The Operations of War Explained and IllustratedW. Blackwood, 1872 - 479 עמודים |
מונחים וביטויים נפוצים
2d corps advance advanced-guard advantage adversary Alessandria Allies Archduke army operating artillery assailant assembled attack Austrian base battle Bernadotte Blucher bridge brigade Brussels campaign cavalry Centre Chzarnowsky columns commander concentrated cover crossed Danube Davout defeated defiles detached Dillingen directed division Elbe enemy enemy's flank followed force form front fortresses France French army frontier Garlasco guard Guarena Hohenlohe infantry invader Italy Jena Kienmayer Kray Lannes Left Wing Ligny line of communication magazines Marmont Memmingen Milan miles military Mincio Moreau Mortara moved movement Murat Napoleon Novara numbers object obstacles occupied offensive opposing parallel passage passed Pavia position Prussian army Quatre Bras Radetzky railways Ratisbon rear reinforced Reserve retired Rhine right bank Right Wing river roads Saal Salamanca Sardinians Sassello Schaffhausen secure side Soult St Cyr Stokach supplies territory theatre Ticino tion trains troops Turin valley Vercelli victory Vigevano Waterloo Wavre Weimar Wellington
קטעים בולטים
עמוד 21 - March, a reconuoissance of a large body of cavalry, with . some infantry, under command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Rappahannock, but the roads were in such condition, that, finding it impossible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to' return, after reaching Cedar Run.
עמוד 18 - Talavera we could not have gone farther, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle, but certainly afterwards.
עמוד 18 - But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit ; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad as the men.
עמוד 58 - The theatre of war," says Hamley, " is the province of strategy, the field of battle is the province of tactics.
עמוד 21 - ... continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been good. Under these circumstances an immediate pursuit was impossible.
עמוד 58 - It is the object of Strategy so to direct the movements of an army, that when decisive collisions occur it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage.
עמוד 91 - ... movements of its adversary. This principle with slight modifications applies to naval warfare. On the sea the coast cities — the resources— take the place of the " communications " on the land. If, therefore, two navies are manoeuvring against each other's coast cities, that navy whose coast cities are most immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary. As a matter of fact, then, the mere presence of the Spanish naval forces in San Juan Harbour,...
עמוד 448 - My own experience demonstrates the proper method to be: To march a regiment to the road, stack arms, loosen two rails opposite the right and two opposite the left of the regiment, then to heave the whole track, rails and ties, over, breaking it all to pieces, then pile the ties in the nature of crib •work and lay the rails over them, then by means of fence rails make a.