently intimates, that there are many orders of beings much fuperior to man, and that man is of the lowest order of intellectual beings. He reprefents it as a thing highly probable, that "there is a gradation from man, through various forms of fenfe, intelligence, and reafon, up to beings unknown to us, whofe "rank in the intellectual world is even above our conception t." And that "there may be as much difference between fome other *Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 463, 464. Ibid. p. 329, 330: "creatures |