be faved by the reluctance of the nobility to adopt the caprices, or to yield to the vehemence of the common people. In expecting this advantage from an order of nobles, we do not fuppofe the nobility to be more unprejudiced than others; we only fup pofe that their prejudices will be different from, and may occafionally counteract thofe of others. If the perfonal privileges of the peerage, which are ufually fo many injuries to the reft of the community, be refrained, I fee little inconveniency in the increase of its number; for it is only dividing the fame quantity of power amongst more hands, which is rather favourable to public freedom, than otherwife. The admiffion of a fmall number of ecclefiaftics into the house of lords, is but an equitable compenfation to the clergy for the exclufion of their order from the houfe of commons. They are a fet of men confiderable by their number and property, as well as by their influence, and the duties of their ftation; yet, whilft every other profeffion has those amongst the national reprefentatives, who, being converfant in the fame occupation, are able to ftate, and naturally difpofed to fupport, the rights and interefts of the clafs and calling to which they belong, the clergy alone are deprived of this advantage. Which hardship is made up to them by introducing the prelacy into parliament; and if bishops, from gratitude or expectation, be more obfequious to the will of the crown, than thofe who poffefs great temporal inheritances, they are properly inferted into that part of the conftitution, from which much or frequent refiftance to the measures of government is not expected. I acknowledge, that I perceive no fufficient reafon for exempting the perfons of members of either houfe of parliament from arreft for debt. The counfels or fuffrage of a fingle fenator, efpecially of one one who in the management of his own affairs may justly be fufpected of a want of prudence or ho nefty, can feldom be fo neceffary to thofe of the public as to juftify a departure from that wholefome policy, by which the laws of a commercial ftate punish and ftigmatize infolvency. But whatever reafon may be pleaded for their perfonal immunity, when this privilege of parliament is extended to domeftics and retainers, or when it is permitted to impede or delay the courfe of judicial proceedings, it becomes an abfurd facrifice of equal juftice to imaginary dignity. There is nothing, in the British conftitution, fo remarkable, as the irregularity of the popular reprefentation. The houfe of commons confifts of five hundred and forty eight members, of whom two hundred are elected by feven thousand conftituents fo that a majority of these feven thoufand, with any reasonable title to fuperior weight or influ ence in the ftate, may, under certain circumftances. decide a queftion against the opinion of as many millions. Or, to place the fame object in another point of view: if my eftate be fituated in one county of the kingdom, I poffefs the ten thoufandth part of a fingle reprefentative; if in another, the thoufandth; if in a particular diftrict, I may be one in twenty who choose two reprefentatives; if in a still more favoured fpot, I may enjoy the right of appointing two myfelf. If I have been born, or dwell, or have ferved an apprenticeship in one town, I am reprefented in the national affembly by two deputies, in the choice of whom, I exercife an actual and fenfible fhare of power; if accident has thrown my birth or habitation, or fervice into another town, I have no representative at all, nor more power or concern in the election of those who make the laws, by which I am governed, than if I was a fubject of the Grand Signior-and this partiality fubfifts 2 fubfifts without any pretence whatever of merit or of propriety to juftify the preference of one place to another. Or, thirdly, to defcribe the ftate of national reprefentation as it exifts in reality, it may be affirmed, I believe, with truth, that about one half of the house of commons obtain their feats in that affembly by the election of the people, the other half by purchafe, or by the nomination of fingle proprietors of great estates. This is a flagrant incongruity in the conftitution; but it is one of thofe objections which ftrike most forcibly at firft fight. The effect of all reafoning upon the fubject is to diminish the first impreffion: on which account it deferves the more attentive examination, that we may be affured, before we adventure upon a reformation, that the magnitude of the evil juftifies the danger of the experiment. In the few remarks that follow, we would be underftood, in the firft place, to decline all conference with thofe who wish to alter the form of government of thefe kingdoms. The reformers with whom we have to do, are they, who, whilft they change this part of the fyftem, would retain the relt. If any Englishman expect more happiness to his country under a republic, he may very confently recommend a new modelling of elections to parliament; becaufe, if the king and houfe of lords were laid afide, the prefent difproportionate reprefentation would produce nothing but a confused and ill-digefted oligarchy. In like manner we wave a controverfy with those writers who infift upon reprefentation as a natural right: we confider it fo If this sight be natural, no doubt it must be equal, and the right, w♣ may add, of one fex, as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of reprefentation, that we have heard of, begins, by excluding the votes of women thus cutting off, at a fingle ftroke, one half of the public from a right which is afferted to be inhe rent in all; a right too, as fome reprefent it, not only aniverfal, but unalienable and indefeasible. far far only as a right at all, as it conduces to public utility; that is, as it contributes to the establishment of good laws, or as it fecures to the people the juft administration of thefe laws. Thefe effects depend upon the difpofition' and abilities of the national counsellors. Wherefore, if men the most likely by their qualifications to know and to promote the public intereft, be actually returned to parliament, it fignifies little who return them. If the propereft perfons be elected, what matters it by whom they are elected? At least, no prudent ftatefman would fubvert long established or even fettled rules of reprefentation, without a profpect of procuring wifer or better reprefentatives. This then being well obferved, let us, before we feek to obtain any thing more, confider duly what we already have. We have a house of commons compofed of five hundred and fortyeight members, in which number are found, the moft confiderable landholders and merchants of the kingdom; the heads of the army, the navy, and the law; the occupiers of great offices of the state; together with many private individuals, eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, or activity. Now, if the country be not fafe in fuch hands, in whofe may it confide its interefts? If fuch a number of fuch men be liable to the influence of corrupt motives, what affembly of men will be fecure from the fame danger? Does any new scheme of reprefentation promise to collect together more wifdom, or to produce firmer integrity? In this view of the fubject, and attending not to ideas of order and proportion (of which many minds are much enamoured), but to effects alone, we may discover juft excufes for thofe parts of the present representation, which appears to a hafty obferver most exceptionable and abfurd. It fhould be remembered as a maxim extremely applicable to this fubject, that no order or affembly of men whatever can long maintain their place and authority authority in a mixed government, of which the wenders do Lot rudividually poffefs a refpectable thate of vercial inporance. Now, whatever may K de velos of the present arrangement, it infalIl tours a great weight of property to the houfe RADNA by rendering my fears in that houfe 800.2010 more forma ed to fuch ma 200 Avete meristable characters are engaged ms and boterefts of IN J Jar the bet able to |