from God's freedom, independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state, or manner of acting; or as implying any infirmity, restraint, or subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory too much.

SECTION VIII.

SOME FURTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE MORAL NECESSITY OF GOD'S VOLITIONS CONSIDERED.

THE author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishonour, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from necessity: notwithstanding all that can be objected from the agreement of such a necessity with the fate of the Stoics, and the necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different things among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness or preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonour, or any thing, in any respect, unworthy or unbecoming of God, for his will to be necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the argument, from the unsuitableness

of such a necessity to the liberty, supremacy, independence, and glory of the Divine Being; and a resting the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point wholly diverse, viz. whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible things which are in God's view, and may be considered as capable objects of his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing above another. This is denied by this author, who supposes that, in many instances, between two or more possible things which come within the view of the Divine mind, there is a perfect indifference and equality, as to fitness or tendency, to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his designs. Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident.

The arguments brought to prove this are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that, in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of choice, which God has in view: and, (2.) that the difference between many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any consequence, or to suppose that any of God's wise designs would not be answered in one way as well as the other. Therefore,

I. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference between different objects of choice, that are proposed to the Divine understanding?

And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed,

does not give reason to suspect that there is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired, whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of choice? If there be absolutely no difference, in any respect, then there is no variety or distinction; for distinction is only by some difference. And if there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or difference of determination. For that determination of a thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but the same. That this is no quibble, may appear more fully anon.

The arguments to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly without difference, are two.

1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another; and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects, between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.

Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so; or a succession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely long series: which must needs be a groundless imagination. The eternal dura

tion which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's existence; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once; vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio. Which is so generally allowed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it.*

So, this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable as that now mentioned of absolute and infinite duration. It is as improper to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one

"If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or succession of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity

is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda supervenit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately existing. This is the common notion; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is nothing but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity the necessary existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no change or succession in his nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case; first, we find succession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself; which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the Eternal Being; and suppose it, one knows not what, a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one minute after another. This is the work of pure imagination, and con

beyond another, as that the infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after another. A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case as the other; and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine existence, and mile-squares of Deity: and we equally deceive ourselves when we talk of the world's being differently fixed, with respect to either of these sorts of measures. I think we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity: and all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of

trary to the reality of things. Hence the common metaphorical expressions; Time runs a-pace, let us lay hold on the present minute, and the like. The philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustration. They compare eternity to the motion of a point running on for ever, and making a traceless infinite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present minute; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it; that is, they ascribe motion to a mere nonentity, to illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up of finite successive parts.—If once we allow an all-perfect Mind, which hath an eternal immutable, and infinite comprehension of all things always, (and allow it we must), the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a Mind. In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio; how much soever this may have been a paradox hitherto." ·Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, vol. ii. pp. 409–411. Edit. 3.