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LETTER X.

Another Attempt against Christianity in Dr. Morgan's Book, called, The Moral Philofopher-He feems to acknowledge the great Ufefulness of Revelation, but leaves no Way of knowing when a Revelation is really given-He difcards all Authority, even a divine one, in Matters of Religion, and all Proof from Miracles and Prophecy-His Invectives against the Law of Mofes and the Prophets--Though he profeffeth himself a Chriftian on the Foot of the New Tefiament, he infinuates feveral Reflections on the Character of our Saviour, and endeavours to invalidate the Atteftation given to Chriftianity by the extraordinary Gifts and Powers of the Holy Ghof-He pretends, that the Apostles preached different Gofpels, and that the New Teftament is a Fumble of inconfiftent Religions-His Book fully confuted in the Anfwers that were published against himSome Account of thofe Anfwers, as alfo of the fecond and third Volumes of the Moral Philofopher.

SIR,

s

AS you fill infift upon my continuing the correfpondence

on the fubject of my former letters, I fhall now take notice of a fresh attempt againft Chriflianity, in a book that appeared with a pompous title, The Moral Philofopher, in a Dialogue between Philalethes, a Chriftian Deift, and Theophanes, a Chriftian Few" In which the grounds and reasons of religion in general, "and particularly of Chriftianity as diftinguifhed from the religion of nature; the different methods of conveying and propofing moral truth to the mind; and the neceffary marks or "criteria on which they must all equally depend; the nature of pofitive laws, &c. with many other matters of the utmost con"fequence to religion, are fairly confidered and debated, and the arguments on both fides impartially reprefented," London, 8vo. 1737. The author of this book, Dr. Morgan, feems at firft view to go much farther in his conceffion, than other his fellow-labourers in the fame caufe. If we were to judge by fome parts of his book, we fhould be ready to look upon him as having very friendly difpofitions towards the Chriftian religion: fince L

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he feems exprefsly to acknowledge the great usefulness of divine revelation in general, and of the Christian revelation in particular. He fpeaks of man's natural weakness and inability; and represents those as conceited of themselves, who in the present flate of mankind talk of the ftrength of human reafon in matters of religion. He obferves, that at the time of Chrift's appearing, "mankind in general were in a state of grofs ignorance and "darknefs, with refpect to the true knowledge of God, and of "themselves, and of all thofe moral relations and obligations we "ftand in to the Supreme Being, and to one another: That they

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were under great uncertainty concerning a future ftate, and "the concern of divine providence in the government of the "world, and at the fame time were filled with a proud and "vain conceit of their own natural abilities and felf-fufficiency: "That our Saviour's doctrines on thefe heads, though they appeared to be the true and genuine principles of nature and reafon, when he had fet them in a proper light, yet were fuch as "the people had never heard or thought of before, and never "would have known, without fuch an inftructor, fuch means "and opportunities of knowledge: That they who would judge "uprightly of the ftrength of human reason in matters of morality "and religion, under the present corrupt and degenerate state of "mankind, ought to take their eftimate from thofe parts of the "world which never had the benefit of revelation; and this perhaps might make them lefs conceited of themselves, and more "thankful to God for the light of the gofpel." He afks," if the

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religion of nature, under the prefent pravity and corruption of "mankind, were written with fufficient ftrength and clearness "upon every man's heart; why might not a Chinese, or an In"dian, draw up as good a fyftem of natural religion as a Chris

tian, and why have we never met with any fuch?” He adds, that let us take Confucius, Zoroafter, Plato, Socrates, or the greatest moralift that ever lived without the light of revelation, " and it will appear, that their best systems of morality were in"termixed and blended with fo much fuperftition, and fo many "grofs abfurdities, as quite eluded and defeated the main defign "of them". This author could fcarce have declared more exprefsly than he hath here done against Tindal's darling fcheme,

*Moral Philofopher, vol. i. p. 144, 145.

concerning

concerning fuch an abfolute univerfal clearnefs and fufficiency of the light of nature in the prefent ftate of mankind, as renders revelation entirely needlefs and ufelefs. To which it may be added, that he speaks in many paffages very honourably of Jefus Chrift, and the religion he hath introduced, as having brought clearer discoveries of our duty, and enforced it by ftronger motives, and provided more effectual aids, than ever was done before. And accordingly he exprefsly declareth himself to be a Chriflian on the foot of the New Teftament.

If we were to form our judgment of him merely from fuch paffages as thefe, it might be thought to be doing wrong to our moral philofopher, to rank him in the lift of the deistical writers: but by a prevarication and a difingenuity which is not easily paralleled, except among fome of thofe that have appeared on the fame fide, under all thefe fair pretences and difguifes, he hath covered as determined a malice against the honour and authority of the Christian revelation, as any of thofe that have written before him.

It is not eafy to form a distinct notion of what he understandeth by that revelation, the usefulness of which he would be thought to acknowledge. He granteth," that God may, if he thinks fit, communicate his will by immediate infpiration, or fupernatural illumination; yea, and that what he thus communicates may come with evidence equal to a mathematical demonftration". Yet he plainly intimates, that it can never be proved, that God had ever thus communicated his will; and treats fuch inspiration as the invention of our spiritual fcholaftics or fyfiematical divines. By feveral paffages of his book, efpecially if compared with what he faith in his fecond volume, which he published in defence of it, it appeareth, that by revelation he underftandeth any discovery of truth, in what way foever a man comes by it, even though it be by the ftrength and fuperiority of his own natural faculties: So that all that have discovered rational or moral truth by their own ftudy and application, in the use of their natural faculties, may be faid, according to this account of it, to have had the light of revelation: and if fo, it is not easy to see how he could confiftently represent whole na

* Moral Philofopher, vol. i. p. 83, 84.

Ibid. p. 343. vol. ii. p. 12, 13. 25, 26. 44.

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tions, among whom he reckoneth the Indians and Chinese, as having never had the benefit of revelation; or how he could fay, that the most eminent philofophers and moralifts, fuch as Confucius, Zoroafter, Plato, Socrates, lived without the light of revelation. For will he fay, that none of them had any discovery or manifestation of rational moral truth made to them in any way whatsoever, no, not fo much as in the exercife of their own natural faculties?

The great principle he hath laid down, and which runs through his whole book, is, that there is but one certain and infallible mark or criterion of divine truth, or of any doctrine or law as coming from God, and that is, the moral truth, reafon or fitness of the thing itself, when it comes to be fairly proposed to, and confidered by the mind or underftanding. He frequently declareth, that we are not to receive any thing as true in religion upon any authority whatsoever*, or upon any other foundation than its own intrinfic evidence, or moral fitnefs: and this he explaineth to be its conduciblenefs to our happiness, as appearing to our reason, independently of all authority: So that after all his fair pretences about the benefit of revelation, we are not to receive any thing upon the authority of revelation at all. Suppofing any perfons to have been extraordinarily fent of God, to make a discovery of his will concerning truth or duty, whatever credentials they produce to prove their divine miffion, we are not to receive any thing upon that authority, no more than if they were not thus extraordinarily fent of God. The doctrines and laws they deliver as from God, in what way foever they are attested and confirmed, are really and entirely on the fame footing with the opinion of philofophers or moralifts, who do not pretend to be extraordinarily fent of God at all; i. e. we are to believe the doctrines they teach, if upon examining them we find them to be true, by reafons drawn from the nature of things; and we are to fubmit to their precepts and directions, if upon confidering them we are fatisfied that they tend to our own advantage and happiness; but their authority, abftra&tly from the reafon of the thing, muft have no weight to determine us. Thus the proper. use and advantage of revelation, which is to affure us by a di

* Moral Philofopher, vol. ii. p. 6. 21, &c.

vine teftimony of the truth of things, which either we could not have known at all, or not fo certainly or clearly, by our own unassisted reason; and with regard to our practice, to direct us to our duty, and bind it upon us by exprefs precepts, confirmed by a divine authority, is entirely fet afide by this author. Accordingly he will not allow either miracles or prophecy to be any proof of divine revelation, or any reafon at all for our believing any doctrines, or fubmitting to any laws, which have this atteftation given to them. This being the true state of the cafe, according to him-that nothing is to be received upon the authority of revelation-it is to no great purpose to inquire how this revelation is communicated to us. Yet he makes a great noise about the uncertainty of the manner of conveying a revelation to us. He frequently feems to make a mighty difference between immediate and traditional revelation; and fometimes puts on an appearance of granting, that inspiration or extraordinary revelation from God is a fufficient ground of affurance to the person or persons to whom this revelation is originally and immediately communicated. But upon a close examination, and by comparing feveral paffages in his book, it will be found, that he does not, and indeed cannot in confiftency with his scheme, allow, that thofe perfons to whom this revelation is immediately made, have any way of being fure of the truth of what is thus communicated, but by the reafon of the thing, by its own intrinfic evidence, or apparent tendency to our benefit. And those to whom this revelation is traditionally communicated, may have the fame kind of affurance; i. e. they may believe it, if upon examining they find it to be true, by arguments drawn from the nature and reafon of the thing. So that, upon his scheme, immediate revelation makes no difference, though he often talks as if there were a very great one.

It appeareth upon this view, that though he fometimes feems abfolutely to contradict and subvert the fcheme of the author of Chriftianity as old as the Creation; yet at the bottom, his own scheme cometh pretty much to the fame thing. He, as well as that author, is for discarding all authority, even a divine one, in matters of religion; and represents the receiving any thing purely upon fuch authority, as a renouncing our reafon. According to him, the only way any man, even of the meaneft capacity, can