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S the day approaches for the assembling of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments, public attention is directed more and more upon the problems affecting China. For the aspiration of that Republic to gain a position of full sovereignty like that of other nations together with the imperialistic ambition of Japan constitute the great outstanding feature of the Conference. Indeed, the peace of the world depends upon a settlement of this situation, a settlement which must be satisfactory to China.

There are indications that the Cantonese government of the South and the Peking government are coming into agreement for the sake of the nation's salvation, and that the delegation that will come to Washington will represent a unified China, so that there will no longer be any validity to the argument advanced by the Japanese that she will be unable to discuss in the Conference her relations with a country which has no government.

The world knows that China will enter the Conference with the United States as her staunch friend. She

comes, also, as a new self governing

nation which the Versailles Conference declared itself bound to protect. Without any question the Shantung situation will be presented and it will be decided in favor of China. Public opinion in the United States may be said to be unanimously in favor of China in that controversy. The facts, the evidence and the principles of international law are all on the side of China.

A great international lawyer said to the writer recently, "If you have a leased apartment and desire to sublet

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it you must get the consent of the ownOr if an enemy comes into the apartment and drives you out, the enemy cannot legally hold the premises, for you are the owner of the lease." many held a lease of the Kiao Chau Peninsula. Overcome by Japan the lease of Germany naturally vanished and the title or ownership reverted to China. The case is perfectly clear.

Moreover, the Versailles treaty gave to Japan only the rights in Shantung which were owned by Germany. Japan agreed to this settlement, although China did not. But since the signing of the treaty, Japan not only refused to return Shantung to China, but has made many other encroachments upon the sovereignty of her neighbor. The nations which will be represented in the Washington Conference know all these facts.

But about Japan. The record reveals that she never has gained any territory by diplomacy. All her gains have come by the use of force. She seized Korea, Port Arthur and Formosa.

At the time Viscount Ishii entered the terms of which Japan was to act as into the Lansing-Ishii agreement under the good friend of China and protect her, Japan had already entered into secret agreements with Great Britain, France and Italy under which they were to stand with Japan in her Chinese claims.

She urges the necessity of over population as the excuse for expanding and gaining more territory in Asia. She has not colonized either Formosa, Mongolia or Manchuria. Her population is less in proportion to her territory than that of many nations in Europe, yet we

do not hear these nations crying for expansion.

The fact is that all of Japan's energies are directed towards the increase of her imperial and economic power, and back of her over population argument is simply an overweaning greed.

Her delegates are coming to Washington hoping to deceive the diplomatists who will be assembled here. She will not succeed, for they know the facts.

The United States desires to maintain the policy of John Hay in China.

She wants China to be untrammeled and to be in a position to work out her national destiny. She wants all the powers who have special privileges in China to readjust their relations so as to be in harmony with China's dignity as a sovereign state.

Japan must be held in leash and must not be permitted to encroach further upon the rights of China. She must be forced to get out of Shantung and restore the peninsula to its sovereign

owner.

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AJOLEMENT and dissimilation distinguish Japanese diplomacy in Europe and America, force and threat describe its working in Asia. On August 24th., 1914, Okuma sent a special message to the American people, saying, "as premier of Japan I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess. My government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps promises." And "as Japan always keeps promises," the Twenty-One Demands resulted within a year of that "promise"! Might the Lansing-Ishii agreement be a "promise" of this sort? Certain facts which were not known then, not even to Mr. Lansing himself, have been recently revealed as to make the purposes and intentions of the Lansing-Ishii agreement very clear to the historian.

During the World War, the one avowed aim of Japan was to take the unusual advantage of every changing or changed war situation; so as to isolate China and to exploit her boldly. After the great Russian retreat before the massed artillery offensive on the German eastern front, after the fall of Vilna, Russia began to exhaust in man and munition; and Japan initiated the SazonovMotono agreement signed in 1916. was a repetition of the previous secret treaties of 1907, 1910 and 1912; and it was done without the knowledge of America and China but with the British assent. It was a crime in China to excel the British crime in Persia in 1914. With the inpending Revolution

early in 1917, the strength of the Allies was considerably weakened and the Allies were in dire need of Japanese assistance in European waters. It was then the best time for Japan to bargain for, as he has succeeded, her secret treaties with Britain and France. Without a knowledge of these secret treaties, one can hardly grasp the full meaning of Motono's speech at that time. As he asserted, "nobody disputes that Japan occupies a special position in China." But he continued, "In safeguarding our own interests, we must respect carefully those of others, and we must try first of all to move in accord with other powers with whom we have special agreements and try to reconcile our interests with those of other nations."

What Japan tried to have was a bargain in which she has more advantage than the other party, or a bargain, as the Ishii-Lansing agreement, in which Japan secures the oyster and gives up the shells. In 1917, Japan was supporting the An-Fu Clique in Peking in the hope of snatching away the Fifth Group of the Twenty-One Demands. The Allies were tied up by secret agreements; the only fear of Japan would have been the United States, with whom the Japanese might have sought for a certain agreement even America had not gone to the European war. fifth item of the Root-Takahira notes of Nov. 30, 1908, reads, "Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or principle of equal opportunity, as above defined, it remains for the two governments to communicate with each other, in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take." But when the United States did

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go to war, Japan saw her long desired opportunity. Busily engaged in war as she was, the United States could hardly afford time carefully to study the Far Eastern question. It was at this historical and tragical moment that the magical statesman of Japan was able to make, with a lot of camouflage, the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement.

After the fashion of war mission to America headed by Balfour for the British, and Joffre and Viviani for the French, came the Japanese mission which had no specific negotiations for either military or financial matters. As Ishii, on his arrival in Washington, told the Associated Press, there were only two purposes of the coming of his mission to convey congratulations to U. S. for her entrance to war and to determine how best to cooperate with United States in the War. He asserted, He asserted, "Japan is entirely unselfish in her aims.' When he solemnly spoke to the United States Senate that Japan "did not enter this war because any selfish interest to promote or any ill conceived ambition to gratify," the secret agreements between Japan and the Allies had been signed almost a year. Only at present do we see that the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the chief product of the mission, was to complete that series of agreements which, more than any other single group of acts, were to destroy the Chinese confidence and to obstruct the American success in the Paris confer

ence.

The Japanese ambassador in London told the British that the Lansing-Ishii agreement was to defeat "German machination," and was to prove the "resolute solidarity" of the Allies. The British public believed it. And when Ishii declared, at the N. Y. municipal banquet, Sept. 29, 1917, "at no time in the past and at no time in the future do we, or will we, seek to take territory from China or to despoil China of her rights," most of the Americans forgot their official protest against the TwentyOne Demands on China of two years before. Quoting Charles Summer's "moral elevation" and "true grandeur

of humanity," Ishii concluded his speech in the Boston State House by confirming that justice and happiness must constitute "a rule for guidance in international affairs." He reasured the conservative Bostonians that "this rule fills the ideal of the true spirit of Japan in her dealings with you and with the world." How far the artistic Japanese forgery and flattery have succeeded to accomplish the untold diplomatic purpose, might be imagined by a reading of those comments and remarks made by the distinquished Americans in Ishii's audience. Don C. Seitz of the "New York World," saw more virtue in the Japanese than in other war missions of the year. "The other gentlemen all came to the U. S. to get something; but these (Japanese) gentlemen have come to give us something." An experienced diplomat, Elihu Root, was almost hypnotized by Ishii. His admiration of the Japanese statesman led him to say that the "frankness and charm" of the latter's expression "awakened kindly interest, and the authentic character of his statements carried conviction."

"The people of America, who now hold their foreign affairs in their hands," said Root, "wish to be forever friends and brethren of the people of Japan." Fortunately or unfortunately for Mr. Root, it was Lansing and not he who knew the secret negotiations this time. Perhaps he would not have been so optimistic about international relations, had he been in the place of Mr. Lansing.

From August to November the American public was cheered and flattered by Ishii, who never tolerated any open negotiation with a democratic people. Addressing the national press club in Washington Sept. 21, 1917, he said, "I have not told anyone what I have said in the pleasant conversations I have had with the officials in Washington, and I do not believe for a moment that the high officials have told anyone either." "There are. . .some things which can not be openly discussed, because of a wise embargo upon unwise disclosures." Even on the day when

the formal notes exchanged beween Lansing and Ishii were published, the American Secretary of State remarked, "at the present time it is inexpedient to make public the details of these conversations." In view of the fact that China had been more cordial with America since her entrance into war in August,—a relation regarded by Japan with much apprehension; and that the loss of Russia from the ranks of the Allies, pointing to a decided need of unity of counsel and of effort between America and Japan, there seems reason for the belief that a certain amount of pressure was brought to bear on America to recognize the aspirations of Japan in China. This the United States apparently yielded to Japan at the expense of China and of her own interests, for after a series of conferences in Washington between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii, the agreement was issued on November second.

There are two important clauses in this agreement; that the United States recognzied Japan's "special interests" in China; and that both the United States and Japan repledged themselves to observe the principle of the "open door" and the territorial integrity of China. The terms here are self-contradictory. "Special interests" imply special privileges, either commercial or political. These privileges are in direct contradiction with "open door." "special interests" only mean the mild beginning of creating exclusive interests. The same sort of contradiction had existed in the treaty between Great Britain and Japan, made in 1905, concerning Korea. Three months after this treaty, a Japanese protectorate was established over Korea; five years later Korea was formally annexed. The Lansing-Ishii agreement aroused a great fear, especially on the part of China, that history would repeat itself.

The term "special interest" is obviously vague. It may mean anything to Japan. In this vagueness of meaning there is possibility of future misunderstanding. The Japanese had understood such a possibility. Motono

was "of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than would the United States." A Japanese writer, Mr. Tomimas, regarded "special interests" a decided advantage to Japan, for he said, "U. S. saw it a wise policy to offer Japan a present of 'special interests' in China for Viscount Ishii's pocket . . rather than to touch the delicate questions at home, especially under unfavorable circumstances in the course of the present war." On the clause of "special interest" itself, he commented that, "it is only fair. . . to leave these questions to be interpreted in practical politics under actual circumstances which develop from time to time."

It was stated in the agreement that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries," and that consequently Japan was entitled to the "special privileges" named. We know that territorial propinquity exists between the U. S. and Canada; the former desired special relations of reciprocity; but, when Canada did not wish to enter into these relations, there was no question of using force to accomplish them. Territorial propinquity does not seem to be a sufficient reason for acquiring special privileges against the will of the people concerned. Furthermore, if territorial propinquity were generally recognized by the other powers as creating special relations, "the Philippines have a propinquity to China differing only a little in degree and not at all in kind from that which Japan and her insular possessions have. If the propinquity of the latter is a basis for special interests, what becomes of that of the former?"

The Lansing-Ishii agreement has not a bit of effect upon the aggression of Japan in China, just as the Root-Takahira agreement in 1908 did not check in the least Japan's designs so manifestly shown in the Twenty-One Demands. The two agreements resemble each other in that both the contracting parties pledged themselves to the principes of the "open door" policy and the