belief, I am unable to ascertain: I am not aware that the doctrine is taught in the Bible." Here he alludes in direct terms to the common doctrine, and expresses his dissent from it. But what does he hold? "Adam," says he, "was the natural head of the human race, and his sin has involved them in its consequences; but not on the principle. that his sin is literally accounted their sin." [Quære: Who does maintain this opinion?] "The truth," he adds, "is simply this: that from the relation in which he stood as their natural head, as a matter of fact, his sin has resulted in the sin and ruin of his posterity." Then follows what we first quoted. Thus it appears that though he employs the terms covenant of works, he rejects the doctrine which is generally entertained by those who use them. He intends one thing by them, and they another.

Mr. Barnes, in the seventh edition of his Notes on the Romans, (p. 128,) uses the word impute, in reference to the guilt of Adam's first sin; though by a comparison between his remarks here, and some which are found in other parts of the book, it is evident he attaches a different meaning to the word, from what is common among Calvinistic wriHe says, (p. 95,) "I have examined all the passages" where the word occurs in the Old Testament, " and as the result of my examination, have come to the conclusion that there is not one in which the word is used in the sense of reckoning or imputing

ters.

to a man that which does not strictly belong to him; or of charging on him that which ought not to be charged on him as a matter of personal right. The word is never used to denote imputing in the sense of transferring, or of charging that on one which does not properly belong to him. The same is the case in the New Testament. The word occurs about forty times, and in a similar signification. No doctrine of transferring, or of setting over to a man what does not properly belong to him, be it sin or holiness, can be derived, therefore, from this word."

The transfer of the moral turpitude of Adam's sin is no part of the doctrine, as held by its advocates-but this is not what Mr. Barnes intends to deny; because he expressly informs us that by transferring he means. "setting over to a man what does not properly belong to him." The word impute, then, according to him, is never used in the sense of "setting over to a man what does not properly belong to him"-i. e. what "ought not to be charged on him as a matter of personal right." Nor is this doctrine taught in any of these passages. How different is this from the language of Turretin and Owen, as quoted by Dr. Hodge. "Imputation," says the former, "is either of something foreign to us, or of something properly our own. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours; in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is without us,and not

performed by ourselves; thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins are imputed to him, although he has neither sin in himself, nor we righteousness. Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not the former, because we are talking of a sin committed by Adam, and not by us. . . The foundation, therefore, of imputation, is not only the natural connexion which exists between us and Adam, since, in that case, all his sins might be imputed to us, but mainly the moral and federal, in virtue of which God entered into covenant with him as our head." Owen says, "Things which are not our own originally, inherently, may yet be imputed to us, ex justitia, by the rule of righteousness. And this may be done. upon a double relation unto those whose they are. 1. Federal. 2. Natural. Things done by one may be imputed unto others, propter relationem fœderalem, because of a covenant relation between them. So the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity. And the ground hereof is, that we stood in the same covenant with him who was our head and representative.". . . . "Nothing is intended by the imputation of sin unto any, but the rendering them justly obnoxious unto the punishment due unto that sin."

Though, therefore, Mr. Barnes uses the word impute, he does not mean with these authors, that Adam's posterity were rendered legally liable to punishment on account of his sin; but only that they are "subject to pain,

and death, and depravity, as the consequence of his sin;" "subject to depravity as the consequence;" i. e. liable to become depraved as soon as they arrive at moral agency, on account of their being descended from Adam who was "the head of the race;" and who having sinned, "secured as a certain result that all the race will be sinners also;" such being "the organization of the great society of which he was the head and father." "The drunkard," says he, "secures as a result, commonly, that his family will be reduced to beggary, want and wo. A pirate, or a traitor, will whelm not himself only, but his family in ruin. Such is the great law or constitution, on which society is now organized; and we are not to be surprised that the same principle occurred in the primary organization of human affairs." Is this the sense in which our Confession of Faith uses the word impute? I will leave it for the reader to judge.

Professor Fitch of New Haven has not laid aside the phrase original sin, though the whole drift of his discourses on the nature of sin is inconsistent with the common doctrine, and was doubtless intended to overthrow it. If it be true, according to him, "that sin, in every form and instance, is reducible to the act of a moral agent, in which he violates a known rule of duty," how can it be possible that there is any such thing as is called by President Edwards, "the innate sinful depravity of the heart?" Professor Fitch does

not pretend that there is—and yet he would make his readers believe that he holds to original sin, and he tells us in one of his inferences, that "the subject may assist us in making a right explanation of the doctrine." And what is it? "Nothing can in truth be called original sin, but his first moral choice, or preference being evil." One can hardly exculpate him from disingenuousness in retaining the terms, after having adopted principles subversive of their clear import; and then employing them in a sense materially different from common and long established usage. He must certainly have known that his definition of original sin is strikingly at variance with that of Calvin; who describes it as "an hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through every part of the soul, which first makes us obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then produces those works which the Scriptures denominate the works of the flesh."

We have extended these remarks so much beyond what we anticipated, that the quotations we intended to make in proof of our statement concerning the New School doctrines, must be reserved for another chapter. We will therefore close the present chapter with a few appropriate and forcible observations of Dr. Miller, taken from his Letters to Presbyterians. After enumerating most of the New School doctrines which are brought to view in this chapter and some others which we shall notice hereafter, he says: "If Pela