to circumstances. In examining, therefore, the relations of testimony to the marvellous, we are really investigating the method of weighing a probability on one side against an improbability on the other, and it is necessary in the outset to determine the grounds both of probability and improbability; i. e. it is necessary to discover how testimony as well as the object of testimony stands related to experience.

First, concerning the object of testimony. Improbability arises wholly from experience and consists in being in some way contrary to experience. That is to say, the moment anything is reported which differs from the general or uniform results of foregoing observations, an improbability, greater or less, is at once felt, and we scrutinize with caution the nature of the testimony on which it rests. This will be admitted by all But how can we graduate the degrees of improbability, so as to be able to weigh it against the testimony? What plan of classification of the varying shades of improbability can we find which shall prove at once accurate and practically useful? We admit the difficulty of the question; in fact we are ready to confess that in matters involving such an immense multitude and variety of details and attending circumstances as we have often to consider, especially in simple historical incidents, the laws of historical development having as yet been very imperfectly and partially established, the estimation of improbability cannot be made a matter of simple and definite determination by rule, but remains apparently a subject upon which equally good and instructed judgments differ. And yet it seems to us that the voice of nature answers the question in a manner at all times helpful and often thorough and decisive. For if improbability consists in contradicting experience, it increases with the amount of experience contradicted, and attains its maximum in going contrary to the largest amount of experience possible, i. e. in violating the widest and best established generalizations. The lowest degree of experience and, by consequence, of improbability has to do with the usual nature and actions of a particular individual; improbability increases as the contrariety extends to the characteristics of the species; and so on through the successive grades of classification. To illustrate: if an animal were reported to have acted in a manner very different from its usual and repeatedly observed manner, the improbability, though real, would be comparatively slight, and might be credited upon equally slight testimony, because of the unaccountable vagaries of individual action. But if the animal were reported to have done things entirely at variance with the observed habits of the species to which the animal had every other mark of belonging, the improbability would be much greater; though still testimony might easily set it aside, and in so doing would construct a variety, or perhaps a new species. But if the animal were reported to have violated some prominent mark or trait of the genus, the improbability in this case would be founded upon agreement in the observations of very many individuals of all the species constituting the genus, and would be, supposing an accurate, careful and advanced state of scientific observation and

But we

No certain

classification, of a very strong and positive nature. At every remove from the individual, uniformity is increased and ensured. Finally, if the animal be affirmed to have violated any marked distinguishing trait of the whole family or order, exhibited by all the numerous individuals that have been examined of all the species of all the genera constituting the family, the improbability is immense, it might almost be said, invincible and final in proportion to the accuracy of the scientific observation. Suppose we were told that a man in some New England village had lived a hundred and fifty years. We should be very sceptical about it until we had examined the testimony. might readily believe it, for it is wholly an individual matter. age is common to any one species of men, much less to the genus homo; and the general average that is maintained, evidently depends on contingent circumstances and is frequently much exceeded. But let us be told that a certain child, when a week old, delivered articulate sounds; and as this would contradict the mode and order of growth uniform to the whole genus homo, we could scarcely believe it on testimony absolutely unimpeachable. If finally we were assured that some woman became a mother without any union of the male and female principles, we should flatly refuse to listen to any evidence in the premises; for the alleged fact would violate not only the law obtaining in the genus homo, but the law prevailing without exception in the higher orders of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. This we take to be an intelligible, and in very many cases a practically useful, account of the growth of the various degrees of improbability; and if it should seem to any not conclusive, we are sure it can only be in consequence of the lack of that full appreciation of the significance of the terms employed, which, it is to be feared, only a long and careful scientific training can adequately supply.

Let us turn now to probability or inprobability as affecting the testimony. Call to mind the qualifications before laid down as necessary to a credible witness. They were, it will be remembered (Art. XI.), Honesty and Competency, the two implying that the witness does not deceive or is not himself deceived or mistaken. Testimony is probably true in proportion as these two qualifications are realized. But honesty and competency are not marks of the genus nomo as such; they are not even uniform charateristics of any particular species of man. It is obvious, therefore, that probability or improbability in reference to testimony is of the lowest order, that, namely, which attaches to variations from what is usual in the individual. What is individual, we repeat, can be no more than usual; for all that is uniform is included in the marks of the species or genus: and the degree of improbability, arising from the violation of the usual, is manifestly immensely less than that arising from the violation of the uniform. But it is said, Men are honest and competent very much more often than dishonest and incompetent. True, i. e. honesty and competency are usual; and being usual, are, in so far, probable, and it is this fact which saves the truth of testimony from being a matter of the most complete and indifferent chance. There is an antecedent probabil

ity in favor of testimony because it is found by experience, that facts and the narratives of witnesses usually agree in the most important particulars. It is admitted, moreover, that the usual has its varying degrees, just as the uniform has; i. e. it may be substantiated by a greater or less amount of observation. But we insist that the trustworthiness of testimony is only usual, not uniform; that there are many cases to the contrary; that each case must be examined on its own merits at last; that, in fine, in every respect, it is wholly individual, and capable, therefore, in so far, of only the lowest degree of probability. It is not to be forgotten, however, that testimony is able to increase its antecedent probability very considerably by multiplication of witnesses, by employment of skilled witnesses, etc., and it may be corroborated and strengthened by collateral and circumstantial evidence.

The problem now, at which we have fairly arrived, may be stated thus: If testimony affirm a fact which is extravagant, marvellous, in violation of general experience, what should be our state of mind with regard to it? The answer we take to be manifestly as follows: We should first carefully estimate the degree of improbability attaching to the alleged fact, deciding first whether it violate the usual or the uniform; and, if the former, how habitual or usual it is; if the latter, the degree of induction upon which the violated uniformity rests. We should then estimate the probability in favor of the testimony, by adding to its antecedent probability all circumstances tending to strengthen and confirm it. We have then only to weigh the improbability of the fact against the improbability of the falsity of the testimony; and the result is plain :-No fact can be regarded as established unless the falsity of the testimony be more improbable than the existence of the fact.

The next article will be occupied with a further elucidation and illustration of the same subject.

THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM.

REFERENCE has been made in two former numbers of THE FRIEND,*

briefly, to the Coming Time-to the liberation and high attainment and possession that the future must see. It cannot be doubted that in the sphere of historic inquiry there is to be a great advance, a freedom and fruitfulness of investigation that has never been approached hitherto. Much, very much, lies yet to be done; indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say

Articles: "The Coming Dispensation" and "The New and the Old," in Nos. for February and April, 1867.

that all remains, especially in the religious or ecclesiastical department, yet to be accomplished. We have had Christianity now for sixteen hundred years, a powerful institution, coloring and transforming much of the life of the civilized portions of the world; yet it is no disparagement to the labors of the past to affirm that thus far Christianity has never had its historian. The soul broad enough to take in the full fact, high and skilful enough to perceive its exact significance no more, no less-and tell it to mankind, has not yet come, certainly has not manifested himself.

What is the relation of this phenomenon, this wondrous fact in the centuries, to the permanent growth and thought of man, to his genuine enfranchisement and redemption? How far was it a true and substantial awakening of men's souls to the grand realities of life? how far, again, was it a fresh kindling of vapid enthusiasm, of wonder and extravagance, and fanatical belief, of which the world has had so many instances, a powerful excitation of the popular mind, sweeping all before it for the time being, but resting not really in intelligent and inspiring recognitions, and fruiting not, therefore, in regenerated life?

How did first Christianity relate to other more or less prevailing beliefs and usages of that time? Had it kinship, in origin, with the sect of the Essenes, a people who dwelt in the wilderness, were renunciants of the world, and had, so we read, all their possessions in common, and held much more exalted views of worship and of life than their fellow sects of that time generally? How about the multiplied sects that sprang up, almost instantly, in the bosom of the Church itself-numberless heresies and angry disputings that infected and distracted that body, and now show to us the strangest day-dreams and spectral illusions in the new religion? Were these early Christian fathers narrow, dogmatic, proscriptive, certainly before two centuries had passed, hardly less, many of them, the creatures of bigotry, than the zealous idolators and pagans about them who had instigated and inflicted the dreadful persecutions?

How did Christianity meet and look in the face philosophy? What was the greeting to each other of the Greek intellect and the fervent Hebrew soul? Could they do justice to each other, seek mutually mediation and blending? And how did the Christian faith treat the treasures of ancient thought, and those rich contributions to culture and life which, coming down from Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and their successors, had descended a precious legacy to all the ages? Did it welcome and gratefully appropriate and honor these, broadening out to a genuinely universal and human religion, transcending the incunabula of its birth, or did it draw back and encase itself in dogma and rite and incantation, until it became one of the veriest idolatries and usurpations the world has ever seen? And with all this, how much and what of it was inner, real, of substantial and vital value to mankind, there in the beginning, and there unextinguished to the end, amid all the changes and transformations that befell? How much of the worship and the

doctrine does embody elements that are living, at least normal and wholesome for the soul, and that shall therefore abide, have recognition and place in all coming culture?

It is plain that these questions have not yet had sufficient answer. There have been writers enough, narrators, authors in ecclesiastical history, who have undertaken to tell the story of Christianity, its birth and fortunes, venturing freely their judgment and assertion; but the true historian has not yet appeared. Perhaps it is too early to expect him, the qualifications must be so high. The fact has been not yet well apprehended. The writing thus far, with slight exception, has been strongly partisan in character, coming for most part from men prejudiced, committed, determined at any hazard to maintain and bolster up their side, to advocate and establish Christianity; or, on the other hand, from men revolted, embittered, determined to tear down and destroy. So, with much debate, and dispute, and dogmatizing, we have had little light and genuine exposition.

The

But as more clear and just views come in of religion, taking it in its broad, comprehensive, human character, there will be fresh examination and entirely new adjustment of these things. We have a new standard, the pure absolute Truth, before which all must be rigorously held up. No book, institution, or dispensation to measure by, no supreme interest in any thing outer. Copernican doctrine revolutionized all the old astronomy; new tables must be constructed from the foundation. So, under the new idea, the reconstruction entire of history, especially of ecclesiastical history, will be a necessity. There will be new readings, new apprehensions; men will look to see whether they have understood rightly, have done justice to the facts; and they will view things under relation more truly and clearly than ever before. What of Christianity—the institution, with its beliefs and observances, as we see it is vital, abiding, answering to the unquenched wants of the soul of man, let it be separated out, religiously preserved and held in all honor. What, on the other hand, is partial, of the time, of limitation, of prejudice, belonging to opinion, and not to thought, let it be divorced from the other and consigned to the rubbish or the Gehenna of flame. Having no supreme interest in any thing historic to protect, let us be loyal to the reality, working for the pure Truth, and not for a cause.

We shall find a tabula rasa, a clean tablet, all the judgments to be reopened and re-examined, and the verdicts perhaps generally reversed. One comes to suspect that the adverse side in the great controversy has not been fairly stated, that the opponents of Christianity, especially those who appeared from the ranks of philosophy, have not been justly and candidly presented. We feel curious to know what is the deliberate verdict in regard to Potamon, Ammonius Saccas, and their successors, especially as we have from their enemies hints which seem to afford glimpses of their true attitude. They undertook, it appears, to select and segregate, finding Christianity, as well as the surrounding paganism, guilty of extravagances and fables; and they