called eternal life, not only for the last reasons which are given, but also to show its Divine source and nature; and that it is, in itself, a living, indestructable principle. In the text before us, I conceive the terms eternal life, relate to a principle, rather than to the duration of existence. Nor is this exposition new, or unprecedented. There are numerous passages of Scripture that will bear this construction, and some that cannot bear any other. "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear." Col. iii. 4. "The power of an endless life." vii. 16. "Thou hast the words of eternal life." John vi. 68. "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." ib. xvii. 3. "This is the true God and eternal life." 1 John v. 20. "No murderer hath eternal life abiding in him." ib. iii. 15. This last passage is very conclusive on the point, and cannot be construed in ony other way. The apostle, speaking of the Word, and his incarnation, says: "In Him was life; and his life was the light of men." John i. 4. The same inspired writer also uses the expressions: "For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you THAT eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us." 1 John i. 2. And as this Grace, Light, and Life, (to which the epithet eternal so properly belongs,) may visit, influence, and animate us -as we may be placed in it as in a new capacity, power, or office, we may, by a mode of expression analogous to those cases already quoted, be said to be chosen, appointed, or ordained to it. But though this life itself is eternal, yet, after possessing it, we may be separated from it, and that separation be properly denominated death. (Vide Art. Perseverance.)

The meaning of the passage quoted from the Acts, I conceive, amounts simply to this: that as many as received or were invested with, or come under, the influence of the

Divine principle, "believed." For I cannot suppose that we are to infer any more from this passage, than that these Gentiles, on hearing the glad tidings of the Gospel, preached by the apostles, and under the influence of that grace which brings salvation, had become ingrafted into the true Church, and placed precisely on a footing with those to whom it was said: "If thou continue in his goodness-otherwise thou also shalt be cut off." *

We do not represent the Supreme Being, as bringing mankind into existence for the very purpose of making them miserable to all eternity; or calling on them for the performance of certain duties, and, at the same time, rendering obedience absolutely impossible; and punishing them to all eternity, for what was the effect of his own irresistible, secret will. Such an idea is too shocking to be ascribed to Infinite Goodness.

But if it be said that the disobedience of sinners, though under the direction of the secret will of God, is still voluntary; it may be replied, that this is too plain a contradiction to be offered to even the lowest capacity. As well might we talk of the voluntary act of a machine, or the voluntary or wilful movement of a cloud. It is all the effect of force, which the subject has neither power nor will to resist.

If it be said that the will of the creature is in accordance with the secret will of God: I answer, so much the more is he an object of acceptance, not of punishment. But

The passage here under discussion might be more correctly rendered, "As many as were disposed for eternal life believed;" or, "As many as were disposed (or prepared) believed in [the doctrine of] eternal life."

The original word (TTT) signifies to dispose or set in order as the ranks of an army; and seems in this place to "imply those whose well ordered minds were open to the candid examination and reception of Truth." It is not the term used to signify an eternal decree; nor is it employed to denote appointment to offices in the church, in the passages above alluded to, p. 62, 63. For a further elucidation of this text, the reader is referred to Horne's Introduction to the Scriptures, or Bevan's Life of Paul. ENG. ED.

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what ideas can men entertain of the Deity, who suppose that his secret and revealed will are different!—that He pretends to will one thing, and secretly wills another ;-that there is no reality in the revealed will, it is nothing but an appearance; and yet that an undeviating performance of the secret will, which is nothing more than his real will, is to draw down his judgments and everlasting wrath!!!

It has been urged by some, that God does not work without a plan-and that predestination is nothing more than the plan of Divine operations.

Suppose we admit that the Supreme Ruler of the universe does not work without a plan; it does not follow that unconditional election and reprobation is that plan. Such a conclusion could not be drawn without proving that such a plan would be consistent with the attributes of the Deity, and also, that the doctrine of free agency would not. But this has not been done. On the other hand, it may be urged, both from Scripture and from reason, that the plan which the Almighty has laid down for the government of his rational creatures, is, that man should be free to choose and to act-instructed in his duty, enabled to perform it, and made subject to the consequences.

It has also been supposed that, as the Deity foreknows all things what is certainly foreknown must certainly come to pass.

All those who have pretended to digest the doctrine into any thing like a system, and all who have held it so digested, have distinguished between the foreknowledge of the Deity, and his decrees. The one is an attribute, the other an act. The prescience of the Almighty is as much an attribute as his power, and must have existed from all eternity. But it would seem that a decree necessarily implied an act: an act necessarily required a time at which it was performed-begun and finished. But how will this accord with the idea of its having existed from all eternity?

And if the prescience existed before the decrees, then what is foreknown is not necessarily decreed. Calvin did

not rely on the argument of foreknowledge, to establish the doctrine of the decrees. At that day there was a doctrine which Calvin seemed more careful to oppose than that of free-will-it was the merit of works. And as he apprehended it might be supposed, that the Almighty, foreknowing the course of conduct which each individual would pursue, had fixed his election or reprobation, according to the works foreknown, he contended that the decrees were totally irrespective of the foreknowledge, or of the moral condition of the subjects.

In thus distinguishing between the decrees and the foreknowledge of God, and asserting that such decrees are not dependent on this foreknowledge, he entirely destroys the force of the argument which has been drawn from that For if the existence of such decrees be denied, those who confess that they are not dependent on foreknowledge, cannot refer to that foreknowledge as an evidence of their existence.

source.

Some of the disciples of Calvin explain his opinions by saying, that "Intelligent beings first determine on a purpose, and then know that it will be accomplished."

* His words are: "But many persons involve this doctrine in difficulties, and especially those who pretend to found it upon the Divine Prescience. Both of these things we establish, that God foresees all, and that He disposes of all; but we maintain that it confounds every thing, to subject the PREDESTINATION of God to his PRESCIENCE."

MACKENZIE'S LIFE OF CALVIN, p. 242. "We cannot suppose Him to have fore-known any thing, which He had not PREVIOUSLY decreed, without setting up a series of causes, EXTRA Deum, and making the Deity dependent for a great part of the knowledge He has, upon the will and works of his creatures, and upon a combination of circumstances exterior to Himself. Therefore, his determinate plan, counsel, and purpose, (i. e. his own predestination of causes and effects,) is the only basis of his fore-knowledge: which fore-knowledge could neither be certain nor independent, but as founded on his own ANTECEDENT decree."

TOPLADY, p. 100.

If we apply this proposition to the Deity, and it certainly can apply to no other being-it will follow, that his Prescience did not exist from all eternity. For that could not have been of eternal duration, which was preceded by any event whatever. Thus we are led back to a period, in which, according to this view, one of the attributes of the Deity did not exist.

In tracing these various arguments to their natural consequences, my mind revolts at the ideas which are necessarily excited. It is painful too, to my feelings, to canvass the principles of any society with freedom. I feel no sectarian animosity. I know and esteem many individuals who hold this very doctrine. But while I acknowledge the obligations of charity, I hope it will not be a cause of offence, if I am found also in the exercise of Christian solicitude for their eternal happiness. This solicitude prompts me to the investigation of the subject before us, and freely to develope its character and consequences.

And here I would drop a caution, against a boldness which is sometimes discoverable, in attempting to bring down Divine attributes to the level of human comprehension. It is done in the doctrines of infidelity, as well as in those of predestination. In the former it has been levelled against revealed religion, and all the mysteries it embraces; in the latter, it offers an indignity to the Divine character. Among the very objectionable consequences and imputations which necessarily follow from it, it represents the foreknowledge very far below perfection, by confining it merely to what is decreed. Besides this, it denies the justice and mercy of the Almighty. It is true the professors of the doctrine do not acknowledge these consequences, but they follow from it as inevitably as mathematical demonstrations.

And how dare we call these Divine attributes in question? Do not our very hopes of heaven and happiness