perly fummed up Mr. Hume's argument against the evidence of miracles, thus: We have had a long, univerfal, and uninterrupted experience, that no events have happened contrary to the courfe of nature, from conftant and unvaried obfervations. We have therefore a full proof, that this uniform courfe has not been broken in upon, nor will be, by any particular exceptions.

But the obfervation of truth depending upon, and conftantly following human teftimony, is by no means univerfal and uninterrupted: and therefore it does not amount to a full proof, that it either has or will follow in any particular inftance.

And therefore the proof arifing from any human teftimony, can never equal the proof that is deduced against a miracle from the very nature of the fact.

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This he takes to be a full and fair ftate of Mr. Hume's reafoning: and it appears to me to be fo. And he fays, "The anfwer is "plain. If by human teftimony he would mean of any one 'fingle man indifferently taken, then his fecond propofition would be true; but then the conclufion would by no means "follow from it: but if by human teftimony he would underfland "the evidence of any collection of men, then the fecond propo"fition is falfe, and confequently the conclufion is fo too.”

This anfwer relateth only to the fecond propofition". But it might have been faid, that neither of the propofitions are to be depended upon, and that they are utterly infufficient to fupport the conclufion he would draw from them. For as to the firft propofition, it affumes the very point in queftion: it affirms, that no events have ever happened contrary to the course of nature; and that this we know by a long, univerfal, and uninterrupted experience. If this be meant univerfal and uninterrupted experience of all mankind in all ages, which alone can be of any.

*Though the ingenious gentleman hath not directly and formally anfwered the first propofition, yet he has plainly fhewn that he doth not admit it, when he faith, that "the very fame objection Mr. Hume makes against "the veracity of human teftimony, to weaken its authenticity, may be retort"ed with equal force against his unvaried certainty of the courfe of nature. "And that doubtlefs the many approved hiftories we have relating to miracles, will as much leffen the probability of what he calls a full proof on his "fide of the queftion, as all the forgeries and falfehoods that are brought to "difcredit human teftimony will weaken it on the other.”

VOL. I.

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force

force in the prefent argument, how doth it appear that we know by univerfal and uninterrupted experience, that no fuch events have ever happened? Are there not several events of this kind recorded by credible teftimonies to have happened? The whole argument then is upon a wrong foundation. It proceedeth upon an univerfal and uninterrupted experience, not broken in upon in any inftance. And there is good teftimony to prove, that it hath been broken in upon in feveral inftances. And if it hath been broken in upon in any inftances, no argument can be brought from experience to prove that it hath not, or may not be broken in upon; and fo the whole reafoning falls. If it be alledged, that thefe teftimonies, or indeed any teftimonies at all, ought not to be admitted in this cafe, the queftion returns, For what reafon ought they not to be admitted? If the reafon be, as it must be according to Mr. Hume, because there is an univerfal uninterrupted experience against them, this is to take it for granted, that no fuch events have ever happened: for if there have been any inftances of fuch events, the experience is not universal and uninterrupted. So that we fee what the boafted argument against miracles from uniform experience comes to. It in effect comes to this, that no fuch events have ever happened, because no fuch events have ever happened.

As to the fecond propofition, though if we fpeak of human teflimony in gencral, it will be eafily allowed, that it is not to be abfolutely and univerfally depended upon; yet, as hath been already hinted, it may in particular inftances be fo circumftanced, as to yield a fatisfying affurance, or what may not improperly be called a full proof. Even the teftimony of a particular perfon may in fome cafes be fo circumftanced, as to leave no room for reasonable fufpicion or doubt. But especially if we fpeak of what this gentleman calls a collection of men, this may in fome cafes be fo firong, as to produce a full and entire conviction, however improbable the attefted fact might otherwife appear to be. And therefore if we meet with any teftimonies relating to particular events of an extraordinary nature, they are not immediately to be rejected, under pretence of their being contrary to past experience; but we must carefully examine the evidence brought for them, whether it be of fuch a kind as to make it reafenable for us to believe them: and that the evidence

brought

brought for the miraculous facts recorded in the gospel are of this kind hath been often clearly fhewn.

The only farther reflection I fhall make on this gentleman's paper is, that it contains good and proper obfervations concerning our being determine in matters of practice by probabilities: That in all cafes of moment, where to act or forbear may be attended with confiderable damage, no wife man makes the leaft fcruple of doing what he apprehends may be of advantage to him, even though the thing were doubtful: but in matters of the utmoft confequence, a prudent man will think himself obliged to take notice of the lowest probability, and will act accordingly. This he applies to the practice of religion, and obferves, that confidering the vast importance of religion to our happiness in every refpect, the bare poffibility that it might prove true, were there nothing elfe to fupport it, would engage his afsent and compliance: or elfe he must be fuppofed to a differently in this refpect to what he generally does in all the other concerns of his life.

1

This observation is not entirely new, but it is handfomely illuftrated by this gentleman, and feems very proper to fhew, that those who neglect and despise religion, do in this, notwithstandftanding their boafted pretences, act contrary to the plain di&ates of reafon and good fenfe. But we need not have recourse to this fuppofition. The evidence on the fide of religion is vaftly fuperior. And if this be the cafe, no words can fufficiently exprefs the folly and unreafonablenefs of their conduct, who take up with flight prejudices and prefumptions in oppofition to it; and by choofing darkness rather than light, and rejecting the great falvation offered in the Gofpel, run the utmost hazard of exposing themselves to a heavy condemnation and punishment. Thus I have taken the liberty you allowed me of giving my thoughts upon the paper you fent me. I cannot but look upon the young gentleman's attempt to be a laudable and ingenious. one, though there are fome things in his way of managing the argument, which feem not to have been thoroughly confidered, and which, I am fatisfied, he would have altered, if he had lived to take an accurate review of the fubject.

This, with a few additions fince made to it, is the fubftance of the answer I returned to the worthy gentleman who had written to

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me,

me, and which I have here inserted, because there are fome things in it that may tend to the farther illuftration of what I had offered in my remarks on Mr. Hume's Effay on Miracles. My next will contain fome additional obfervations relating to the Abbé de Paris, and the miracles attributed to him; together with reflections on feme paffages in Mr. Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which feem to be intended to expofe Chriftianity.

LEF.

Some Reflections on the extraordinary Sanctity afcribed to the Abbé de Paris-He carried Superftition to a frange Excefs, and by his extraordinary Auflerities voluntarily haftened his own Death-His Character and Courfe of Life, of a different kind from that rational and folid Piety and Virtue which is recommended in the Gospel-Obfervations on fome Puffages in Mr. Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals— He reckons Self-denial, Mortification, and Humility among the Monkifh Virtues, and reprefents them as not only useless, but as having a bad Influence on the Temper and Conduct — The Nature of Self-denial explained, and its great Ufefulness and Excellence fhewn-What is to be underfood by the Mortification required in the Gospel-This alfo is a reasonable and neceffary Part of our Duty-Virtue, according to Mr. Hume, hath nothing to do with Sufferance-But by the Acknowledgment of the wifeft Moralifts, one important Office of it is to support and bear us up under Adverfity-The Nature of Humility explained-It is an excellent and amiable Virtue,

SIR,

HE miracles of the Abbé de Paris have made fo great a noise

Ti mir world, and fo much advantage hath been taken of

them by the enemies of Chriflianity, and particularly by Mr. Hume, that I thought it neceffary to confider them pretty largely above in the nineteenth Letter. Some things have occurred fince, which have fome relation to that matter, and which I fhall here take notice of.

In that Letter, p. 352, mention is made of the high opinion the people had conceived of the Abbé's extraordinary fanctity, as what tended very much to raise their expectations of miracles to be wrought at his tomb, and by his interceffion. If we inquire whence this opinion of his extraordinary fanctity arofe, and upon what it was founded, we fhall find it to have been principally owing to the exceffive aufterities. in which he exercifed himfelf for feveral years; of which therefore, and of fome remarkable

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things