תמונות בעמוד
PDF
ePub
[graphic][merged small]

SOMETIME CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT PRESIDENT OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

[graphic][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][ocr errors][merged small]
[merged small][merged small][graphic][graphic][merged small][merged small][merged small]
[ocr errors]

MARCH, 1922

The Aftermath of the Conference

OPULAR satisfaction for the success of the Conference is still in its sentimental stage; the final judgment has to be reserved for the future historian. Men are disposed to accord excessive credit to this Conference because it was held far enough from the atmosphere of Paris but near enough in the recollection of its fail ure. The formal close of this memorable gathering did not mean the end of its work. Indeed, as critical observers of Washington rightly pointed out that the great danger with this Conference was its indulgence in theory, its agreement "in principle." Proposals were written in exquisite style; catching phrases evoked a smiling assent. In Paris, secrecy predominated; in Washington principles overflew. In Paris few knew the inside working of the Conference; in Washington all craved for publicity. "Sovereignty", "independence", and "integrity" were

No. 5

formidable terms. To subscribe to these
terms was one thing, to see them strict-
ly applied in their details was quite
another.
another. With one exception-the re-
spect of China's neutrality in war time
where violation would be clearly
noticeable, the terms of the Nine Pow-
er Treaty are susceptible of different
interpretation. And evasion is just as
bad as trespass.

The main reason why the friends of China were reticent at the Conference was that China was politically unstable, morally corrupt, and financially insolvent. It would be fair therefore to see what China has yet to do after the Conference. The victory, if we may call it and be it remembered that it is given and not won, is not at all reassuring. China has to show that justice is properly administered, an efficient postal system is maintained, likin is to be abolished, military forces are reduced, and foreign troops are made un

necessary. In connection with the Shantung settlement, the funds for the redemption of the railway are yet to be raised, a responsible local government is to be set up and proper training is to be given to the successors of the Japanese traffic manager and accountant. A colossal task is ahead of China. It will surely take years for China to justify herself for her yearning for justice. China's salvation does not lie in the frequency or liberality of Conferences. A nation can not forever live on charity.

On the part of the other powers, it remains for them to vindicate their consistent adherence to the resolutions to which their authorized representatives assented in the Conference. The questions of the arms embago and the Chinese Eastern Railway are to be settled through diplomatic channels. An equitable settlement will add much to the record of this Conference. They have yet to withdraw their postal agencies, troops, and radio stations such as specified in the resolutions adopted by the Conference promptly and faithfully. It speaks well for the prestige and dignity of the powers to see that the terms of these treaties are actually and effectively executed.

Much of the work of the Conference has been left to commissions. There is the commission "to inquire into the present practice of extra-territorial juisdiction in China, and into the laws and the judical system and the methods of judicial administration of China." Our hope is that the commission, while assisting and furthering the efforts of the Chinese Government towards the attainment of her expressed desire to reform her judicial system, will not lose sight of the improvements that China has already made in the administration of justice. A fair and favorable report of the commission, uninfluenced by adverse criticisms which are to be expected from the resident traders of the respective powers, will do much to wards the progressive relinquishment of the rights of extra-territoriality.

There is the tariff commission which shall meet at Shanghai to effect the re

vised rates of duty such as agreed upon by the Conference. Then is the Special Conference "to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin, to authorize the levying of a surtax on dutiable imports and to give practical effect to the principles of uniformity in the rates of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China. For over half a century, China had been deprived of one of the main sources of her revenue. None can be more anxious than the Chinese to see that the increase of revenue which will result from the revision is properly spent.

The smooth working of this special Conference must be one of the potent factors in the reorganization of China's finances.

There, too, is the Board of Reference about which there is much misunderstanding and speculation. It is not a foreign court of supervision. Nor yet is it a court of arbitration. It is an instrument through which any controversy relating to the principles of Open Door may be settled. The principles are so broad, that difficulties of interpretation are bound to arise. It is expedient as well as economic to inquire into such difficulties and to refer them to the Board for settlement. Instead of the United States bearing the responsibility alone all the contracting parties as well as those who express their willingness to adhere to the present Treaty are made equally duty-bound to observe this principle. If the Board actually functions, as we hope it will, this time-worn principle which has been advocated on many occasions and broken as often, will have less chances of being disregarded.

There is, finally, the joint Sino-Japanese Commission to carry out the detailed arrangements relating to the transfer of the administration of the former German leased territory of Kiaochow and to the transfer of public properties in the said territory and to settle other matters likewise requiring adjustment. Upon the harmonious cooperation of the Commissioners of both countries depends a speedy and

amicable end of seven years' unpleasant experiences.

The world is now watching Japan with critical eyes, especially so because she maintains status quo in Manchuria and has been assured of her Pacific possessions. It is incumbent on her to respect the pledges which she has so deliberately given. She has yet to convince the world that her intention of withdrawal from Shantung and

Siberia is a sincere one, and that she does not mean to defy the moral sentiment of the enlightened public.

Thus the work of the Washington Conference is only half done. The practical half is really more arduous if not more difficult. If the various commissions can conclude their work just as palpably and satisfactorily as the Far Eastern Committee did theirs, then they would cast a pleasant reflection on the work of this Conference.

Τ

The Last Episode of the Shantung Question

a

HE settlement of the Shantung question was generally considered as the crowning achievement of the Washington Conference. When Mr. Hughes announced at the last plenary session that the Chinese and Japanese delegates had signed treaty relating to Shantung, the audience gave expression to unreserved ecstasy. Doubtless it was one of the triumphant moments in the life of Mr. Hughes. To those who have watched the Far Eastern situation with concern, it was a relief. To the partisan, it was a Republican victory. To the sentimentalists, it was an American success. A question which had stirred the whole world, a question which had elicited the moral and political judgments of all contemporary statesmen, a question which remained unsettled during the last seven years was finally and amicably settled to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. It was not a mere accident. It must be, as an average American would say, attributed to the peculiar atmosphere of Washington hitherto untainted by secrecy and intrigue. Men could still recall the days of Versailles, and not unnaturally they began to study the difference between the two conferences, between Mr. Hughes and Mr. Wilson.

The collateral conversations on Shantung really formed an important part of the whole Conference. Men were too conscious of the consequences of its

Press

settlement or non-settlement. reporters, members of the different delegations, students, and the general public cared more for the results of these discussions than anything else. This was particularly true as the Conference drew toward its close. The anxiety on the part of the spectators became more manifest; the solicitude of the Republican Administration more apparent. When the final agreement on the railway was made known, the mission of the Conference was thought to have been admirably fulfilled.

These conversations between the two delegations were, indeed, peculiarly interesting in many ways. They had more meetings than any other committee and two of those meetings actually lasted from three in the afternoon till ten in the evening. The Chinese delegates with their secretaries and technical experts occupied one side of the table while the Japanese delegates and their staff the other. Two American observers,-Mr. MacMurray and Mr. Bell-and two British observers,-Sir John Jordan, later succeeded by Mr. Gwatkin, and Mr. Lampson,-sat at the end of the table. Throughout, the conversations were conducted in the most frank, and, with the exception of two or three occasions, friendly man

ner.

In general the Japanese proposals of September 7, 1921, were taken as the basis of discussion. The transfer of

« הקודםהמשך »