the apparent caprice with which it was sometimes abundant and sometimes scanty, would prevent them from suspecting any thing like method in the arrangements of nature; nor could their minds even conceive the existence of those general principles which govern the order of events, and by a knowledge of which we are often able to predict their future course. But when such tribes advance into the agricultural state, they, for the first time, use a food of which not only the appearance, but the very existence, seems to be the result of their own act. What they sow, that likewise do they reap. The provision necessary for their wants is brought more immediately under their own control, and is more palpably the consequence of their own labour. They perceive a distinct plan, and a regular uniformity of sequence, in the relation which the seed they put into the ground bears to the corn when arrived at maturity. They are now able to look to the future, not indeed with certainty, but with a confidence infinitely greater than they could have felt in their former and more precarious pursuits. Hence there arises a dim idea of the stability of events; and for the first time there begins to dawn upon the mind a faint conception of what at a later period are called the Laws of Nature. Every step in the great progress will make their view of this more clear. As their observations accumulate, and as their experience extends over a wider surface, they meet with uniformities that they had never suspected to exist, and the discovery of which weakens that doctrine of chance with which they had originally set out. Yet a little further, and a taste for abstract reasoning springs up; and then some among them generalize the observations that have been made, and despising the old popular opinion, believe that every event is linked to its antecedent by an inevitable connexion, that such antecedent is connected with a preceding fact; and that thus the whole world forms a necessary chain, in which indeed each man may play his part, but can by no means determine what that part shall be.

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Thus it is that, in the ordinary march of society, an increasing perception of the regularity of nature destroys the doctrine of Chance, and replaces it by that of Necessary Connexion. And it is, I think, highly probable that out of these two doctrines of Chance and Necessity there have respectively arisen the subsequent dogmas of Free Will and Predestination. Nor is it diffi

Some of the moral consequences of thus diminishing the precariousness of food are noticed by M. Charles Comte, in his Traité de Législation, vol. ii. pp. 273-275. Compare Mill's History of India, vol. i. pp. 180, 181. But both these able writers have omitted to observe that the change facilitates a perception of the regularity of phenomena.

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cult to understand the manner in which, in a more advanced state of society, this metamorphosis would occur. In every country; as soon as the accumulation of wealth has reached a certain point, the produce of each man's labour becomes more than sufficient for his own support: it is therefore no longer necessary that all should work; and there is formed a separate class, the members of which pass their lives for the most part in the pursuit of pleasure; a very few, however, in the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge. Among these last there are always found some who, neglecting external events, turn their attention to the study of their own minds; and such men, when possessed of great abilities, become the founders of new philosophies and new religions, which often exercise immense influence over the people who receive them. But the authors of these systems are themselves affected by the character of the age in which they live. It is impossible for any man to escape the pressure of surrounding opinions; and what is called a new philosophy or a new religion is generally not so much a creation of fresh ideas, but rather a new direction given to ideas already current among contemporary thinkers.5 Thus, in the case now before us, the doctrine of Chance in the external world corresponds to that of Free Will in the internal while the other doctrine of Necessary Connexion

On the relation between this and the previous creation of wealth, see Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i. p. 30: "Ein gewisser Grad von Cultur und Wohlstand ist eine nothwendige äussere Bedingung der Entwickelung des philosophischen Geistes. So lange der Mensch noch mit den Mitteln seiner Existenz und der Befriedigung seiner thierischen Bedürfnisse beschäftiget ist, so lange gehet die Entwickelung und Bildung seiner Geisteskräfte nur langsam von statten, und er nähert sich nur Schritt vor Schritt einer freiern Vernunftthätigkeit.". "Daher finden wir, dass man nur in denen Nationen anfing zu philosophiren, welche sich zu einer beträchtlichen Stufe des Wohlstandes und der Cultur empor gehoben hatten." Hence, as I shall endeavor to prove in the next chapter, the immense importance of the physical phenomena which precede and often control the metaphysical. In the history of the Greek mind we can distinctly trace the passage from physical to metaphysical inquiries. See Grote's History of Greece, vol. iv. p. 519, edit. 1847. That the atomic doctrine, in its relation to chance, was a natural precursor of Platonism, is remarked in Broussais, Examen des Doctrines Médicales, vol. i. pp. 53, 54, an able though one-sided work. Compare, respecting the Chance of the atomists, Ritter's History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. i. p. 553; an hypothesis, as Ritter says, "destructive of all inner energy;" consequently antagonisitic to the psychological hypothesis which subsequently sprang up and conquered it. That physical researches came first, is moreover attested by Diogenes Laertius: Μέρη δὲ φιλοσοφίας τρία, φυσικὸν, ἠθικὸν, διαλεκτικόν φυσικὸν μέν, τὸ περὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ἠθικὸν δὲ, τὸ περὶ βίου καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· διαλεκτικὸν δὲ, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοὺς λόγους πρεσβεύον καὶ μέχρι μὲν ̓Αρχελάου τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος ἦν· ἀπὸ δὲ Σωκράτους, ὡς προείρηται, τὸ ἠθικόν ἀπὸ δὲ Ζήνωνος τοῦ Ἐλεάτου, τὸ διαλεκτικόν. De Vitis Philosophorum Proem. segm. 18, vol. i. p. 12: compare lib. ii. segm. 16, vol. i. p. 89.

Beausobre has some good remarks on this in his learned work Histoire Critique de Manichée, vol. i. p. 179, where he says that the great religious heresies have been founded on previous philosophies. Certainly no one acquainted with the history of opinions will admit the sweeping assertion of M. Stahl that "la philosophie d'un peuple a sa racine dans sa théologie." Klimrath, Travaux, vol. ii. p. 454, Paris, 1843.

is equally analogous to that of Predestination; the only difference being that the first is a development by the metaphysician, the second by the theologian. In the first instance, the metaphysician, setting out with the doctrine of Chance, carries into the study of the mind this arbitrary and irresponsible principle, which in its new field becomes Free Will; an expression by which all difficulties seem to be removed, since perfect freedom, itself the cause of all actions, is caused by none, but, like the doctrine of Chance, is an ultimate fact admitting of no further explanation. In the second instance, the theologian taking up the doctrine of Necessary Connexion recasts it into a religious shape; and his mind being already full of conceptions of order and of uniformity, he naturally ascribes such undeviating regularity to the prescience of Supreme Power; and thus to the magnificent notion of one God there is added the dogma that by Him all things have from the beginning been absolutely pre-determined and pre-ordained.

These opposite doctrines of free will and predestination' do, no doubt, supply a safe and simple solution of the obscurities of our being; and as they are easily understood, they are so suited to the average capacity of the human mind, that even at the present day an immense majority of men are divided between them; and they have not only corrupted the sources of our knowledge, but have given rise to religious sects, whose mutual animosities have disturbed society, and too often embittered the relations of private life. Among the more advanced European thinkers there is, however, a growing opinion that both doctrines are wrong, or, at all events, that we have no sufficient evidence of their truth. And as this is a matter of great moment, it is

“Also ist ein Wille, dem die blose gesetzgebende Form der Maxime allein zum Gesetze dienan kann, ein freier Wille." Kritik der praktischen Vernunft in Kant's Werke, vol. iv. p. 128. "Hat selber für sich eigentlich keinen Bestimmungsgrund." Metaphysik der Sitten in Werke, vol. v. p. 12. "Die unbedingte Causalität der Ursache." Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Werke, vol. ii. p. 339. See also Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik in vol. iii. p. 268.

That these doctrines, when treated according to the ordinary methods of reason. ing, not only oppose, but exclude each other, would be universally admitted if it were not for a desire generally felt to save certain parts of each: it being thought dangerous to give up free will on account of weakening moral responsibility, and equally dangerous to give up predestination on account of impugning the power of God. Various attempts have therefore been made to reconcile liberty with necessity, and make the freedom of man harmonize with the foreknowledge of the Deity. Compare on this point a remarkable letter from Locke to Molyneux (Locke's Works, vol. viii. p. 305), with the argument in one of Bentley's Sermons (Monk's Life of Bentley, vol. ii. pp. 7, 8); also Ritter's Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, vol. iv. pp. 143, 144; Tennemann, Gesch. der Philosophie, vol. iv. pp. 301-304; Copleston's Inquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination, pp. 6, 7, 46, 69, 70, 85, 92, 108, 136; Mosheim's Ecclesiastical Hist. vol. i. p. 207, vol. ii. p. 96; Neander's Hist. of the Church, vol. iv. pp 294, 389-391; Bishop of Lincoln on Tertullian, 1845, p. 323; Hodgson on Buddhism, in Transac. of Asiatic Society, vol. ii. p. 232.

important, before we proceed further, to clear up as much of it as the difficulties inherent in these subjects will enable us to do. Whatever doubts may be thrown on the account which I have given of the probable origin of the ideas of free will and predestination, there can, at all events, be no dispute as to the foundation on which those ideas are now actually based. The theory of predestination is founded on a theological hypothesis; that of free will on a metaphysical hypothesis. The advocates of the first proceed on a supposition for which, to say the least of it, they have as yet brought forward no good evidence. They require us to believe that the Author of Creation, whose beneficence they at the same time willingly allow, has, notwithstanding His supreme goodness, made an arbitrary distinction between the elect and the non-elect; that He has from all eternity doomed to perdition millions of creatures yet unborn, and whom His act alone can call into existence and that He has done this, not in virtue of any principle of justice, but by a mere stretch of despotic power. This doctrine owes its authority among Protestants to the dark though powerful mind of Calvin: but in the early Church it was first systematically methodized by Augustin, who appears to have borrowed it from the Manichæans. At all events, and putting aside its incompatibility with other notions which are supposed to be fundamental, it must, in a scientific investigation, be regarded as a barren hypothesis, because, being beyond the province of our knowledge, we have no means of ascertaining either its truth or its falsehood.

The other doctrine, which has long been celebrated under the name of Free Will, is connected with Arminianism; but it in reality rests on the metaphysical dogma of the supremacy of human consciousness. Every man, it is alleged, feels and knows that he is a free agent: nor can any subtleties of argument do

* Even Ambrose, who never went so far as Augustin, states this principle in its repulsive nakedness: "Deus quos dignat vocat, quos vult religiosos facit." Neander, vol. iv. p. 287. Calvin declares "that God, in predestinating from all eternity one part of mankind to everlasting happiness, and another to endless misery, was led to make this distinction by no other motive than His own good pleasure and free will." Mosheim's Eccles. Hist. vol. ii. p. 103; see also p. 100; and Carwithen's Hist. of the Church of England, vol. i. p. 552.

On the Manichæan origin of Augustin's opinions, compare Potter, Esprit de l'Eglise, vol. ii. p. 171, Paris, 1821; Tomline's Refutation of Calvinism, 1817, pp 571-576; Southey's Book of the Church, 1824, vol. i. p. 301, 302; Matter, Hist. du Gnosticisme, 1828, vol. i. p. 325. However, Beausobre (Histoire de Manichée, vol. ii. pp. 33-40) seems to have proved a difference between the election of Augustin and that of Basilides.

19 On the absurdity of "an omnipotent arbitrary Deity," and on the incongruity of such a combination with ovσel kaλòv kal dikaιov, see Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. vol. i. pp. 45, 419, vol. iii. p. 241, vol. iv. p. 160. See also Theodicee in Kant's Werke, vol. vi. pp. 141, 142, and Metaphysik der Sitten, in vol. v. p. 332, upon "den gött lichen Zweck in Ansehung des menschlichen Geschlechts."

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away with our consciousness of possessing a free will. Now the existence of this supreme jurisdiction, which is thus to set at defiance all the ordinary methods of reasoning, involves two assumptions of which the first, though possibly true, has never been proved; and the other is unquestionably false. These assumptions are, that there is an independent faculty, called consciousness, and that the dictates of that faculty are infallible. But, in the first place, it is by no means certain that consciousness is a faculty; and some of the ablest thinkers have been of opinion that it is merely a state or condition of the mind. 12 Should this turn out to be the case, the argument falls to the ground; since, even if we admit that all the faculties of the mind, when completely exercised, are equally accurate, no one will make the same claim for every condition into which the mind itself may be casually thrown. However, waiving this objection, we may, in the second place, reply, that even if consciousness is a faculty, we have the testimony of all history to prove its extreme fallibility. 13 All the great stages through which, in the

"Johnson said to Boswell, "Sir, we know our will is free, and there's an end on't." Boswell's Life of Johnson, edit. Croker, 1848, p. 203. "La question: Sommes nous libres? me parait au-dessous de la discussion. Elle est résolue par le témoignage de la conscience attestant que dans certains cas nous pourrions faire le contraire de ce que nous faisons." Cousin, Hist. de la Philosophie, I. Série, vol. i. pp. 190, 191. "Die Freiheit des Menschen, als moralischen Wesens, gründet sich auf das sittliche Bewusstseyn." Tennemann, Gesch. der Philosophie, vol. v. p. 161. That this is the only ground for believing in the freedom of the will is so evident, that we need not notice the mystical proof of Philo (Ritter's Ancient Philosophy, vol. iv. p. 447); nor the physical one of the Basilidian monads (Beausobre, Hist de Manichée, vol. ii. p. 23); still less the argument of Bardesanes, who thought to demonstrate freedom by the variety of human customs! Matter, Hist du Gnosticisme, vol. i. p. 323, which should be compared with Burdach's Physiologie comme Science d'Observation, vol. v. p. 50, Paris, 1839.

" Mr. James Mill (Analysis of the Mind, vol. i. pp. 171, 172) says that consciousness and belief are the same, and that great error has arisen from calling consciousness a feeling distinct from all other feelings." According to Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding, book ii. chap. i., Works, vol. i. p. 89) “consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind." Brown (Philosophy of the Mind, pp. 67, 68) denies that consciousness is a faculty: and Sir W. Hamilton complains of "Reid's degradation of consciousness into a special faculty." Notes to Reid's Works, pp. 223, 297, 373. M. Cousin (Hist. de la Philosophie, II. Série, vol. i. p. 131) pronounces consciousness to be "phénomène complexe;" and at p. 94 “la condition nécessaire de l'intelligence c'est la conscience;" while a still later writer (Jobert's New System of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 25) declares that "we have the consciousness of our consciousness-this is certain." The statement in Alciphron, Dialogue vii. (Berkeley's Works, vol. i. pp. 505, 506) is equally unsatisfactory: and what still further perplexes the question is the existence of what is now recognised as "double consciousness." See on this extraordinary phenomenon Elliotson's Physiology, pp. 367-369, 1165; Mayo's Physiology, pp. 195, 196; Prichard's Treatise on Insanity, pp. 450, 451; Carpenter's Human Physiology, p. 379.

23 This requires explanation. Consciousness is infallible as to the fact of its testimony; but fallible as to the truth. That we are conscious of certain phenomena, is a proof that those phenomena exist in the mind, or are presented to it; but to say that this demonstrates the truth of the phenomena is to go a step further, and not only offer a testimony, but also pass a judgment. The moment we do this, we intro