makes very favourable to what he addeth in the next page, concerning the univerfal liberty to be allowed by the state to all kinds of philofophy. According to his own way of reprefenting it, Epicurus must have been caft, if he had pleaded his caufe before the people; and the principal defign of this Effay, which feems to be to fhew not only the reasonableness, but harmlessnefs, of that philofophy, is loft: for if the fpreading of those principles and reafonings is contrary to the rules of good policy, and the character of good citizens; if they have a tendency to free men from a firong refraint upon their paffions, and to make the infringement of the laws of equity and fociety, more eafy and fecure; then fuch principles and reafonings, according to his way of reprefenting the matter, ought in good policy to be refirained, as having a bad influence on the community.

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There is one paffage more in this Effay which may deferve fome notice. It is in page 230, where he obferves, that “God dif"covers himfelf by fome faint traces or outlines, beyond which "we have no authority to afcribe to him any attribute or per "fection. What we imagine to be a fuperior perfection may "really be a defe&t. Or, were it ever fo much a perfection, the afcribing it to the Supreme Being, where it appears not to "have been really exerted to the full in his works, favours more "of flattery and panegyric, than of juft reafoning and found philofophy." The courfe of his arguing feems to be this: That it would favour of flattery, not of found reafoning, to afcribe any attribute or perfection to God, which appears not to have been exerted to the full in his works. And he had obferved before, that "it is impoffible for us to know any thing of the cause, "but what we have antecedently, not inferred, but difcovered to "the full in the effect." It is plain therefore, that according to him we ought not to afcribe any perfection to God, but what is not merely inferred, but difcovered to the full in his works. It is alfo manifeft, that according to him there is no attribute or perfection of the Deity exerted or difcovered to the full in his works; for he had faid just before, that he discovers himself only by fome faint traces or outlines. The natural conclufion from thefe premifes taken together is plainly this: that it would be

*Hume's Philofophical Effys, p. 222.

flattery

flattery and prefumption in us to afcribe any attribute or perfection to God at all. And now I leave it to you to judge of the obligations the world is under to this writer. In one part of this Effay, he makes an attempt to fubvert the proof of the existence of God, or a fupreme intelligent caufe of the univerfe: and here he infinuates, that it would be wrong to afcribe any perfection or attribute to him at all. And the main defign of the whole Effay is to fhew, that no argument can be drawn from any of his perfections, to make it probable, that there fhall be rewards and punishments in a future ftate, though he acknowledgeth that it is of great advantage to mankind to believe them.

You will not wonder after this, that this gentleman, who has endeavoured to fhake the foundations of natural religion, should use his utmost efforts to fubvert the evidences of the Chriftian revelation. What he hath offered this way will be the fubject of fome future letters.

An Examination of Mr. Hume's Effay on Miracles-A Summary of the first Part of that Effay; which is defigned to fhew, that Miracles are incapable of being proved by any Teflimony or Evidence whatfoever-His main Principle examined, that Experience is our only Guide in reafoning concerning Matters of Fact; and that Miracles being contrary to the established Laws of Nature, there is an uniform Experience again the Existence of any Miracle-It is fhewn, that no Argument can be drawn from Experience, to prove that Miracles are impoffible, or that they have not been actually wrought-Miracles not above the Power of God, nor unworthy of his Wifdom-Valuable Ends may be aligned for Miracles-They are capable of being proved by proper Tejimony-This applied to the Refurrection of Chrift—And it is shown, that the Evidence fet before us in Scripture is every way fufficient to fatisfy us of the Truth of it, fuppofing that Evidence to have been really given as there repre fented.

I

SIR,

NOW proceed to confider Mr. Hume's celebrated Effay on Miracles, which is the tenth of his Philofophical Effays, and has been mightily admired and extolled, as a masterly and unanfwerable piece. Ithink no impartial man will fay fo, that has read the ingenious and judicious anfwer made to it by the Reverend Mr. Adams, now Reffor of Shrewsbury. It is intitled, An Effay in Anfwer to Mr. Hume's Effay on Miracles, by William Adams, M. A. That which I have by me is the fecond edition, with additions, London, 1754. Befides this, I have seen a fhort but excellent difcourfe, by the Reverend Dr. Rutherforth, intitled, The Credibility of Miracles defended against the Author of the Philofophical Effays" In a difcourfe delivered at "the primary vifitation of the Right Reverend Thomas Lord "Bifhop of Ely.-Cambridge, 1751." Thefe in my opinion are fufficient. But fince you defire that I would alfo take a par

ticular

ticular notice of Mr. Hume's Effay, I fhall obey your commands, and enter on a distinct confideration of this boafted performance.

Mr. Hume introduceth his Effay on Miracles in a very pompous manner, as might be expected from one who fets up in his Philofophical Effays, for teaching men better methods of reafoning than any philofopher had done before him. He had taken care at every turn to let his leaders know how much they are obliged to him for throwing new light on the most curious and fublime effects, with regard to which the most celebrated philofophers had been extremely defective in their refearches. And now he begins his Effay on Miracles with declaring, that “he "flatters himself that he has difcovered an argument, which, if “juft, will, with the wife and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of fuperftitious delufion; and confequently, will be useful as long as the world endures: for fo long," he prefumes, "will the account of miracles and prodigies be found in "all profane history*."

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This Effay confifteth of two parts. The firft, which reacheth from p. 173 to p. 186, is defigned to fhew, that no evidence which can be given, however feemingly full and ftrong, can be a fufficient ground for believing the truth and existence of miracles: or, in other words, that miracles are in the nature of things incapable of being proved by any evidence or teftimony whatsoever. The fecond part is intended to fhew, that fuppofing a miracle capable of being proved by full and fufficient evidence or teflimony, yet in fact there never was a miraculous event in any history eftablished upon fuch evidence. The firft is what he feems principally to rely upon: and indeed, if this can be proved, it will make any particular inquiry into the telimony produced for miracles, needlefs.

The method he makes ufe of in the firft part of his Effay, to fhew, that no evidence or teftimony that can be given is a fufficient ground for a reafonable affent to the truth and exiftence of miracles, is this: He lays it down as an undoubted principle, that experience is our only guide in reafoning concerning matters of fact, and at the fame time infinuates, that this guide is far

Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 174.

from

1

from being infallible, and is apt to lead us into errors and mif. takes. He obferves, that the validity and credibility of human teftimony is wholly founded upon experience: That in judging how far a teftimony is to be depended upon, we balance the oppofite circumftances, which may create any doubt or uncertainty: That the evidence arifing from teftimony may be deftroyed, either by the contrariety and oppofition of the teftimony, or by the confideration of the nature of the facts themfelves: That when the facts partake of the marvellous and extraordinary, there are two oppofite experiences with regard to them; and that which is the moft credible is to be preferred, though ftill with a diminution of its credibility in proportion to the force of the other which is oppofed to it: That this holdeth ftill more trongly in the cafe of miracles, which are fuppofed to be contrary to the laws of nature; for experience being our only guide, and an uniform experience having cftablished thofe laws, there must be an uniform experience against the existence of any miracie: and an uniform experience amounts to a full and entire proof. To fuppofe therefore any teftimony to be a proof of a miracle, is to fuppofe one full proof for a miracle, opposed to another full proof in the nature of the thing against it, in which cafe thofe proofs deftroy one another. Finally, that we are not to believe any teftimony concerning a miracle, except the falfehood of that testimony fhould be more miraculous than the miracle itself which it is defigned to establish. He also gives a hint, that as it is impoffible for us to know the attributes or actions of God otherwife than from the experience which we have of his produc tions, we cannot be fure that he can effe& miracles, which are contrary to all our experience, and the eftablifhed courfe of nature: and therefore miracles are impoffible to be proved by any evidence.

Having given this general idea of this first part of Mr. Hume's Effay on Miracles, I fhall now proceed to a more particular examination of it.

It is manifeft that the main principle, which lieth at the foundation of his whole fcheme, is this: that experience is our only in reafoning concerning matters of fact*."

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"guide

*Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 174.

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