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a defpicable figure does a perfon make, upon whom the fame motive has great influence at one time, and very little at another? He is a bad member of fociety, and cannot be rely'd on as a friend or as an affociate. But how highly rational is this fuppofed perfon, compared with one who can act in contradiction to every motive? The former may be termed whimsical or capricious: the latter is worfe; he is abfolutely unaccountable, and cannot be the fubject of government, more than a lump of matter unconfcious of its own motion.

Let the faculty of acting be compared with that of reafoning: the comparifon will reconcile every unbiaffed mind to the neceffary influence of motives. A man is tied by his nature to form conclufions upon what appears to him true at the time. This indeed does not always fecure him against error; but would he be more fecure by a power to form conclufions contrary to what appears true? Such a power would make him a moft abfurd reafoner. Would he be less abfurd in acting, if he had a power to act against motives, and contrary to what he thinks right or eligible? To act in that manner, is inconfiftent with any notion we notion we can form of a sensible being. Nor do we fuppofe that man is fuch a being in accounting for any action, however whimfical, we always afcribe it to fome motive; never once dreaming that there was no motive.

And after all, where would be the advantage of fuch an arbitrary power? Can a rational man wish seriously to have fuch a power? or can he feriously think, that God would make man fo whimsical a being? To endue man with a degree of felf-command fufficient to refift every vitious motive, without any power to refift thofe that are virtuous, would indeed be a valuable gift; too valuable indeed for man, because it would

exalt him to be an angel. But fuch felf-command as to refift both equally, which is the prefent fuppofition, would be a great curfe, as it would unqualify us for being governed either by God or by man. Better far to be led as rational creatures by the prospect of good, however erroneous our judgment may fometimes be.

While all other animals are fubjected to divine government and unerringly fulfil their deftination, and confidering that man is the only terref trial being who is formed to know his Maker and to worship him; will it not found harfh that he alone fhould be withdrawn from divine government? The power of refifting the strongest motives, whether of religion or morality, would render him independent of the Deity.

This reafoning is too diffufe: if it can be comprehended in a fingle view, it will make the deeper impreffion. There may be conceived different fyftems for governing man as a thinking and rational being. One is, That virtuous motives fhould always prevail over every other motive. This, in appearance, would be the most perfect government: but man is not fo conftituted; and there is reafon to doubt, whether fuch perfection would in his prefent ftate correfpond to the other branches of his nature (a). Another fyftem is, That virtuous motives fometims prevail, fometimes vicious; and that we are always determined by the prevailing motive. This is the true fyftem of nature; and hence great variety of character and of conduct among men. A third fyftem is, That motives have influence; but that one can act in contradiction to every motive. This is the fyftem I have been combating. Obferve only

what it refolves into. How is an action to be accounted for that is done in contradiction to every motive? It wanders from the region of com

(a) See book 2. fketch 1. at the end.

mon

mon sense into that of mere chance. If fuch were the nature of man, no one could rely on another a promise or an oath would be a rope of fand: the utmost cordiality between two friends would be no fecurity to either against the other: the first weapon that comes in the way might be lethal. Would any man wish to have been formed according to fuch a model? He would probably wish to have been formed according to the model first mentioned: but that is denied him, virtuous motives fometimes prevailing, fometimes vicious; and from the wifdom of Providence we have reafon to believe, that this law is of all the best fitted for man in his present state.

To conclude this branch of the fubject: In none of the works of Providence, as far as we can penetrate, is there difplayed a deeper reach of art. and wisdom, than in the laws of action peculiar to man as a thinking and rational being. Were he left loose to act in contradiction to motives, there would be no place for prudence, forefight, nor for adjusting means to an end: it could not be forefeen by others what a man would do the next hour; nay it could not be forefeen even by himfelf. Man would not be capable of rewards and punishments he would not be fitted, either for divine or for human government: he would be a creature that has no refemblance to the human race. But man is not left loofe; for though he is at liberty to act according to his own will, yet his will is regulated by defire, and defire by what pleafes and difpleafes. This connection preferves uniformity of conduct, and confines human actions within the great chain of caufes and effects. By this admirable fyftem, liberty and neceffity, feemingly. incompatible, are made perfectly concordant, fitting us for fociety, and for government both human and divine.

Having explained the laws that govern human actions; we proceed to what is chiefly intended in the prefent fection, which is, to examine how far the moral fentiments handled in the foregoing fection are confiftent with thefe laws. Let it be kept in view, that the perception of a right and a wrong in actions, is founded entirely upon the moral fenfe. And that upon the fame fenfe are founded the fentiments of approbation and praise when a man does right, and of difapprobation and blame when he does wrong. Were we deftitute of the moral fenfe, right and wrong, praife and blame, would be as little understood as colours are by one born blind *.

The formidable argument urged to prove that our moral fentiments are inconfiftent with the fuppofed neceffary influence of motives, is what follows. "If motives have a neceffary influence on "our actions, there can be no good reafon to "praise a man for doing right, nor blame him "for doing wrong. What foundation can there "be either for praife or blame, when it was "not in a man's power to have acted otherwife? "A man commits murder, inftigated by a fud"den fit of revenge: why fhould he be punish"ed, if he acted neceffarily, and could not re

fift the violence of the paffion?" Here it is fuppofed, that a power of refiftance is effential to praise and blame. But upon examination it will be found, that this fuppofition has not any fupport in

the

In an intricate subject like the prefent, great care should be taken to avoid ambiguities. The term praise has two different fignifications: in one fense it is opposed to blame; in another to difpraife. In the former sense it expreffes a moral fentiment: in the latter, it expreffes only the approving any object that pleases me. I praise one man for his candour, and blame another for being a double-dealer. Thefe, both of them, imply will and intention. I praise a man for being acute; but for being dull, I only difpraise him. I praise a woman for beauty; but blame not any for ugliness, I only difpraise them. None of thefe particulars imply will or intention.

the moral fenfe, nor in reafon, nor in the common. fenfe of mankind.

With refpect to the firft, the moral fenfe, as we have feen above, places innocence and guilt and confequently praife and blame, entirely upon will and intention. The connection between the motive and the action, fo far from diminishing, enhances the praife or blame. or blame. The greater influence a virtuous motive has, the greater is the virtue of the actor, and the more warm our praife. On the other hand, the greater influence a vitious motive has, the greater is the vice of the act-" er, and the more violently do we blame him,, As this is the cardinal point, I wish to have it confidered in a general view. It is effential both to human and divine government, that the influence of motives fhould be neceffary. It is equally ef fential, that that neceflary influence fhould not have the effect to leffen guilt in the eftimation of men. To fulfil both ends, guilt is placed by the moral, fenfe entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himfelf for doing mifchief willingly and intentionally, without once confidering whether he acted neceflarily or not. And his fentiments are adopted by all the world: they pronounce the fame fentence of condemnation that he himself does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the fecrets of his party: another does the fame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty of a crime, and yet the bribe perhaps operated as ftrongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled against his will to reveal the fecrets of his party; and therefore is innocent: the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great fum. of money; and therefore is guilty.

With refpect to reafon, I obferve, that the moral fenfe is the only judge in this controverfy, not

the